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Introduction
Gilbert Ryle opens his paper Categories (1938) by remarking that “doctrines of
categories and theories of types are explorations in the same field.” He goes on to show
how in particular Aristotle’s doctrine of categories can be seen as a special case of the
theory of types. That particular proposal will not be defended here, but a principle
underlying Ryle’s argument serves to organize what follows: categories, or types, and
logical syntax are closely affiliated notions. It will be argued that Aristotle’s as well
as Kant’s categories are close associates of what I shall call syllogistic syntax, namely
a logical syntax that takes the form ‘S is P ’ as basic; while type theory is a close
associate of function–argument syntax, namely a logical syntax that takes the form
f(a), function applied to argument, as basic.
The dissertation is divided into two chapters, the first dealing with syllogistic
syntax and the second with function–argument syntax. The traditional doctrine of
categories and type theory each invite different sets of reflection. A discussion in one
chapter is therefore in general not mirrored by a discussion in the other chapter, and
neither does a discussion in one chapter in general depend on one in the other; but
certain themes from the first chapter recur in the second; and it is hoped that the
first chapter adds depth and perspective to the second. Apart from the relation of
categories to logical syntax, recurring themes are the generality of the categories and
the nature of the items categorized. Throughout, our emphasis is on logical aspects
of categories. For an overview of the content of each chapter the reader is referred to
the table of contents and to the synopses at the beginning of each chapter.
The most important contribution of this dissertation, to my mind, is the map
it presents of a large range of conceptions of category and type, indeed of most
such conceptions that are of relevance to logic. The map drawn in chapter 1 is
one in which Aristotle’s categories, the parts of speech, and Kant’s categories all
find their place. It requires less ecumenical effort to synthesize the various notion
of type that have been salient in the logico-philosophical debate since the time of
Frege and Russell; but I am not aware of any such effort of the same extent as
that documented in chapter 2 below. A dissertation must, however, do more than
just report on existing speculations pertaining to a certain topic. In chapter 2 we
enter into several current debates, in particular debates concerning category mistakes,
Frege’s problem of the concept horse, sortal concepts, and generality. We give an
introduction to Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory and argue for its relevance
to these debates. In chapter 2 we moreover deal with various exegetical issues, for
instance the relation between the pairs function/argument and function/object in
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Frege’s works; the role of the notion of range of significance in Russell’s type theories;
and the proper understanding of Husserl’s pure grammar in relation to categorial
grammar. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the notion of material categories,
with which we leave the domain of logic and enter that of phenomenology. A thorough
treatment of that topic therefore lies outside the scope of this dissertation. Chapter 1
is more historical in character, but I have tried to avoid painstaking exegesis; not
that there is anything wrong with painstaking exegesis, but it would be out of place
in a work with a scope as broad as the current one. Besides the synthesis already
mentioned, the main contributions of chapter 1 are found in its sections 1 and 2, in
particular in their examination, firstly, of the items categorized by, and secondly, of
the generality of Aristotle’s categories.
A definition of the notion of category will not be provided in the current work.
Instead we shall study different notions of category already present in the philosophical
literature. In that regard the work is an historical one. The bits of history that we
do, however, are motivated by systematical concerns. We rarely consider historical
causes and historical consequences; and we generally ignore historical contexts. Our
main aim is not to understand the history of the notions of category and type, but
to understand these notions themselves. In that regard the work has systematical
aspirations. But whether the pudding offered here contains systematical fruits can
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CHAPTER 1
Categories and Syllogistic Syntax
1
Synopsis
In this chapter we study various traditional doctrines of categories: Aristotle’s
doctrine, the grammatical doctrine of the parts of speech, and Kant’s doctrine. The
main point of attention is Aristotle’s doctrine of categories; the discussions of the
parts of speech and of Kant’s categories are both set against that background.
In the first section we consider the question of what the items are that fall under
Aristotle’s categories. We argue that these are terms in the sense of syllogistics. The
starting point of the second section is the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s
categories as highest genera. This motivates a study of the so-called predicables,
of which genus is one. We argue that Aristotle’s categories are not highest genera,
but rather classes of terms. The nature of items categorized is taken up again in
section 3. Terms are linguistic in nature. We report on an ancient thesis that the
items categorized are linguistic and argue against a recent contention that the category
scheme in chapter 4 of the Categories differ from that in chapter I.9 of the Topics. The
doctrine of parts of speech is introduced in the fourth section. We look at elements
of its early history and its relation to Aristotle’s categories. In section 5 we suggest a
view of the relation of Kant’s categories to those of Aristotle in terms of the distinction
between categorematic and syncategorematic terms. There we also consider various
ways of “deriving” the categories from certain other notions.
2
1. Items categorized
In order to understand what sorts of items fall under Aristotle’s categories it is
natural to look to chapter 4 of the Categories, where the categories are first introduced
(the list can be found in Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter (p. 66)). They are
said there to collect “things said without combination” (ta kata mēdemian symplokēn
legōmena).1 Section 1.1 investigates this and related notions in Aristotle’s work; it
is proposed that items categorized are terms in the technical sense of syllogistics. It
is sometimes held that items categorized are predicates; this view is scrutinized in
section 1.2 and shown when properly understood to be subsumed by the view that
items categorized are terms.
1.1. Things said without combination. The examples of things said without
combination that Aristotle lists in chapter 4 of the Categories include ‘man’, ‘white’,
‘four-foot’, ‘double’, ‘in the Lyceum’; as examples of things said with combination
he lists in chapter 2 of the same work ‘man runs’ and ‘man wins’. But apart from
these examples Aristotle gives only a negative characterization of the notion: being
said with combination is a prerequisite for being true or false. That truth and falsity
presupposes combination is a claim one finds not only in the Categories (2a10, 13b10),
but at several places in Aristotle’s works,2 and it may be regarded as one of the main
theses of Plato’s Sophist. It is in fact reasonable to assume that Aristotle with his
notion of thing said without combination alludes to this work of his teacher.3 Plato
there (261d–263d) notes that a logos comes to be when certain spoken sounds (phōnai)
“fit together.”4 A list of verbs such as ‘walks runs sleeps’ remains a list, as does a list of
nouns such as ‘lion stag horse’, for these words do not fit together. But when a noun
and a verb are combined,5 as in ‘Socrates walks’, the words fit, and the result is a logos.
Things said without combination would therefore be the elements combined in a logos.
1We follow Ackrill in using ‘thing said’ as the translation of legomenon, a participle of legō; thus the ‘thing’
is supplied by the English.
2Int 16a11, DA III.6 430b2, Met E.4 1027b19. Whereas the Categories speaks only of symplokē, these
cited places uses the pair of terms synthesis (combination) and diaresis (separation). It is clear from the
cited DA passage that Aristotle sees a close parallel between combination and separation, so for ease of
exposition I shall omit separation from the discussion. For the claim that a term by itself is not yet a
proposition, see also Top 101b26–28.
3As was perhaps first noted by Trendelenburg (1846, pp. 11–12).
4Plato was probably reacting to “the problems of predication” raised by Parmenides and Antisthenes: how
is false, and how is non-tautological predication possible? (cf. Nuchelmans, 1973, pp. 9–12) The problem of
falsity (and non-being) is a main theme throughout the greater part of the Sophist. Antisthenes’s problem
of non-tautological predication is raised at 244c: “Surely it is absurd for someone to agree that there are
two names when he maintains that there’s only one thing” (cf. 251b–c).
5Plato uses both the noun symplokē (262c6) and a participle of the corresponding verb symplekō (262d4)
to describe this combination of noun and verb.
3
Let us not worry now about the fact that Plato calls these elements noun and verb;
as we shall see in the next paragraph Aristotle introduces a different terminology, and
as we shall see in section 4.1, he reserves ‘noun’ and ‘verb’ for making more purely
grammatical distinctions.
The notion of logos that Plato describes in the Sophist is taken over by Aristotle
with his notion of logos apophantikos, translated by Ackrill as ‘statement-making
sentence’. This is a sentence in which there is truth or falsity (Int 17a2); hence
it is a thing said with combination. Moreover, it says something of something (ti
kata tinos, 17a25). Thus, firstly, a statement-making sentence is a combination, and
secondly, it says something of something. It is reasonable therefore to suggest that
what is combined in a statement-making sentence are the two “somethings” of the
formula ‘something of something’, namely the something said of something else and
the something else of which that something is said. In the context of Aristotle’s
syllogistics these are both called terms (APr 24b16):
I call a term that into which a proposition is resolved, that is, what
is predicated and what it is predicated of, with the addition of to
be or not to be.
What is here called a proposition (protasis) is “a sentence (logos) affirming or deny-
ing something of something” (APr I.1 24a16), and thus coincides with the notion of
a statement-making sentence as defined in the De Interpretatione. Instead of “some-
things” this definition speaks of ‘what is predicated’ and ‘what it is predicated of’,
and baptizes these things ‘terms’. Since a statement-making sentence was taken to
be a combination of the two “somethings” in the formula ‘something of something’, it
can therefore also be said to be a combination of terms: a statement-making sentence
is a combination of terms.
The phrase ‘with the addition of to be or not to be’ in the quoted passage pre-
sumably refers to the copula. Thus, there are the terms S and P and the addition
of to be or not to be in the shape of the copula. The proposition is therefore as-
sumed to have the form ‘S is P ’, the basic form of the syntax of syllogistics. Not
all statement-making sentences are of this form, however: ‘man runs’, for instance,
is not. If a combination of terms has the form ‘S is P ’, it may therefore be asked
whether all statement-making sentences are combinations of terms. Aristotle can be
viewed as dealing with this question in chapter 10 of the De Interpretatione, where he
argues that an important class of statement-making sentences is reducible to syllogis-
tic form. Aristotle distinguishes the three forms of simple statement-making sentence
illustrated by the following examples.
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(1) man is (not)
(2) man is (not) recovering
(3) man recovers/does not recover.
Here (2) is of syllogistic form, and Aristotle holds that (3) is reducible to (2): replacing
the finite verb ‘recovers’ in (3) by a copula and a participle we get ‘man is recovering’.6
Aristotle says little about the first form, and the reason is perhaps that it is difficult
to see that it involves any combination at all.7 In fact, when Brentano in the 19th
century suggested a revision of logical syntax, taking the form (1), ‘S exists (not)’, as
basic, he did so partly on the grounds of a conviction that not all judgements involve
a combination.8 However that may be, Aristotle disregards this form in his logic, and
his reduction of (3) to (2) allows him to concentrate on the form ‘S is P ’, and that
is a combination of terms. But if a thing said with combination is a combination of
terms, then a thing said without combination must be a term; hence we propose to
identify things said without combination with terms. The proposal is therefore also
that items categorized by Aristotle’s categories are terms.
In the Analytics Aristotle gives many examples of terms, including ‘there being
a single science’ (to mian einai epistēmēn, APr I.36) and ‘there is knowledge of the
good, that it is good’ (tou agathou estin epistēmē hoti agathon, APr I.38). Hence one
sees that terms need not be of the simple form exhibited by ‘man’ and ‘white’, but
may have a varying degree of complexity. In APr I.35 Aristotle in fact distinguishes
between simple and complex terms, calling the former onomata and the latter logoi
(48a29–30). But if a term is a thing said without combination, then we need to un-
derstand the complexity of a complex term otherwise than as the sort of combination
yielding a thing said with combination. To that end let us first consider the word
logos, employed by Aristotle for complex terms.9
According to the De Interpretatione a logos is a significant spoken sound that
has parts significant in separation, while an onoma is a significant spoken sound that
does not have parts significant in separation. Ackrill translates logos in this context
as ‘sentence’. Hence, as a sentence is presumably a thing said with combination, one
is led to think that having parts significant in separation is just the same as being said
with combination. A more thorough examination shows that such an identification
6The same reduction is made at Met ∆.7 1017a27ff..
7Alexander of Aprhodisias (in APr 15,15–15,23) argues that this form as well is reducible to the first form,
namely as ‘man is being’, hence with ‘being’ as the predicate term. This view is not compatible with our
interpretation, since it would force us to assign a category to ‘being’.
8Brentano first presents his revision of syllogistic syntax in the seventh chapter of Psychologie vom em-
pirischen Standpunkt (Brentano, 1874, pp. 271–289).
9For the following cf. the similar considerations of Moravcsik (1968, pp. 126–135).
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cannot be upheld. The translation of logos as ‘sentence’ is not compatible with
Aristotle’s terminology in APr I.35, where it means complex term; but that may be
just another instance of the famous polysemy of this Greek word. There are, however,
reasons to think that this is not so. In Poetics 20, a chapter that repeats almost
verbatim the definition of logos given in the De Interpretatione, Aristotle on the one
hand says that there are logoi without verbs, hence sub-sentential units, and on the
other hand he calls the Illiad, a super-sentential unit, a logos (cf. APo II.10 93b35).
Thus, the word logos seems to signify complex sayings quite generally.10 Nothing in
Aristotle’s definition of logos at Int 4 and Poet 20 excludes such an interpretation,
and even in the De Interpretatione (16a21) one finds an example of a sub-sentential
unit, namely ‘white field’, being called a logos (cf. Int 17a16). That a logos need
not be a thing said with combination is in fact confirmed by the example ‘rational
mortal animal’. This phrase, or whatever one takes to be the definition of man, is
a logos according to Poet 1457a25; but it is synonymous to ‘man’, since a defined
term is synonymous to its definition (Cat 1a6); but ‘man’ is a thing said without
combination (Cat 1a19); hence, on the reasonable assumption that two synonymous
phrases are either both said with or both said without combination it follows that
‘rational mortal animal’ must also be a thing said without combination. We cannot
therefore identify the two notions of having parts significant in separation and being
said with combination, for there are items having parts significant in separation that
are not said with combination.
This is not to say that there are no logoi that are things said with combination:
statement-making sentences, logoi apophantikoi, are precisely that. We thus have a
genus of logos, defined as a sign having parts significant in separation, with the two
species under it of complex terms on the one hand and things said with combination on
the other. These are species of logos, and so are complex sayings, but they differ in the
nature of their complexity: on the one hand we have the complexity pertinent to terms
and on the other the complexity pertinent to sentences. A similar distinction has been
drawn in more recent times by Jespersen (1924, esp. pp. 96–144) between what he calls
nexus and junction. A junction is a complex term, typically generated by adding one
or more qualifiers to a simple term (ibid. pp. 108–114); so it has parts significant in
separation in Aristotle’s sense. A nexus is a sentence or a sentence-like combination
(ibid. esp. pp. 117–122), corresponding to Aristotle’s thing said with combination.
That a nexus need only be sentence-like means that the notion comprehends apart
from sentences—be it as main or subordinate clauses—also accusatives with infinitive
10Barnes (2007, p. 180) translates logos in this context as ‘saying’, while the German translation of Wei-
demann (2002) uses Wortgefüge.
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and the combination of a verbal or adjectival noun with a genitive, as in ‘the doctor’s
arrival’. Like Aristotle, Jespersen relies on our intuitive grasp of the difference between
these two manners of combination, and the only general characterization he offers are
elucidations of a junction as “lifeless, stiff, rigid” and as “a single idea,” and of a
nexus as “having life in it,” being “pliable, as it were, animate and articulated” and
“always containing two ideas which must necessarily remain separate” (ibid. pp. 115–
116). We have maybe reached a point here where crisp descriptions must give in, and
elucidations by means of metaphors or otherwise take their place.
In any event we must distinguish complex terms from sentences. Complex terms
have parts significant in separation, but are not said with combination; sentences are
things said with combination. A simple term must then be a term that has no parts
significant in separation. As is seen from a discussion in Porphyry’s commentary on
the Categories (3rd century AD), this definition is problematic. Porphyry maintains
that verbs in the first-person as well as certain idiomatic third-person forms are, even
when said by themselves, things said with combination.11 Although the subject is
not then expressed, it is implicit in the verbs themselves (in Cat 87,38ff.).12 Among
these idiomatic third-person forms Porphyry counted ‘it rains’, in Greek expressed
by the one word huei.13 According to Aristotle’s definition of the verb (Int 16b6),
it is a sign having no parts significant in separation. A verb is therefore a simple
term according to the suggested definition. If Porphyry is right, however, some verbs
are also things said with combination. Verbs of the kind Porphyry points to would
therefore be counterexamples to the identification of simple terms with words having
no parts significant in separation.
Until now we have assumed, as Aristotle also did, that a simple term is a simple
expression and a complex term a complex expression. We have in effect twice found
that simplicity of expression cannot be used as an indicator of saying without com-
bination: there are complex terms, such as ‘mortal rational animal’, that say things
11Cf. Wittgenstein’s remark (TLP 4.032) that the simple sign ambulo is composite.
12This view was shared by Ammonius in his discussion of the same problem at in Int 28,11–28,28.
13According to Porphyry huei has ‘Zeus’ as implicit subject. This appears to have been the common
construal of the sentence among the Greeks (cf. Miklosich, 1883, p. 7). Brentano held, supported by the
work of Miklosich (ibid.), to the contrary that such sentences are truly subjectless (cf. Brentano, 1925,
pp. 183–187). Subjectless sentences, as they were sometimes called, were in fact much discussed among
19th century logicians (in lecture notes from 1917 Husserl (1996, p. 172) speaks of “die endlose Literatur”
on this topic). Herbart, who was among the first to deal with subjectless judgements in the context of
syllogistic syntax did so by construing their subject to have no content (and therefore maximum extension);
see Herbart (1837, § 63). See the entry on Subjektlose Sätze in Eisler ’s Wörterbuch der philosophischen
Begriffen for an overview of what various other authors said on this matter.
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without combination as well as simple terms, such as huei, that say things with com-
bination. But the notion we are after is perhaps not simplicity of expression, but
rather simplicity of meaning. Another commentator, Ammonius (5th century AD),
held that a thing said without combination is what has both a simple meaning and a
simple expression (in Cat 32,26–33,4):
For (1) we can use a simple expression (phōnē) with a compound
meaning (sēmainomenon), as when I say trechō (‘I run’), for I
refer to myself and to my action; (2) the expression may be com-
pound but its meaning simple, as in ‘mortal rational animal’, for
the expression is compound, but its meaning is man; (3) both may
be compound, as when I say ‘Socrates runs’; or (4) both may be
simple, as the categories themselves.
Ammonius here assumes that we have a means of recognizing a compound meaning
in a simple expression and a simple meaning in a compound expression. But what
are such means? We seem to have a good grasp of the distinction between what is
sentential and what is not, and on that basis we may settle such cases as trechō and
‘Socrates runs’. Moreover, if we know of an expression that it has simple meaning,
then we can infer that its definition will have simple meaning, as in ‘mortal rational
animal’. These seem to be the means of recognition of compound meaning implicit
in Ammonius’s examples. It is clear that they leave many cases unsettled. ‘White
man’ is a compound expression, but does it have a compound meaning? Defining
‘Whan’ to mean ‘white man’, does ‘whan’ have a simple meaning?14 One chapter
in the Organon that could be taken to deal with such questions is Int 11, but it is
not clear what it says on the matter; as Barnes (2007, p. 130) notes, it “obscures
rather than illuminates.” Indeed, no general test for the simplicity or otherwise of the
meaning of an expression is forthcoming, it seems to me.
We are primarily seeking instruction on the sort of item that is categorized by
Aristotle’s categories. Perhaps it is possible to make progress on that matter without
first explicating the nature of the complexity of a complex term and the simplicity of a
simple term. It seems reasonable to say that if a term t is of category C, then adding
a suitable qualifier (e.g. an adjectival, adverbial, or prepositional phrase) to t yields a
new term belonging to the same category C, even though the qualifier taken by itself
may be of another category C ′. For instance, a white man is a man and therefore a
substance, even though white is a quality. Ackrill (1963, pp. 73–74) holds that ‘white
14This question is in effect raised by Ackrill (1963, p. 73); Barnes (2007, pp. 132–133) discusses it and
related questions.
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man’ does not fall into any category, for it “introduces two items from two categories.”
But it seems like an unnecessary restriction on the scope of Aristotle’s category theory
if qualified terms could not be said to belong to a category. Man, let us assume, is
defined as rational animal. Hence, if man belongs to the category of substance,
then rational animal does as well. But in ‘rational animal’ we have two items from
two categories. That a qualified term belongs to a category is thus presupposed by
the practice of definition. More specifically, the doctrine of definition by proximate
genus and differentiae seems to presuppose that a qualified term belongs to the same
category as its head. The proximate genus, namely, must belong to the same category
as the defined term, although the differentiae need not do so.15 Could there be other
rules apart from qualification for generating categorized terms? Conjunctions such
as ‘Plato and Socrates’ or ‘walking or conversing’ could perhaps be called complex
substances and complex actions, but to a conjunction such as ‘cuts while being cut’
it is not possible to assign a category since it conjoins an action and an affection.16
The foregoing suggests that if we were to supply syllogistics with category spec-
ifications, then we should have to assume a regimented language of some form. The
problems surrounding the notion of simple term suggest that these would have to
be laid down by fiat, and each assigned a category. From the simple terms new
terms would be generated by formation rules formulated such that each term could
be assigned a category in some sense consistent with the category of the terms from
which the new term was generated. These formation rules would include a rule of
qualification that would take, say, a substance term and a quality term and yield a
substance term; more generally, we should need to stipulate which kind of term may
qualify others, and what the category of the qualified term should be. Besides there
could be rules such as intra-categorial conjunction. Assuming, as we do here, that
items categorized are terms, such formation rules would also determine the extension
of the concept of a term: each term belongs to a category; what does not belong to
a category is not a term. It would presumably follow that Aristotle’s example of a
15 Morrison (1993) argues convincingly that P ’s being a differentia of S does not determine its category
(e.g. it need not be of the same category as S). An important assumption of Morrison’s is a distinction
between categories of predication and ontological categories. I shall argue in section 3.2 below that this
distinction is not Aristotelian; to my mind, the true Aristotelian pendant of Morrison’s “categories of
predication” are the predicables (substance as a category of predication corresponds to the predicable of
genus, while quality as a category of predication corresponds to the predicable of differentia (on which
Aristotle was not quite clear, see section 2.1.2 below)). I am grateful to Donald Morrison for sending me
a copy of his paper.
16Conjunction of terms was regarded by Porphyry as one of two ways of saying with combination (in
Cat 71,5). Simplicius in Cat 71,18 holds that a verb in the middle voice will signify both an action and
an affection, and so may not be categorized.
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complex term ‘there being a single science’ is in fact not a term. It is not a term since
it cannot be assigned a category. That appears not to raise a problem, however, since
the sentence Aristotle wishes to formalize, ‘Of contraries there is a single science’, is
simply not formalizable in syllogistic syntax.
1.2. Subject and predicate. Plato noted that any proposition (logos) is about
something and says something of that thing (Sophist 262e–263d). In effect he thereby
drew the now traditional distinction between the subject and the predicate of a propo-
sition. As a definition of this pair of notions there are certainly shortcomings in saying
merely that the subject is (that which signifies) what the proposition is about while
the predicate is what is said of that thing; for as Ryle (1933) noted, ‘about’ has many
meanings.17 ‘Peter’ is the subject of ‘Peter loves Mary’; but instead of saying that
this sentence is about Peter we may perhaps equally well say that it is about loving
Mary; that is, it is about loving Mary and says that this is a characteristic of Peter.18
To this one could object, rightfully I think, that the original sentence was not ‘loving
Mary is a characteristic of Peter’, but rather ‘Peter loves Mary’, and it is only the first
of these that allows the suggested analysis. So the sentence ‘Peter loves Mary’ is not
about loving Mary; but could we not say that it is about Mary, predicating Peter’s
loving her of her?19 As a foolproof definition of the notions of subject and predicate is
not needed for our purposes, that is a question I shall not attempt to answer here.20
That we grasp the distinction seems enough for what follows; and I take it as an
unproblematic assumption that at least speakers of English do so. We have practiced
that grasp as schoolchildren analyzing sentences, and again when applying the rule
S→ N + VP in exercises of generative syntax.
The tradition is not always clear whether subject and predicate are linguistic or
other sorts of items. Aristotle, for instance, vacillates at this point, taking subject
and predicate now to belong to the level of logos (APr 24b16ff.), now to the level of
17The definition of what a proposition is “absolutely about” defended by Goodman (1961) is of little use in
defining the notion subject, since it entails (cf. ibid. pp. 9–10) both that ‘Socrates is identical to himself’
is not about Socrates and that ‘Cows are animals’ is about the class of non-cows.
18This point was made by Ramsey (1925b, p. 404).
19Geach (1962), who defined a subject of a sentence S as “an expression for something that S is about” (p.
23), insisted that ‘Mary’ in fact is a subject of ‘Peter loves Mary’.
20Apart from Geach, Strawson has written extensively on the distinction from the point of view of philos-
ophy (cf. esp. his 1959, Part II; 1971; 1974). He regards the case where the subject is singular as basic and
the general case as derived from this (1974, esp. pp. 35–36, 125–132), though he never offers anything like a
definition of the general case. For a treatment from the point of view of linguistics, see Lyons (1968, ch. 8),
who notes, for instance, that case may not be a foolproof indicator of what is the subject of a proposition.
In some languages, namely, the case of what is the “goal” of a transitive verb is also the case of the subject
of an intransitive verb; hence the subject (or “actor”) of a transitive verb will here not be in the same case
as the subject of an intransitive verb (ibid., pp. 340–342).
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pragma (Int 17a40).21 According to the Stoics a predicate is a “deficient lekton,” hence
not an expression, but rather something like Fregean sense (DL VII.63). Ammonius
(in Int 7,30), on the other hand, speaks of subject and predicate as vocal sounds
(phōnai). In the more recent treatments of Geach (1962) and Strawson (1974) subject
and predicate are understood to be expressions, and that is the practice we shall follow
here. Thus we take ‘Peter’ and not Peter to be the subject of ‘Peter loves her’. Peter
himself may rather be said to be the topic of the proposition. Likewise ‘loves her’ is
the predicate of ‘Peter loves her’, while loving Mary may be called the comment of
the proposition, relating to the topic as the predicate relates to the subject.22
One might ask whether characterizing subject and predicate is what Plato in fact
does at the place in question; might the characteristics he states not just be yet other
characteristics of noun and verb? Indeed, in his examples illustrating the distinction
it is always a noun that serves the former role and a verb that serves the latter. In that
respect the examples are deceptive, for they all consist of only two words. Consider
instead the following sentence.
A young Norwegian mathematician who came from a poor family
and died at the age of 26 proved that there is no general solution
by radicals to quintic equations.
Here we should say that the first part ‘A young. . . the age of 26’ is the subject, while
the rest is the predicate. But then one sees that there is no limit to the complexity
of the subject and the predicate of a proposition, in particular, that they do not have
to be single nouns and verbs respectively. One sees, moreover, that there may be
noun phrases embedded in the predicate and verb phrases embedded in the subject.
The fundamental contrast between subject and predicate on the one hand and noun
and verb on the other lies, however, not in matters of complexity. The fundamental
contrast lies in the fact that subject and predicate, unlike noun and verb, are rela-
tive notions. It is only in the context of a proposition that it makes sense to speak
of subject and predicate. By contrast, a word is a noun or a verb, and a phrase a
21For more examples, see Barnes (2007, pp. 114–123).
22The pair of terms ‘topic’ and ‘comment’ seems to stem from Hockett (cf. Lyons 1968, p. 335 and OED
on ‘topic’) but ‘topic’ is found with what must be the same meaning in Jespersen (1924, p. 146). A similar
pair of notions is that of psychological subject and predicate, introduced by Von der Gabelentz (1869, p.
378): “ich nenne das, woran, worüber ich den Angeredeten denken lassen will, das psychologische Subject,
das, was er darüber denken soll, das psychologische Prädicat.”
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noun phrase or a verb phrase, independently of its occurring in any given proposi-
tion.23 Thus one speaks of the grammatical or logical roles or functions of subject
and predicate in contrast to the parts of speech or word classes of noun and verb.
Our interest here is in propositions of syllogistic syntax, ‘S is P ’. As instances of
this form we should, however, count not only ‘Peter loves Mary’ (analyzed as ‘Peter is
loving Mary’) or ‘man is mortal’, but also ‘some men are bald’ and ‘some men are not
philosophers’. In general, a proposition of syllogistic syntax is determined not by its
terms alone, but by its terms together with what is traditionally called its quantity
and quality (and in modal syllogistics, its modality as well).24 These are aspects of
the proposition indicating whether the predicate is said of all or of some S’s, and
whether it is in fact said or rather denied of these. There is therefore a question
whether, in ‘some men are bald’, one should count ‘some men’ or only ‘men’ by itself
as the subject. A grammarian would presumably choose the former alternative (and
would again realize the problem of defining the subject in terms of what the sentence
is about: which men is ‘some men is bald’ about?). I am inclined towards choosing
the latter, that is, towards saying that the term S by itself is the subject. For if the
quantifier is counted as part of the subject term, then by symmetry we should also
have to count negation as part of the predicate in a negative proposition; that is, we
should have to countenance negative terms. It is unclear, however, what for instance
a non-man is: whether it is an angel, or any substance whatsoever which is not a
man, or something else. Fortunately, whether we say that ‘some men’ or rather that
‘men’ is the subject makes no difference to what follows.
A related question is whether P by itself or rather the phrase ‘is P ’ should be
viewed as the predicate of a syllogistic proposition. According to the stipulations of
Geach (1962, p. 22ff.) it is ‘is P ’ which is the predicate; likewise, the grammarian
Jespersen (1924, p. 150) calls P by itself the predicative of the proposition and ‘is P ’
its predicate. The view that P alone is the predicate can be found in Alexander of
Aphrodisias (in APr 15,2ff.) and Ammonius (in Int 7,30ff.), in the Port-Royal Logic
(Part II ch. 3) and in the Jäsche Logik (§ 24); let us quote Mill (1843, Bk. I ch. 1 §
2), however, who is conveniently explicit about the matter:
Every proposition consists of three parts: the Subject, the Pred-
icate, and the Copula. The predicate is the name denoting that
which is affirmed or denied. The subject is the name denoting the
23Cf. Chomsky (1965, pp. 68–70), who notes that in one and the same sentence the same word may serve
as the subject of one verb phrase and as the object of the other; thus in ‘John was persuaded by Bill to
leave’ ‘John’ is, according to Chomsky, the object of ‘persuade’ but the subject of ‘leave’.
24For this terminology, see section 4.3 below.
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person or thing which something is affirmed or denied of. The cop-
ula is the sign denoting that there is an affirmation or denial, and
thereby enabling the hearer or reader to distinguish a proposition
from any other kind of discourse. Thus, in the proposition, The
earth is round, the Predicate is the word round . . .
Mill thus takes the predicate not to include the copula. It seems to be mainly a
matter of convention whether we decide for the one or for the other terminology, but
it is important for our discussion here to have recognized both options.
In Aristotle’s Greek katēgoria sometimes means ‘predicate’. He says at Cat 3a36
that “from a primary substance there is no predicate (katēgoria),” and at Int 21a29
he speaks of predicates (katēgoriai) “containing no contrariety” (where ‘dead’ is taken
to contain a contrariety to ‘man’, since a dead man is not a man). Hence, in light of
Aristotle’s introducing the categories in Topics I.9 (and at APo 83b15) as genē tōn
katēgoriōn, genera of predicates,25 we should ask whether items categorized are not
terms but rather predicates. A positive answer to this question seems presupposed in
the traditional designation of the categories in Latin as praedicamenta, that which is
predicated.26 Which answer one ought to give depends on how one understands the
notion of predicate in syllogistic syntax.
If such a predicate is taken to be of the form ‘is P ’, then it is clear already
on grammatical grounds that items categorized are not predicates. For Aristotle
gives ‘man’ as an example of the category of substance, where no ‘is’ is to be found.
To this it may be objected that in a Greek predication the ‘is’ is optional, thus
one can say, for instance, ho Sokratēs anthōpos; hence, whereas ‘is man’ is not an
Aristotelian substance, what is a substance is ‘man’ when said of something, that is,
when predicated. Thus a predicate is a term qua predicated, whether or not an ‘is’ be
attached to it.27 At Cat 3a36 Aristotle said that “from a primary substance there is no
25Frede (1981, pp. 32–35) argues that katēgoria in the Topics generally should be rendered ‘predication’,
thus taken to signify a full proposition. But at Top I.9 Aristotle says that whatever is an accident,
genus, property, or definition belongs to the genē tōn katēgoriōn, and whatever is one of these is not a
full proposition, but a predicate as is clear from Top I.4 101b26–27: “none of these [i.e., whatever is an
accident, genus, etc.] said by itself is a proposition or problem [i.e., a predication].” For further criticism
of Frede’s argument, see Ebert (1985, p. 130, fn. 29).
26Martianus Capella, The Marriage of Philology and Mercury IV.362, 383 (early 5th century AD), speaks
of the categories as praedicationes, but Boethius translates (early 6th century AD) katēgoria in the relevant
sense as praedicamentum, hence at Cat 10b19,21 and at Porphyry Isag 4.15; 4.21; 6.7 (see e.g. the relevant
volumes of Aristoteles Latinus). In fact, Augustine refers to Aristotle’s categories as praedicamenta at
Confessions IV.16.29 (around 400 AD); on the Latin translation he made use of cf. Minio-Paluello (1945,
pp. 65–68).
27This appears to be the position of Apelt (1891), who says, for instance, that the categories are “Arten
der Begriffe, inwiefern und wie sie im Urteil als Prädikate auftreten” (p. 128).
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predicate.” This I interpret to mean that a primary substance by itself cannot serve
as a predicate. That is to say, a primary substance, such as ‘Socrates’ or ‘Bucephalus’,
cannot by itself be predicated of anything. But primary substances are substances,
and therefore items categorized. Hence, ‘Socrates’ is an item categorized that is not
a predicate in the relevant sense. Items categorized can therefore not be identified
with predicates as predicated, since primary substances are not such things.28
If, however, a predicate is understood simply as the P of ‘S is P ’, then we may
well say that items categorized are predicates. For in Aristotle’s logical syntax the
terms S and P are syntactically similar; that is to say, whatever is an S of one
proposition can be the P of another, and vice versa.29 That principle is presupposed
by Aristotle’s proof method of conversion, which is fundamental to syllogistics’ being
more than just a list of valid moods, namely also a system for reducing imperfect
moods to perfect ones (APr I.4–6). By the principle of syntactic similarity any term
may be a P , and so the class of terms coincides with what may be a P , hence so
does the class of items categorized. The syntactic similarity of terms means that the
category of a term has no influence on the syntactic properties of a term: terms will
in general differ in category, but they are always syntactically similar. As we shall see
in the next chapter (esp. section 1.3), this is a point at which syllogistic syntax parts
ways with Fregean function–argument syntax. In the latter the category of a term—
function of a certain order and kind, or object—determines the kinds of syntactic
relations into which it may enter—a first-level unary function, for instance, can never
be substituted for an object.
If items categorized are terms, then primary substances are singular terms. Fol-
lowing what we just said, a singular term is syntactically similar with all other terms,
although it signifies an individual. It is clear from APr I.33, where Aristotle considers
terms such as ‘Aristomenes’ and ‘Mikkalos’, that he countenances singular terms in
syllogistics. The question then arises how to accommodate this with Cat 3a36, the
statement that there is no predicate from a primary substance. Indeed, independently
of the identification of primary substances with singular terms the question arises of
how to interpret a proposition whose P is a singular term. One possible answer is to
say that the copula in this case must be understood as the ‘is’ of identity. A better
answer to my mind is to say that the singular term P must be understood as a general
term satisfied by P alone, namely as an “individual concept.” This suggestion also
28Considerations along these lines are the reasons offered by Ryle (1938, pp. 190–191) and De Rijk (2002,
368–374) for preferring to say that items categorized are terms and not predicates.
29Geach (1972, p. 47) saw in the acceptance of the syntactic similarity of subject and predicate a change
from the logical syntax presupposed in the De Interpretatione. He deemed this change “a disaster, compa-
rable only to the Fall of Adam.”
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supplies an answer to the question of what the quantifier is in a proposition whose
subject is singular: it may be particular as well as universal.30
2. The generality of the categories
As understood in the philosophical tradition categories are concepts of a very
general kind. The commonest way of explaining the generality of Aristotle’s categories
is to identify them with highest genera. A famous statement of this identification is
found in the so-called Introduction, or Isagoge, of Porphyry (Isag 6.7–6.13):
Let it be supposed, as in the Categories, that the first genera
are ten—ten first origins, as it were. . . The highest genera [ta
genikōtata], then, are ten.
Statements to the same effect are found, among the ancient commentators, in Alexan-
der of Aphrodisias (in APr 291,17ff.), Ammonius (in Cat 13,15ff.), and Simplicius
(in Cat 17,19ff.); among modern commentators in Bonitz (1853, pp. 591–623), Tren-
delenburg (1846, e.g. p. 20), Brentano (1862, p. 100), Ross (1949, p. 25), and Ackrill
(1963, pp. 79); the identification is moreover implicit in such recent works on the
Categories as Wedin (1997) and Studtmann (2008b). This section offers a critical
examination of the identification.
2.1. The predicables. In traditional logic a genus is one of the four or five
so-called predicables, and it is as such that we must understand highest genera when
identified with categories. The doctrine of predicables originates in Aristotle’s Topics,
but has perhaps more often been associated with Porphyry’s Introduction.
2.1.1. Aristotle’s Topics. Aristotle’s Topics is structured around the notions of
definition, idion, genus, and accident (cf. Top I.6 102b35–103a1): roughly, Top II–III
deal with accident, Top IV with genus, Top V with idion and Top VI-VII with defi-
nition. Aristotle does not employ a technical term for these notions collectively, but
they have come to be called predicables.31 The predicables characterize the relation
of the predicate to the subject in a true categorical proposition. When we make ex-
plicit, what Aristotle does not, the reference to such a true categorical proposition ‘S
30For this suggestion, see Barnes (2007, pp. 154–167).
31This word in the appropriate sense apparently originated with Abelard (cf. Baumgartner and Kolmer,
1989, p. 1179). Kant uses the name Prädikabilien in an altogether different sense, namely for a priori
concepts derived from the categories (KrV A82/B108); he might knowingly have gone against the tradition,
as his own “Transcendental Topics” was based on a different set of notions, the so-called concepts of
reflection (cf. A268–269/B324–435). Geach (1962, p. 25) defines a predicable as “an expression that gives
us a proposition about something if we attach it to another expression that stands for what we are forming
the proposition about,” noting (ibid. p. 24) that “the older use of the noun ‘predicable’ is too little current
in recent philosophical literature to stop me from staking out my own claim to the term.”
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is P ’, the definitions read as follows (cf. Top I.5). The predicate P is the definition
of the subject S if it is a logos signifying the essence (to ti ēn einai) of S. It is
an idion, or proprium, or (unique) property, of S if it is not a definition of it, yet
nevertheless counterpredicates with S, that is, is such that ‘P is S’ is true. Thus,
(neglecting plucked hens) ‘featherless biped’ is an idion of man, since it does not
reveal the essence of man, yet is nevertheless such that the converse ‘featherless biped
is man’ is true. The predicate P is a genus of S if “it is predicated in the what it is
(en tōi ti esti katēgoroumenon) of many items differing in species” (102a31). A pred-
icate is predicated of S in this manner, Aristotle explains further, if the proposition
in question is what would appropriately be given in answer to the question of what
something is, as it is appropriate if the subject is man to say that it is an animal.
Aristotle gives two definitions of what it is for P to be an accident of S. Firstly, if
P is neither the definition, nor an idion, nor a genus of S, then P is an accident of
S. Secondly, and less trivially, if P is such that it does, but need not, belong to S,
then P is an accident of S. According to both criteria, being-seated is an accident of
Socrates, assuming that he is sitting.
At Top I.8 Aristotle presents what he takes to be a deductive proof (pistis dia
sullogismou) that his list of predicables constitutes a complete classification of the
ways in which a predicate may truly be said of a subject—in other words, that in any
true categorical proposition the predicate P is either the definition, an idion, a genus,
or an accident of the subject S. The proof is by division and runs as follows. We
assume that ‘S is P ’ is true. Now, the converse ‘P is S’ is either true or false. If ‘P
is S’ is true, then P is either the definition or an idion of S, depending on whether
or not P reveals the essence of S. If ‘P is S’ is false, then P is either a genus or
an accident of S, depending on whether or not P is said in the definition of S (en
tōi horisōi legomenōn). QED. Two remarks on this proof are worth making. Firstly,
Aristotle holds that a definition “is composed of genus and differentiae” (e.g. Top I.8
103b14). Hence, if ‘P is S’ is false and P is said in the definition of S, it would seem
to follow that S is either a genus or a differentia of S. Whence it would seem that
Aristotle has forgotten to include differentiae on his list, indeed that his own proof
of completeness presupposes differentia to be a predicable. As we shall see in more
detail shortly, Aristotle subordinates the notion of differentia to that of genus, and
that allows him to infer that P in this case must be a genus of S. Secondly, it is plain
that Aristotle in the proof employs the first of his two definitions of accident, namely
as the residue of the other three predicables. Hence the result established is rather
“unexciting,” as Smith (1997, p. 73) remarks: if you classify some P ’s as A, others as
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B, others as C, and then say that every P which is neither an A nor a B nor a C is
a D, then it needs no proof that any P is one of A, B, C, or D.
The relational character of the predicables is worth emphasizing: no term is a
genus just by itself, but only a genus of another term; no term is an accident just
by itself, but only an accident of another term; and likewise for idion and definition.
This contrasts with the categories, for a category is not relational in this sense: which
category a term belongs to is not relative to its occurrence in a true categorical
proposition. For this reason the name ‘figures of predication’, translating Aristotle’s
ta schēmata tēs kategorias, seems to me an unhappy description of the categories.
Figures of predication would rather seem to describe the predicables, for they classify
ways in which the predicate is predicated of the subject, while the categories classify
predicates in isolation. Aristotle employs the name ‘figures of predication’ for instance
at Met ∆.7 (1017a22ff.), in one of his distinctions of the different senses of ‘being’:
“the senses of being are just as many as the figures of predication.” Recalling our
reading (p. 4 above) of “with the addition of to be or not to be” at APr I.1 24b18 to
refer to the copula, it seems natural to interpret this passage from Metaphysics ∆ as
identifying the categories with the different senses of the copula, thus to hold that the
being in question here is that expressed by the copula.32 But, again, it seems more
reasonable to say that the copula is said in as many ways as there are, not categories,
but predicables, for the predicables classify precisely different ways in which S is P .
Thus, we could say when P belongs to S as its definition that S is nothing but P ;
when P belongs to S as a genus that S is essentially or generically P ; when P belongs
to S as an idion that S is properly P ; and when P belongs to S as an accident that S
is accidentally P . But we would not say that S is substantially P or qualitatively P
or quantitatively P or relatively P , etc., but simply that P is a substance or a quality
or a quantity or a relative, etc.
A slightly different conception of the relation between categories and figures of
predication is defended by Brentano (1862, esp. pp. 108–122). According to him
there is no actual identity between these things, but only a one-one correspondence;
in particular, each category corresponds to a way of predicating a predicate of a
primary substance. If S is a substance, then ‘S is P ’ and ‘S is P ′’ differ in figure of
predication if and only if P and P ′ differ in category. If S is a singular non-substance,
namely an “individual accident” such as the particular whiteness of this table,33 then
there is a predication ‘S is P ’ if and only if S and P belong to the same category;
but they all share the same figure of predication, namely that found in ‘Socrates is
32That view is argued for by Apelt (1891).
33On individual accidents, see ch. 2 section 1.2.
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a man’, viz. the figure corresponding to the category of substance. The figure of ‘S
is P ’ where S is general is the same as the figure of ‘S′ is P ’ where S′ is singular.
The figures of predication are therefore just as many as the kinds of predicate. There
are objections one could raise against this argument, but I shall not do so here.
Instead I want to question, once again, the notion of figure of predication, for also on
Brentano’s reading is it difficult to make sense of the idea that these correspond to
the categories. Consider for instance the predication ‘Socrates is six feet tall’. Here a
quantity is predicated of Socrates. Brentano’s view must be that this is a quantitative
predication, that the predicate is predicated in the figure of quantity. But then one
is forced to say that in this predication ‘six feel tall’ is predicated quantitatively of
Socrates, and that seems to me to be either nonsensical or pleonastic. In any event it
fails to clarify the notion that categories are, or correspond to, figures of predication.
2.1.2. Porphyry’s Introduction. In Thomas Blount’s Glossographia of 1656 one
reads that “In Logick there are five Predicables, otherwise called Prophyries five
terms.” Porphyry had in fact distinguished five rather than four predicables, also
known in the tradition as the quinque voces: genus, species, differentia, idion, acci-
dent. He defines genus as “what is predicated in answer to, What is it?, of several
items which differ in species” (Isag 2.15), which repeats almost verbatim the definition
Aristotle gave at Top I.5. At Top I.4 Aristotle had expressly treated the notion of dif-
ferentia as a specimen of genus: “the differentia, since it is genus-like should be placed
together with the genus” (Top 101b18). At Top IV.6 (128a20–29), however, Aristotle
in effect denies that differentiae are to be identified with genera, and he gives three
criteria for distinguishing the two. Firstly, “the genus is said of more items than the
differentiae”;34 secondly, “in presenting the what it is it is more fitting to say the genus
than the differentia”; thirdly, “the differentia always signifies a quality of the genus,
but not so the genus of the differentia.”35 It is indeed doubtful whether Aristotle’s
definition of genus as “what is said in the what it is of several items differing in species”
covers the notion of differentia. Thus, in his completeness proof at Top I.8 Aristotle
operates with a notion of genus simply as what is said in the definition of the subject;
the proof would presumably not go through had it relied on the the official definition
of genus from Top I.5. Given this ambivalence, it is not surprising that Porphyry adds
34Here it is plain that Aristotle has in mind the divisive, and not the constitutive, differentiae of the genus
in question; these notions are, as far as I know, not explicated in Aristotle’s work, but Porphyry explains
them in his chapter on differentia (Isag 9.25–10.21).
35This third characteristic is also found at Top IV.6 144a18–22 and in the first definition of quality at
Met ∆.14 (1020a33ff.). It does not imply that all differentiae fall into the category of quality: see Morrison
(1993) and Barnes (2003, pp. 350–356). On how the Neoplatonic commentators dealt with the categorial
status of differentae cf. De Haas 1997, pp. 180–250.
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differentia to the list of predicables, and that a latter-day traditional logician such as
Joseph (1916, p. 74) has followed him in doing so. Porphyry gives several accounts
of the notion. According to one (Isag 11.8ff.) “a differentia is what is predicated as a
qualification (en tōi poion ti esti) of several items which differ in species,” where one
can recognize Aristotle’s second criterion above, that “the differentia always signifies
a quality of the genus.” Aristotle’s two other criteria for distinguishing differentiae
from genera can likewise be found in Porphyry’s text (cf. Isag 11,11 and 14,14).
Even though species (eidos) does not occur in Aristotle’s list of predicables in
Top I.5, the notion is presupposed in his definition of genus as what is predicated
essentially of several items differing in species. It is therefore natural to ask why
Aristotle did not include species on his list of predicables. To say that S is a species
of P is usually to say that P is a genus of S; hence the name ‘species’ indicates
in this case not how a predicate relates to the subject, but how a subject relates
to the predicate. This is presumably what Ross (1949, p. 33) alludes to when he
says that “this is Aristotle’s classification of predicables which Porphyry later mud-
dled hopelessly by reckoning species as a fifth predicable.” If there is any place for
the notion of species in a set of predicables, it would therefore have to be so as to
cover singular essential predications; indeed, that seems to be presupposed by Por-
phyry’s characterization that “a species is what is predicated in answer to ‘What is
it?’ of several items differing in number” (Isag 4,12). It is, however, clear that none
of Aristotle’s predicables classify such predications: not accident or idion, for these
are not predicated essentially; not genus, for it is predicated of “several items differ-
ing in species” (Top 102a31), so in particular not of individuals as such; and not
definition, for a definition converts with its subject (Top I.8 103b9), but a singular
essential judgement does not convert—Socrates is a man, for instance, but man is
not Socrates. Since Aristotle thought he had covered all possible predications in his
table of predicables, it is natural to conjecture that Aristotle in the Topics did not
countenance singular essential judgements (he may have countenanced accidental or
proper singular judgements);36 this must therefore be the reason why species is not
on his list of predicables.
Porphyry’s treatment of idion and accident has no relevance for the following, so
we omit discussion of them.
2.2. The ordering of genera. Given two terms g and s, let us write s <
g to mean that g is a genus of s. Our aim in this section is to investigate this
36According to Smith (1997, p. xxix) there are no singular judgements at all in the Topics.
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relation.37 We shall see that it is a strict ordering among general terms with the
property that above any g there is at most one greatest element (i.e., a highest genera).
If s < g, then both s and g are general terms, for a genus is a general term said of
another general term. We may therefore take the field of the relation < to consist of
general terms. Rohr (1979, p. 383) remarks that Aristotle’s discussion of the so-called
Third Man argument, reported by Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Met 84,27–85,3),
suggests that he would deny reflexivity of the <-relation; a lesson of the Third Man
is precisely that self-predication of a genus leads to an infinite regress. Another
reason why Aristotle should deny the reflexivity of < is that it would make definition
impossible. A definition, according to Aristotle, states the genus and differentae of
its definiendum.38 Hence if g was its own genus, it would feature in its own definition,
whence the definition would be circular, hence not really a definition. That the <-
relation is asymmetrical seems to be what Aristotle expresses at Top IV.1 121a12:
“it is clear that the species partake of the genera, but not the genera of the species.”
But asymmetry can also, just as irreflexivity, be argued for by appeal to the notion
of definition: if g is a genus of s, then g will feature in the definition of s; if s in
turn would be a genus of g, then it would feature in the definition of g, hence by
unravelling the definition of s (namely by replacing in it g by its own definition)39 we
should find that s features in its own definition, and so again the definition would
be circular. Rohr (1979) argues at length, and convincingly to my mind, that the
relation < is transitive; indeed, Aristotle seems to say as much at Cat 1b10ff. Hence
we conclude that the relation < is a strict ordering.
Aristotle says at Top IV.2 121b29: “for it seems that whenever one species falls
under two genera, the one is embraced by the other.”40 In order-theoretic language this
means that whenever s < g1 and s < g2, then either g1 < g2 or g2 < g1 (that these
cases mutually exclude one another follows from the fact that < is asymmetrical).
Let us say that an ordering which satisfies this condition is tree-like; this name is
motivated by the fact that in such an ordering there is only one way upward along
<, just as in a tree there is only one way down towards the stem. Aristotle therefore
says in the quoted passage that it seems that the ordering < is tree-like; but he
is noncommittal about the matter, “for some think that prudence is both virtue and
37We build on the investigations of Rohr (1979) and Berg (1983).
38Cf. the already quoted Top I.8 103b15: “definition is composed of a genus and differentiae.” See further
Top 139a28–29; 141b25–27; 153b14.
39This notion of unravelling a definition is Aristotelian, cf. Top II.2 110a5: “to replace the words of a
definition by (their) definitions, and not to stop until one has reached what is familiar.” A technical
discussion of this notion is given by Curry (1963, pp. 101–110).
40The same principle is mentioned at Top VI.2 140a1, where it seems to be taken as universally vaild.
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knowledge and that neither of its genera is embraced by the other” (121b31). Prudence
should therefore be a case of an s for which there were two terms g1 (virtue) and g2
(knowledge) such that s < g1 and s < g2, but such that neither g1 < g2 nor g2 < g1
holds. Aristotle claims, however, that in this case there will be a yet higher genus by
which both g1 and g2 are embraced, for instance, both knowledge and virtue are states
(121b33–38). Order-theoretically this means that whenever s < g1 and s < g2, then
there is a g3 such that g1 < g3 and g2 < g3; let us say that an ordering satisfying this






But Aristotle believes that any part of the <-ordering is either tree-like or diamond-
like (122a1): “for if the genera are subordinate neither the one to the other nor both
to the same thing, then what is given is not a genus.” Thus, for given genera g1 and
g2 of s, it holds either that g1 ≶ g2 or else that there is a g3 such that g1 < g3 and
g2 < g3. It is readily seen that in an ordering satisfying this property there is at most
one highest genus above any term s. Hence, while Aristotle may not admit that the
ordering of genera in general is tree-like (though he could insist that some parts of it
is), he is committed to the view that above any species there is at most one highest
genus. Thus, if it should turn out that the categories coincide with highest genera,
what we shall call the principle of the mutual exclusion of the categories would follow:
it is not the case that the same term falls into two categories, for that would mean
that there were two highest genera above that term41
2.2.1. Trees in Plato and Porphyry. Before considering the relation between this
ordering of genera on the one hand and the categories on the other, it is worth briefly
remarking on a well-known historical antecedent and an equally well-known historical
succedent to it. Plato’s method of division (diairhesis) is certainly in the background
of Aristotle’s account of genera, species, differentiae, and their ordering.42 Plato’s
idea seems to have been that by “cutting along natural joints” one should reach the
true definition of a given term (Phaedrus 266a, cf. Statesman 262b-263a). When
41This point was made already by Brentano (1862, p. 128) in commenting on this passage (122a1).
42On Platonic division and its role in Plato’s philosophy, see e.g. Philip (1966) and Ackrill (1971). On the
related method of collection (sunagōgē), see Menn (1998).
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Plato carries out a division to reach the definition of, for instance, the sophist or the
statesman,43 what gets divided and what a particular division results in are variously
called genus and species (these terms seem to be used synonymously by Plato). And
a genus is divided by means of differentiae; for instance, at Sophist 219e hunting is
divided into the hunting of living things and the hunting of lifeless things. Hence the
structure that results from a Platonic division is a tree-like ordering ≺ such that if
s ≺ g then g is a genus of s, and such that s may be obtained from g by the addition of
one or more differentiae; this is indeed the picture we have just seen in Aristotle. That
division should always be dichotomous appears to be dictated by the description of
the method at Phaedrus 266a,44 but Plato elsewhere admits that we may not be able
to divide a kind into only two subkinds, in which case “we must always cut into the
nearest number as far as we can” (Statesman 287c). At the place in question Plato
in fact makes a sevenfold division of arts that contribute to the caring of citizens;
elsewhere he divides spoken sound (phōnē) into vowel, stop, and continuant (Philebus
18b–d). In such cases of polytomous division the question remains of course whether
a sequence of dichotomous divisions is possible that would end in the polytomous one;
that indeed happens in the case of spoken sound: whereas both Plato and Aristotle
(in Poetics 20) divides spoken sound directly into three, the Tekhne grammatikē first
divides it into vowel and consonant, and thereafter divides consonant further into stop
and continuant.45 To the best of my knowledge Aristotle says nothing in the Topics
that commits him one or the other way regarding dichotomy. In Cat 8 he speaks
about four genera of quality (one of them is in fact called a species), suggesting a
division of the genus of quality into four; but it is not obvious that Aristotle thinks
of quality as a genus in the technical sense (more on this below).
What is known as The Tree of Porphyry46 most likely derives from a creative
reading of the following passage in Porphyry’s Introduction (4,21–4,25):
Substance is itself a genus. Under it is body, and under body
animate body, under which is animal; under animal is rational
43For an overview of the divisions in the Sophist and the Statesman, see Gill (2010).
44Boole (1854, pp. 50–51), having shown that the equation x(1− x) = 0, which for him is the expression
of the law of non-contradiction, is derivable from the second degree equation x2 = x remarks:
it is a consequence of the fact that the fundamental equation of thought is of
the second degree that we perform the operation of analysis and classification by
division into pairs of opposites, or, as it is technically said, by dichotomy.
45This observation is due to Menn (1998, p. 295, fn. 5).
46The terms arbor Porphyriana, arbor Porphyrii are not recorded before the Middle Ages; an early occur-
rence is in Peter of Spain’s Summulae Logicales, Tractatus II cap 11 (Dinneen, 1990, p. 19).
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animal, under which is man; and under man are Socrates and Plato
and particular men.
In mediaeval logic textbooks, but not in Porphyry’s Introduction itself, one finds a
drawing as in Figure 1, a tree in the literal sense whose trunk is made up by genera,
and whose leaves are differentiae.47 This, however, is not an ordering of genera of the
kind we have seen in Aristotle; it is indeed a tree-like ordering, but it contains a chain
such as the following
substance > corporeal > body > animate > . . .
That is, it contains a chain that places differentiae under genera, while in Aristotle’s
ordering it is only species that get placed under genera.
substance
corporeal body incorporeal
animate living body inanimate
percipient animal non-percipient
rational rational animal non-rational
mortal man immortal
Figure 1. Porphyry’s tree
2.3. Categories and the ordering of genera. In APo I.19 Aristotle asks
whether, given a term g, it is possible (1) to form an infinitely ascending sequence
g < g′ < g′′ < g′′′ < . . . or (2) to form an infinitely descending sequence . . . < g′′′ <
g′′ < g′ < g. He moreover asks (3) whether, given two terms g < g′ it is possible to
form an infinite sequence g < h < h′ < h′′ < . . . < g′ or g < . . . < h′′ < h′ < h < g.
He deals with question (3) in APo I.20, assuming negative answers to questions (1)
and (2); and indeed assuming that there are no infinitely ascending or descending
47This drawing derives from the one given in Barnes (2003, p. 110); for a more embellished tree, see for
instance Kretzmann (1966, p. 54).
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sequences it is plain that we cannot find infinitely many h, h′, h′′, h′′′, . . . such that
either g < h < h′ < h′′ < . . . < g′ or g < . . . < h′′ < h′ < h < g, since in both of these
cases we should produce an infinitely ascending or descending sequence. Question (1)
is dealt with in APo I.22 (82b37–83a1). Aristotle there offers the following argument,
the virtues of which need not be assessed here. Its first premise is the claim that
knowledge of a term g presupposes knowledge of all g′ > g. Knowledge of g is
knowledge of the definition of g; that definition contains another genus g′ > g, which
itself must be known if the definition is to be known; but knowing g′ means knowing
its definition, appealing to a yet higher genus. Whence all g′ > g are involved in the
knowledge of g. The second premise says that an item of knowledge is finite: “you
cannot survey infinitely many items in thought” (83b6). The third premise says that
knowledge of terms is indeed possible. From this we are invited to draw the conclusion
that any <-sequence above g must be finite: all terms above g are genera found when
unravelling the definition of g, and these must all be known if g is to be known; since
knowledge of g is possible and an item of knowledge is finite, there can be only finitely
many terms above g. In particular, above any g, if it is not already a highest genus,
there is a highest genus. We saw in section 2.2 that above any g there is at most one
highest genus. Hence we may conclude that if g is not already a highest genus, there
is a unique highest genus g′ > g.
Aristotle takes up question (2) in APr I.27. The argument amounts essentially
to the claim that individuals are not predicated of anything else. One may ask why
singular predication should be relevant to the order of genera, which, as we have
seen, has only general terms in its field. Anyhow, even if we did extend the field of
< to individual terms, it would not follow from Aristotle’s claim that we can have
no infinitely descending sequence in <. Man is said of Callias, and Callias is an
individual; but that does not exclude the possibility of there being a species below
man which in its turn is predicated of Callias—male could be such a species.
So this last argument is not valid;48 but our interest here is in highest genera.
As we have now seen there is, according to Aristotle, a diamond-like ordering (some
sections of which may be tree-like) of genera with a unique maximal point above any
genus; that is, if g is not itself already a highest genus, then there is a unique highest
genus above it. It is remarkable that Aristotle, in contrast to modern and ancient
commentators, nowhere identifies these highest genera with the categories. There are
even suggestions in Aristotle’s text that highest genera have a relatively low degree of
generality (Cat 14a24): “good and bad are not in a genus (en genei) but are themselves
48It is then interesting to note that the Jäsche Logik § 11 denies that there are lowest species (and also
that there is a next highest genus.
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actually genera of certain things (genē tinōn ontōn).” Thus, good and bad appear
to be regarded as highest genera, not “being in” any other genus.49 At several places
Aristotle calls the categories ‘genera’, either simply (Cat 11a37, DA 402a23),50 or
in the combinations ‘genera of predicates’ (APo 83b13–17, Top 103b22–23, 152a38,
SE 178a5) or ‘genera of beings’ (APo 88b, DA 412a6). ‘Genus’ thus employed does,
however, not have the technical sense given to it in Top I.5, pertaining to the relation
of the predicate to the subject in a true categorical proposition, but rather a non-
technical sense, meaning ‘class’ or ‘type’ or something along those lines. For instance,
when Aristotle at Top 103b22–23 calls the categories ‘genera of predicates’ it is obvious
that ‘genus’ is used in a non-technical sense, for the genera in this sense are said to
contain the genera in the technical sense.51
The view that a category is a class of terms (or predicates) seems to be pre-
supposed in the following instructive passage on the relation of the categories to the
ordering of genera (Top 120b26–121a9).
Moreover, see whether the genus and the species are not found in
the same division, but the one is a substance while the other is a
quality, or the one is a relative while the other is a quality, as snow
and swan are each a substance, while white is not a substance but a
quality, so that white is not a genus either of snow or of swan. . . . To
speak generally, the genus ought to fall under the same division as
the species; for if the species is a substance, so too should be the
genus, and if the species is a quality, so too the genus should be a
quality; for instance, if white is a quality, so too should colour be;
likewise in other cases.
Categories are here spoken of as “divisions” (diairheseis) within which genera and
species fall,52 and a division is to my mind more like a class than like a highest
genus. In this passage Aristotle presents a topos by means of which one can attack
a dialectical proposition claiming that g is the genus of s: see whether s and g fall
within the same division—if they do not, then g cannot be a genus of s. Let us write
g : C to mean that g falls under the category C. The general principle Aristotle
appeals to in justifying this topos says that if s : C and s < g, then g : C. We may
49Cf. Phys V.4 227b11 “where it happens that the genus is at the same time a species,” suggesting that
this is not the rule.
50The Oxford translation has summa genera at DA 402a23, but there is nothing in the Greek corresponding
to summa.
51Kapp (1920, pp. 226–228) makes the same point referring to Top 107a3–30; 152a38–152b2.
52Cf. Cat 10a19, where the category of quality is spoken of as a division (he peri to poion diairhesis); and
SE 166b14, which refers to the categories as “the divisions previously made.”
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call this the principle of upward categorial closure. The corresponding principle of
downward categorial closure says that if g : C and s < g, then s : C. Contrary to
what one would expect, Aristotle denies the latter principle (Top 124b15–24):
if the species is a relative, so too is the genus, as is the case with
double and multiple; for each is a relative. If, on the other hand,
the genus is a relative, there is no necessity that the species should
be so as well; for knowledge is a relative, but not so grammar.
Here Aristotle first restates the principle of upward categorial closure (for the cate-
gory of relatives); but he goes on to deny the principle of downward categorial closure.
Knowledge apparently provides a counterexample, for while knowledge itself is a rel-
ative, its species grammar is not a relative, but a state, and therefore a quality. The
categorization of knowledge must have presented a problem for Aristotle. Since knowl-
edge is knowledge of an object, it is a relative according to him (e.g. Cat 6b5, 11b26);
but the various species of knowledge, such as grammar,53 are said to be states, and
therefore qualities (Cat 8b28, 9a6–7). Indeed, grammar is not a relative since gram-
mar is not grammar of something, rather grammar is knowledge of something, so it is
only in virtue of the genus that it is a relative; but what we possess when we possess
grammar is a quality (Cat 11a20–38).
The most troubling aspect of Aristotle’s denial of downward closure is not the
lack of symmetry it entails when compared to the acceptance of upward closure. The
most troubling aspect is rather the fact that acceptance of upward categorial closure
together with the denial of downward closure entails the denial of the principle of
mutual exclusion—the principle that the same term cannot fall under two categories.
Namely, the species of knowledge are qualities, so by upward closure knowledge is
itself a quality; but knowledge is also a relative; hence knowledge is both a quality
and a relative, contrary to the principle of mutual exclusion. Aristotle draws the
consequence at Cat 11a38–39:
Moreover, if the same thing really is a quality and a relative there
is nothing absurd in its being counted in both the genera.
Aristotle never states the principle of mutual exclusion explicitly, so he does not
contradict himself outright when he here rejects it; but it is implicit in his introducing
the categories at Cat 4 by saying “of things said without combination each signifies
53Grammar (grammatikē) is here understood quite literally as the knowledge of letters (grammata); cf.
Top VI.5 142b31: “for instance, if he defines grammar as the knowledge of writing from dictation; for he
ought also to say that it is knowledge of reading.” Similarly at Plato Sophist 253a–b the expert in grammar
is said to be one who knows which letters blend and which do not, so presumably someone who knows how
to read and write.
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either substance or quantity or quality or . . . ” as well as in his calling the categories
divisions at Top 120b26: one and the same term cannot belong to two divisions,
so if a category is a division, neither can one and the same term belong to two
categories. Porphyry argues that denial of mutual exclusion is quite unproblematic
(in Cat 140,27–141,5):54
Socrates, for instance, can be shown to be subject to a number of
affections: insofar as he is a man, he is a substance; insofar as he is
three cubits tall, let us suppose, he is a quantity; insofar as he is a
father or a son, he belongs to the relatives; insofar as he is temper-
ate, he is qualified; and in this way he is brought under the different
categories in virtue of various differentiae. If, then, Socrates, who
is a single thing, is found to fall under different categories when
he is considered in different respects, what is absurd about a state
being in one respect a relative, and in another a quality?
But this is not a way out. We can of course predicate terms of all categories of
Socrates, but it does not follow that he, Socrates the substance, therefore is a cate-
gorial chameleon. Each term has its category independently of what is said of it and
what it is said of; the fact that one term t falling under a category C can be truly
predicated of a term t′ falling under a different category C ′ does not entail that t and
t′ nevertheless both belong to the same category. Indeed, if a substance were also all
the things that can be truly said of it, it would belong to all categories, whence one
could ask why categorial distinctions had been made in the first place.55
Frede (1987b, p. 13) speculates that Cat 11a38–39, the passage recently quoted
where mutual exclusion is denied, might be spurious. But this seems unlikely, since,
as we have noted, Aristotle there simply draws the consequence of views explicitly
stated elsewhere in the Categories and in the Topics. Concentrating on Aristotle’s
treatment of knowledge seems to me more promising. One could ask whether the pro-
posed counterexample of knowledge—the only one Aristotle offers—instead of showing
that the principle of mutual exclusion is false rather reveals confusion in Aristotle’s
conception of the notion of a relative? Aristotle’s criteria for calling a term a relative
are indeed rather unclear. Knowledge is a relative since knowledge is always knowl-
edge of something (6b5); and a state is a relative because a state is always the state
54Cf. the similar considerations of De Rijk (2002, p. 133–134).
55I would raise similar objections to one of the main arguments of Morrison (1992) against what he aptly
calls the taxonomical interpretation of the categories. Morrison holds (pp. 26–28) that when Aristotle says
of white that it is not properly called large, but only accidentally (Cat 5a38–5b2), then he assumes a notion
of “accidental categorials”; so white belongs to the category of quantity accidentally. But even if large is
predicated accidentally of white, it does not follow that ‘white’ itself is a quantity.
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of someone or something (ibid.)—but the sense in which an instance of knowledge
is the knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem is altogether different from the sense
in which a given state of virtue is the state of Socrates. Large is a relative because
something is large only relative to a certain comparison class (5b16–21); and lying,
standing, and sitting are called relatives (6b11–12) presumably because a particular
lying, standing, or sitting is always someone’s lying, standing, or sitting. Aristotle
insists that a wing is a relative, since “a wing is a wing of a winged” (6b38–7a5), while
he is willing to revise his definition of relatives in order to avoid having to say that
an arm—which one would think was in the same category as a wing—is a relative
(8a18–8b21). And why, according to Cat 4, is cutting a doing (poiein) rather than
a relative, for a cutting is always the cutting of something; and why is being-cut an
affection (paschein) rather than a relative, for a being-cut is always the being-cut by
someone; and indeed why is four-foot, or any other quantity, a quantity rather than a
relative, for a four-foot is always someone’s or something’s measure? It is difficult to
see how such questions can be settled on the basis of Aristotle’s definition of relatives
(cf. Ackrill, 1963, p. 99); but instead of improving this rather imprecise definition,
Aristotle chose to reject the principle of mutual exclusion.
Let us nevertheless suppose with Aristotle that downward closure (and with it,
mutual exclusion) fails. Rohr (1979, pp. 384–385) observes that in this case cate-
gories cannot be highest genera: the transitivity of the <-ordering together with the
assumption that the categories themselves are genera entail the principle of downward
categorial closure—if g : C and C is itself a genus, then g < C, hence by transitivity
it follows that s : C for all s < g, which is just the principle of downward categorial
closure. (More precisely, the category of relatives cannot be a highest genus, but this
conclusion should generalize to all the categories.) To my mind Aristotle should have
revised his conception of relatives and refined his analysis of knowledge so that it
would not provide a counterexample to downward closure. That principle, as well as
mutual exclusion, would therefore remain intact. This revised Aristotle would thus
not accept one of the premisses of Rohr’s argument. But the revised Aristotle would
still have good reasons to reject the identification of categories with highest gen-
era. This identification presupposes that categories are themselves terms, namely the
maximal elements of the <-ordering. A category C is then predicated of terms falling
under it in precisely the same way that for instance ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’
or ‘horse’. A category can itself, without further ado, be the predicate of an ‘S is P ’
proposition. But as we shall see in more detail in the next chapter (section 4), such
categorial predications are of an altogether different kind from ordinary predications.
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3. The skopos of the Categories
In the opening of the De Interpretatione Aristotle introduces a version of what is
sometimes called “the semantic triangle”56 and distinguishes thereby between the word
as an acoustic or graphic entity, the thought (noēma) corresponding to the word,57
and the thing signified (pragma). In our discussion in section 1 above we neglected
the fact that in the Categories Aristotle appears to confuse these various levels, and
leaves one with the question of which compartment items categorized belong to.58
The aim in what follows will not be to neutralize all passages that may go against
our interpretation of items categorized as terms, hence as linguistic in some sense,
but rather, in section 3.1, to report on an ancient discussion of this question, whose
conclusion agrees quite well with our interpretation; and in section 3.2 to criticize a
reading more recently put forward by several commentators according to which in the
Categories the items categorized are ontological in nature, while in the Topics they
are linguistic in nature.
3.1. The commentators. The list of categories is introduced in chapter 4 of
the Categories as what is signified by “things said without combination,” which could
be taken to mean that items categorized are things signified.59 But later in the same
chapter Aristotle declares that none of the “items mentioned is said just by itself in
any affirmation, but from a combination of these with each other an affirmation is
produced” (2a5–7), where the “items mentioned” must refer to the categories, which
suggests that the items categorized are things said, since only things said combine to
form affirmations. In chapter 2 of the Categories Aristotle sets out to divide ta onta,
what there is; at the opening of his discussion of substance in chapter 5 (Cat 2a14–
16) he then classes primary substances into one of these divisions, suggesting that
the category of substance is made up of things; but a few columns later he speaks
of primary substances signifying “a certain this” (tode ti sēmainein, 3b10–12), thus
apparently assuming that they are things said.
Aristotle’s vacillation at this point appears to have prompted already the Peri-
patetics who in the 1st century BC were the first to write commentaries on the
56In fact it is a quadrangle, cf. Kretzmann (1974). On its relation to the triangle of Ogden and Richards,
see Lieb (1981). On the semantic triangle of the Stoics, see section 4.2 below.
57Aristotle initially calls this “affections of the soul” (ta pathemata tēs psuchēs), but at 16a10 they are
identified with thoughts (noēmata). The acoustic entity is said to be a a symbol of these affections at
Int 16a2, but to follow the thought (to en tēi dianoiai) at Int 23a33.
58A well-known complaint; see e.g. Kneale and Kneale (1962, pp. 25–27, 196–197).
59Though, as suggested by Malink (2007, p. 277) on the basis of numerous relevant passages, we may have
to do here with a more or less technical sense of sēmainei, signify, used simply to indicate membership in
a category.
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Categories to ask the question, into which compartment the items categorized fall.60
The Neoplatonic commentators, starting with Porphyry in the 3rd century AD, paid
particular attention to this question and called it the question of the skopos, or aim,
of the Categories. The reason why it was thus called is not clear to me,61 but the
idea seems to have been that the answer to this question would provide a principle
to be appealed to in dealing with various aporiai. We find for instance the com-
mentator Simplicius (6th century AD) referring to the skopos again and again in his
commentary.62
The question of the skopos was as a rule taken up in the preamble of a commen-
tary.63 Three positions held by nameless precursors were first distinguished:
Let us now examine the questions raised a little way back; the first
concerns the aim (skopos). Notice that commentators have dif-
fered on this, some saying that the Philosopher is discussing words
(phōnai), some, things (pragmata), and some, concepts (noēmata).64
Those arguing65 that the work is about words had pointed to Aristotle’s key term
legomena, ‘things said’, or ‘what is said’. Those arguing that the work is about things
had pointed to Aristotle’s phrase ‘of things there are’ (tōn ontōn, 1a20), and to the
judgement that it is not for the philosopher to study mere words. Those arguing
that the work concerns itself with concepts may have insisted that things said are
in fact conceptual in nature, on a par with the Stoic notion of lekton. Instead, the
Neoplatonic commentators held that the skopos of the work is a synthesis of all these
three views:
The Philosopher’s aim here, therefore, is to treat words that mean
things through mediating concepts.66
To distinguish this reading from the one holding that items categorized are words
(and perhaps for other reasons besides) Porphyry introduced the notions of the pri-
mary and secondary imposition (prōtē, deutera thesis), presented by him and the
60Cf. Gottschalk (1990, esp. p. 70) and Sharples (2008, esp. pp. 279–281). From the discussions of Porphyry
(in Cat 59,16) and Simplicius (in Cat 11,22ff.; 13,16) it appears that the question had been discussed by
Boethus of Sidon, a student of Andronicus of Rhodes (1st century BC).
61Ammonius explains the terminology thus (in Cat 7,18-20): “for just as an archer, for example, has a
mark toward which he shoots and which he wants to hit, so also a writer has some end in view, which he
is eager to attain.”
62See e.g. in Cat 16,15; 21,7; 24,22; 40,18; 69,1ff.; 73,30.
63These preambles had quite a regimented form; see Praechter (1909, pp. 523–531) and Hadot (1987, esp.
pp. 99–106, 120–121).
64Ammonius in Cat 8,20–9,3.
65For the following arguments, cf. Ammonius in Cat 9,3–9,11 and Simplicius in Cat 9,4–10,2.
66Ammonius in Cat 9,17.
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later commentators as an ontogeny of language,67 but in fact being a valuable se-
mantical distinction, closely related to the mediaeval distinction of first and second
intentions.68 In the primary imposition man gave names to the things around him.
In the secondary imposition he “reflected upon the expressions from another point
of view” (in Cat 57,30) and invented words such as ‘noun’ and ‘verb’; thus he gave
names to words themselves.69 Items categorized are words instituted by the first
imposition; indeed the (names of the) categories themselves are words of this kind,
whereas names relevant to an investigation of words qua words are instituted by the
second imposition.
According to the Neoplatonic commentators, therefore, items categorized are
words insofar as they signify things. This view is in line with the interpretation
pursued here, according to which items categorized are terms, which of course are lin-
guistic in some sense. There is also the dual view, that items categorized are things
insofar as they are signified by words. That seems to be the view of Ackrill (1963).
At several places in his commentary Ackrill insists that items categorized are things,
but he admits that (p. 78):
Though the items in categories are not expressions but ‘things’, the
identification and classification of these things could, of course, be
achieved only by attention to what we say.
In a categorization, or “identification and classification” of things, one needs to attend
to what we say; so the view presupposed by Ackrill must be that items categorized
are things insofar as they are signified by words, since it is only through this signifi-
cation that we can effect the categorization. Hence, both Ackrill and the Neoplatonic
commentators recognize the central place that the meaning relation plays in cate-
gorization, but they emphasize different nodes in it. De Rijk (2002, p. 134), who
has forcefully argued that categories are “classes of names,”70 summarizes his view as
follows:
67For a reconstruction of Porphyry’s doctrine of imposition and the concomitant ontogeny of language, see
Ebbesen (1990, pp. 146–162); for the doctrine of imposition in Simplicius and other later commentators,
see Hoffmann (1987, pp. 78–90). Use of the word thesis in the sense of name giving can be found already in
Plato’s Cratylus 390d (he tou onomatos thesis); on thesis in ancient thought about language, in particular
in relation to physis, see Fehling (1965, pp. 218–229). The exact phrase prōte thesis is used in the Tekhnē
grammatikē § 12 to characterize primitive, in contrast to derivative, nouns.
68See Knudsen (1982) for an account of the doctrine of first and second intention also discussing the relation
to the doctrine of imposition (ibid. 484–485); Ockham draws both distinctions at Summa Logicae I.11–12
(Loux, 1974, pp. 72–75).
69And presumably also to other things, as has been emphasized by Lloyd (1990, p. 36–43): Dexippus in
Cat 15.24ff. classifies ‘whole’ and ‘part’ as words of the second imposition; and it seems that ‘genus’ and
‘species’ were also thus classified.
70See especially De Rijk (1980) and De Rijk (2002, pp. 358–471).
31
what is classified is not things by themselves, not names by them-
selves, but things according to their mode of being expressed by a
categorial designation,
That is, it seems, items categorized are things as signified by words. I take it, then,
that the view of Ackrill and others following him, on the one hand, and the view of
the Neoplatonic commentators and De Rijk, on the other, are basically in agreement
with each other, in that they both defend a semantic conception of the categories:
items categorized are meaning entities, be they words as signifying things or things
as signified by words.
Is there any alternative to this semantic conception of the categories? Porphyry
contrasts the categories with what he calls the genera of being, maintaining that the
latter are in some unspecified sense prior to the former, indeed that the categories
simply reproduce the catalogue of being (in Cat 58,12ff.):71
Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differentiae, the
words that indicate them have also come to be ten in genus and
are themselves also so classified. Thus the predicates (katēgoriai)
are said to be ten in genus, just as beings themselves are ten in
genus.
[. . . ] Words are like messengers that report to us about things,
and they get their generic differentiae from the things about which
they report.
In Porphyry’s picture there are thus ten genera of being, and to each such genus
γ there corresponds a unique category Cγ such that, (1) every category is equal to
some Cγ , and (2) a term t falls under Cγ if and only if the signification of t (the
thing about which t reports) falls under the genus γ. The genera of being would
thus seem to present an alternative to semantically conceived categories: pure being
divided into genera altogether independently of language, and indeed providing the
blueprint for the categorization of language. It is not uncommon today to conceive
of category schemes independently of language;72 but it is doubtful whether one can
conceive of Aristotle’s categories that way: according to Aristotle’s doctrine, ‘man’
is a substance, while ‘slave’ is a relative, hence if the genera of being would mirror
the categories—which they do in Porphyry’s picture—then a man and a slave would
71Cf. Simplicius in Cat 11,1–11,22, reporting Porphyry’s view.
72E.g. Chisholm (1996).
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belong to different genera, and that is an idea I for one find it difficult to make sense
of.73
That the items categorized are words fitted well into the view of the commenta-
tors on the order of Aristotle’s works and their place in the Neoplatonic curriculum.
Already Aristotle’s compiler Andronicus of Rhodes had classified the Categories as a
logical work, and had apparently held that logic should be studied before all other
subjects.74 This view was shared by the Neoplatonic commentators, who regarded
logic as a tool for studying other subjects,75 which should therefore be studied before
ethics, physics, mathematics, and theology (metaphysics).76 Among logical works the
Categories is the first to be studied. The argument for this, presented by Ammonius
(in Cat 4,28–5,30) and Simplicius (in Cat 14,21–15,25), may be familiar.77 The aim
of logic is to teach the method of demonstration;78 but a demonstration is a syllogism
productive of knowledge,79 hence one must know what a syllogism is before one can
know what a demonstration is. A syllogism consists of propositions,80 and a proposi-
tion is made up from terms; hence, before teaching what a syllogism is logic should
teach what propositions are, and before teaching what a proposition is logic should
teach what terms are. This order of things was recognized in Aristotle’s writings:
the Categories deals with terms, the De Interpretatione with propositions, the Prior
73Cf. the remark on the category of relatives of De Rijk (2002, p. 135). According to Apelt (1891, p. 107),
a relative is “lediglich eine Geburt unseres Verstandes, ohne ein entsprechendes Ding in der Wirklichkeit.”
74Gottschalk (Cf. 1990, p. 66).
75There was an ancient discussion whether logic is a separate part of philosophy, as the Stoics held (DL
VII.39–40), or an instrument (organon) for philosophy, as the Peripatetics as well as the Neoplatonist
commentators held (e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias in APr 1,1–6,13); see e.g. Lee (1984, pp. 44–54) or
Kneale and Kneale (1962, p. 139). Ammonius in Cat 4,28 and Simplicius in Cat 4,23 describe Aristotle’s
logical works as organika, but the name Organon apparently has no ancient authority (Gottschalk, 1990,
p. 66, fn. 58).
76On whether ethics should be taught before logic, see Ammonius in Cat 5,30–6,5 and Simplicius in
Cat 5,17–6,5.
77For a critical reading of Simplicius’s argument, see Morrison (2005). On the later mediaeval treatment
of the Categories as a treatise of logic and of the question of the subject matter of the Categories more
generally, see Pini (2002, esp. pp. 19–44, 138–170).
78“. . . so that one may be able to distinguish the true from the false and the good from the bad” (Ammonius
in Cat 4,29–5,4, Simplicius in Cat 14,21–25). The moral benefit of logic is not often emphasized today,
but was not lost on Hawes in his Pastime of Pleasure (ch. 5, verse 2): “You shall, quod she [sc. Logyke],
my scyence wel lerne,/ in tyme and space, to your gret utilite;/ So that in lokynge you shal than decerne/
A frende from fo, and good from iniquyte:/ Ryght from wronge ye shall know in certainte./ My scyence is
all the yll to eschewe,/ and for to knowe the false from the trewe.”
79syllogismos epistemonikos is Aristotle’s definition of demonstration (apodeixis) at APo I.2 71b18; adopted
by Ammonius in Cat 5,9; Simplicius in Cat 14,33 gives the less informative definition ‘demonstrative
syllogism’ (syllogismos apodeiktikos).
80Ammonius in Cat 5,11, Simplicius 14,29: a syllogism is a certain aggregate (syllogē) of propositions
(logoi).
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Analytics with syllogism, and the Posterior Analytics with demonstration.81 Hence,
since the teaching of philosophy must begin with logic, and the teaching of logic must
begin with the doctrine of terms, the Categories is the first work the student of phi-
losophy must study: it is “the prologue to the whole of philosophy,” as Simplicius
remarks in the opening of his commentary (in Cat 1,3–1,7).
3.2. A recent contention. Apart from chapter 4 in the Categories, the only
other place in Aristotle’s works where one finds a list of ten categories is in chapter
I.9 of the Topics. Traditionally these two lists are taken to coincide.82 Malcom (1981),
Frede (1981), Ebert (1985), and Malink (2007) have argued that the two lists do not
coincide, and—as far as the skopos is concerned—that the category scheme of Cat 4
is ontological, a division of things, while the category scheme of Top I.9 is linguistic
or logical, a division of terms or predicates. For the purposes of this section let us,
following Malink, call the categories as presented at Cat 4 C-categories, and those
presented at Top I.9 T-categories; and let us call the reading of Top I.9 offered by
these interpreters the novel reading.
The main (and perhaps only) reason offered by the authors cited for preferring
the novel reading is that the first C-category is called substance (ousia), while the first
T-category is called essence (ti esti). The term ti esti recurs several times in the rest
of Top I.9, where in general it cannot be taken to mean substance. Hence we have the
choice either of charging Aristotle with equivocation or else to say that T-categories
differ from C-categories.83 Choosing the latter, and basing itself on what Aristotle
says here and elsewhere in the Topics, the novel reading says the following about
the relation between C- and T-categories. In Top I.9 Aristotle assumes as already
understood the C-categories, since these are listed at 103b27–29 and referred to in
the following.84 The T-categories are then explained in terms of the C-categories. To
the T-category of essence belong all substances as well as all genera of non-substance
C-categories; examples of the latter are colour and magnitude: colour is the genus of
white, while magnitude is the genus of two-cubit. To the other T-categories belong
the non-generic terms of the corresponding C-category; for instance, to the T-category
81Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the De Interpretatione (cf. Intro nn. 1–2) relates these works fur-
ther to the three operations of the mind (operationes intellectus, rationis), viz. the operations traditionally
known as simple apprehension, judgement, and reasoning. That correspondence is, as far as I know, not
found in the Neoplatonic commentators.
82So for instance by Alexander of Aphrodisias in Top 65,14 and Trendelenburg (1846, p. 34).
83For this formulation, see esp. Frede (1981, pp. 36–37).
84As admitted by Malcom (1981, p. 665), Ebert (1985, p. 132) and Malink (2007, p. 273). Frede (1981, p.
38) admits that the categories listed at 103b27–29 are not T-categories, though he seems to want to deny
any involvement of C-categories in the Topics (e.g. ibid. p. 31).
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of quality belongs white, but also coloured (in contrast to colour).85 Hence we get
two altogether different category schemes. Not only does the T-category of essence
not coincide with the C-category of substance, but no T-category coincides with the
corresponding C-category. Having thus argued for the distinction between T- and
C-categories, the novel reading is free to go on to claim that while C-categories are
ontological, T-categories are linguistic or logical.
We have already seen that Aristotle is simply not clear on the matter whether
C-categories are linguistic or ontological; hence, even if the argument offered for
preferring the novel reading was successful, it would not follow that C-categories are
ontological. There are, however, good reasons to have reservations about the novel
reading. Firstly, it seems to trade one ambiguity for another. For since both T- and
C-categories are mentioned and discussed in Top I.9, and since for instance ‘quality’
means different things whether one has in mind T-categories or C-categories, it follows
that the names of the non-substance categories are used ambiguously in this chapter:
‘quality’ sometimes mean the T-category of quality and sometimes the C-category
of quality. The disambiguation of ti esti in this chapter is therefore bought at the
cost of introducing ambiguity of the names of all the other T-categories. With this
exchange of ambiguities the novel reading seems to me to loose its force, since it
was proposed precisely in order to avoid equivocation. Secondly, according to the
novel reading, ‘white’ is a T-quality and ‘cubit’ a T-quantity; but this seems to be
contradicted by what Aristotle says at 103b29 ff. He there says that in predicating
white of a white colour or cubit of a cubit magnitude one “says the essence”; this
technical phrase is taken by the novel readers to imply membership in the T-category
of essence; but that contradicts their classification of ‘white’ and ‘cubit’ as a T-quality
and T-quantity respectively. Indeed, if such terms as ‘white’ and ‘cubit’ do not count
as non-essences, then it is difficult to see which terms do. Thus, Malink (2007, p.
289) admits that ‘white’ is ambiguous: it may signify the T-category of essence or
the T-category of quality. Again the disambiguation of ti esti therefore comes at
the cost of introducing other ambiguities. Thirdly, at several places of Topics VI
Aristotle uses the word ‘substance’ (ousia) where he evidently means essence (to ti
ēn einai, to ti esti). In a general discussion of definition at Top 139a29–31 he says
“of the elements of a definition the genus is what primarily signifies the substance
(ousia) of what is defined,” where what is meant, presumably, is that the genus, in
contrast to the differentiae, is what primarily indicates the essence (ti esti) of the
85See especially the list given by Malink (2007, p. 291) and the definition he offers at pp. 280–281. See also
Malcom (1981, pp. 666–668) and Ebert (1985, p. 125, 137–138). Frede’s article is mainly destructive, and
offers few constructive remarks on what T-categories should look like.
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definiendum. Likewise, at Top 143a18 Aristotle discusses the definition of justice,
saying “the substance (ousia) of a thing involves the genus,” where it is implied that
justice has a substance, but where it is meant that justice has an essence (ti esti).86 If
we regiment Aristotle’s language in the Topics as the novel reading proposes—taking
ousia always to mean the C-category of substance, and ti esti always to mean the
T-category of essence—then we cannot make sense of these passages.
4. The parts of speech
Items categorized are terms, and these are linguistic in nature; but the classifica-
tion of linguistic items effected by the categories differs of course from the classification
into parts of speech. Section 4.1 gives a brief historical introduction to the topic, while
section 4.2 examines, on the basis of historical examples, the relation between parts of
speech and categories. Section 4.3 surveys various characterizations of syncategorems;
as we shall see in section 5 the notion of syncategorem provides a way of understand-
ing the relation between Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories. The reader may prefer to
ignore the many footnotes with which the text in section 4.1 are equipped; most of
them are of a philological character.
4.1. Introduction. The little manual known as the Technē grammatikē, tradi-
tionally attributed to Dionysius Thrax (2nd century BC), is the canonical reference
for the parts of speech of Greek grammar.87 The Greek phrase in the Technē trans-
lated by ‘part of speech’, meros tou logou (GG I.1 23,1), literally means part of the
sentence, since logos is there defined as “a combination of words in prose conveying
a meaning that is complete in itself” (GG I.1 22,5), and that is a description of the
sentence.88 We shall, however, follow the tradition (in English going back at least to
the early 16th century, cf. OED) of calling these parts ‘parts of speech’, employing as
well the more recent term ‘word classes’ (probably deriving from German Wortklasse,
recorded 1817 in Grimm). The parts of speech, then, or word classes recognized in
86See also Top 150b24.
87On the work of Dionysius Thrax, see Pfeiffer (1968, pp. 266–267), and see the whole of Pfeiffer’s book
for the historical context. Already in ancient times doubts were raised as to the authenticity of the Technē
(cf. e.g. Lallot, 1989, pp. 20–21). On account of the work of Di Benedetto (1958, 1959) it appears to be
generally assumed among historians of linguistics today that the Technē as we know it is spurious, although
opinions vary as to the precise genealogy of the text and its proper place in the history of grammar (cf.
e.g. Taylor 1987, Law and Sluiter 1995, Robins 1995). A summary of Di Benedetto’s arguments may be
found in Pinborg (1975, pp. 103–106).
88This description may be of Stoic origin (cf. DL VII.63), as may be the phrase meros tou logou (DL
VII.57, cf. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta 2.131, translated by Frede 1978, p. 327, a fragment apparently
from Chrysippus employing ta tou logou moria in the relevant sense). Aristotle Poet 1456b20 uses merē tēs
lexeōs, to which belong not only the parts of speech, but also letters and syllables as well as the sentence
itself (logos).
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the Technē are: noun, verb, participle, article, pronoun, preposition, adverb, and
conjunction.89 Adjectives are missing from this list, but they are included under the
class of nouns as one of its 24 “species.” Articles were omitted when the list was
adapted by Latin grammarians to their language,90 there being no article in Latin,
but the interjection was added as an eighth pars orationis. Noun, verb, participle,
pronoun, preposition, adverb, conjunction, and interjection are therefore the eight
parts of speech recognized in the very influential Latin grammars of Donatus (4th
century AD) and Priscian (6th century AD); so influential in fact were these works
that, for instance, The Royal English Grammar of Greenwood (1737) follows them in
omitting the article as a separate part of speech, considering it instead an adjective,
and therefore a noun (cf. ibid. pp. 27, 41).91
The Technē employs in its descriptions of the various word classes three kinds of
characteristics. One kind of characteristic is morphological, pertaining to the acoustic
or graphical shape of the words in the respective class; another kind of characteristic
is semantic, pertaining to their signification; a third kind of characteristic is syntactic
or functional, pertaining to the role a word of the class plays in grammatical construc-
tions. The classes of noun, verb, participle, article, and pronoun are all characterized
in part by their so-called accidents (parepomena),92 which are typically manifest in
the morphology of the language, namely in the patterns of inflection characteristic of
the given part of speech. In particular, the accidents of the noun include gender,93
number, and case; the accidents of the verb include tense, number, person, mood, and
voice; and the accidents of the pronoun include person, gender, number, and case. But
nouns are in addition said to signify “a body or a thing” (sōma ē pragma sēmainon,
89According to Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria I.4,20, Aristarchus, the teacher of Dionysius Thrax (on the
life and work of Aristarchus, cf. Pfeiffer, 1968, pp. 210–233), recognized eight parts of speech, where it
is clear from the context that these are the eight parts distinguished in the Technē. The reliability of
Quintilian’s testimony has been defended (convincingly to my mind) by Ax (1991) and Matthaios (1999)
against doubts raised by, e.g., Pinborg (1975, p. 107) and Frede (1977, p. 341).
90Apparently this was done already in the 1st century BC by Remmius Palaemon (cf. Quintilian Institutio
Oratoria I.4,20).
91On the various systems of parts of speech adopted by tradtional English grammars, see Michael (1970,
pp. 201–280); on the treatment of articles in particular, see ibid. pp. 350–360, and especially 354–356.
92The Stoics apparently spoke instead of symbebēkota (cf. Barwick, 1922, p. 107 ff.), which is the word
accident typically translates in a philosophical setting (cf. OED on accident). The term ‘accident’ in
this grammatical sense can still be found in a grammar such as Sweet (1900). In some authors, such as
Jespersen (1924, p. 53), accidents are called ‘syntactic categories’.
93The gender distinction of nouns (and under this name) appears to have been recognized already by
Protagoras (cf. the witness of Aristotle SE 173b19ff., Rhet 1407b7).
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GG I.1 24,3);94 the verb to “express activity or passivity” (energeian ē pathos paris-
tasa, GG I.1 46,5);95 and the pronoun to be “indicative of definite persons” (prosōpōn
hōrismenōn dēlōtikē, GG I.1 63,2). Noun, verb, and pronoun are therefore charac-
terized not only morphologically by their accidents, but also by means of semantic
criteria. The article, apart from being described by its accidents of gender, num-
ber, and case is in addition said to be “placed before or after96 the inflection of the
noun” (GG I.1 61,2), thus syntactically characterized. Likewise the adverb is char-
acterized functionally by its relation to the verb, namely as being “said of the verb”
(GG I.1 72,4), and morphologically as being uninflected. Finally, the preposition
and the conjunction are purely syntactically characterized: “the preposition is a word
placed before all parts of speech, in compounds as well as in grammatical construc-
tions” (GG I.1 70,2) and “the conjunction is a word conjoining thoughts in order and
revealing gaps in the expression” (GG I.1 86,3).97
A similar mixture of criteria is found in the remarks of Plato and Aristotle on what
in the Technē are called the parts of speech.98 In the Sophist Plato describes the noun
and the verb by semantic as well as by syntactic or functional criteria. Thus, by appeal
to semantics the verb is said to be “the sort of indication that is applied to an action”
and the noun to be “the kind of spoken sign that is applied to a thing that performs the
actions” (262a); but Plato moreover says that any logos is about something and says
something about that thing (262e–263d), where it is clear from the context that the
noun serves to pick out what the logos is about and the verb to say something about
that thing. Thus the noun and the verb are syntactically characterized, corollated,
in effect, with the roles of subject and predicate of a sentence, as already noted in
section 1.2 above.
According to Aristotle’s definitions of the noun and the verb in the De Interpre-
tatione 2–3 their genus is “significant spoken sound no part of which is significant
94The ‘or’ here is not merely expletive: stone is given as an example of a sōma and education as an
example of a pragma; perhaps on the basis of these examples Kemp (1987, p. 176) translates the former
by ‘something corporeal’ and the latter by ‘something non-corporeal’. Lallot (1989) translates the former
by ‘corps’ and the latter by ‘action’.
95According to a scholium (GG I.3 161,7) Apollonius Dyscolus said in his work on the verb (now lost) that
Dionysius Thrax defined the verb as a word signifying a predicate (rhēma esti lexis katēgorema sēmainousa);
as we shall see below the Stoics defined the verb by the very same formulation.
96The article placed after the noun is the relative pronoun.
97The second part of this definition “revealing the gaps in the expression” (to tēs hermēneias kechēnos
dēlousa) has bothered editors and commentators; see Barnes (2007, pp. 183–184) and especially Lallot
(1989, pp. 227–236) for more discussion. When Kemp (1987, p. 185) translates “fills up gaps in the
expression” he must be relying on an alternative reading which substitutes plērousa for delousa; for reasons
not accept this reading see Barnes (ibid. p. 184) and Lallot (ibid. p. 228).
98For a concise overview of the doctrine of parts of speech in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, see Robins
(1966).
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in separation,” familiar from our discussion in section 1.1 above, while the verb is
distinguished from the noun by “additionally signifying time” (16b6). The genus of
being a significant spoken sound having no part significant in separation has both a
semantic and a morphological component, for it refers both to signification and to the
notion of a part of a word. The differentia of additionally signifying time may at first
seem to provide a morphological criterion, met by the verb in its showing variation in
tense. Aristotle holds, however, that a verb in the past or the future tense is in fact
not a verb (16b16–17), hence variation in tense cannot be a characteristic of verbs;
moreover, Aristotle explains that ‘recovers’ (hugiainei) is a verb, for unlike the word
‘recovery’ (hugieia) “it additionally signifies something’s holding now” (16b9). Addi-
tionally signifying time thus seems to furnish a semantic criterion. To these partly
morphological and partly semantic descriptions Aristotle adds functional descriptions.
In effect, like Plato, he identifies the verb with the predicate of the sentence (16b6,
16b10) and the noun with the subject (19b5). Thus, at Int 20b1 ‘white’ is called a
verb, but ‘white’ does not additionally signify time, so it is a verb only because it
functions as a predicate. In Poetics 20 two parts of speech in addition to noun and
verb are identified, called syndesmos and arthron. It is unclear from the text which
words are to be counted as arthra,99 but syndesmoi are most likely conjunctions (cf.
Rhet 1407a21–31; Int 17a9,16). Whichever word classes they be, they are defined by
means of functional criteria: their genus is non-significant sound (which thus excludes
semantic criteria in their differentiae); but where the syndesmos “produces out of
several significant sounds one significant sound” (1457a4–6), the arthron “reveals the
beginning, end or middle of the logos” (1457a6–7).
The Stoics are generally held to have played an important role in the development
of grammar.100 They distinguished at least five parts of speech: in addition to verb,
article, and conjunction they divided the class of nouns into two separate parts,
99Lucas (1968, p. 202): “It is impossible to say what kinds of non-significant word A. here intends.”
Likewise, Van Bennekom (1975, p. 406): “The definitions themselves [the text gives two definitions] hardly
give a clue as to what sort of words may be meant.” Adding to the difficulties are the facts 1) that according
to the witness of Dionysius of Halicarnassus De compositione verborum 2 Aristotle distinguished only three
parts of speech, namely noun, verb, and syndesmos; and 2) that arthron is nowhere else in the Aristotelean
corpus (apart from the spurious Rhetoric to Alexander 1435b13–16) employed as a term of grammar (cf.
Pinborg 1975, pp. 72–75 or Schramm 2005, esp. pp. 187–193 for a fuller overview of the difficulties and of
solutions proposed in the literature). Van Bennekom and Schramm (ibid.) argue that the class of arthra
comprises articles and prepositions; articles (including relative pronouns) are indeed what the Technē terms
as arthra, whereas the only certain example of an arthron in the text of the Poetics is the preposition peri.
I am grateful to Michael Schramm for sending me an offprint of his paper.
100So, e.g., Pinborg (1975, pp. 77–103).
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common nouns (prosēgoria) and proper nouns (onoma/kyrion onoma).101 Judging
from the testimony of Diogenes Laertius (DL VII.58) purely semantic criteria were
employed in defining the common noun, the proper noun, and the verb. A common
noun was said to signify a common quality (koinē poiotēs), a proper noun a peculiar
quality (idia poiotēs), and a verb was said to signify what the Stoics called a predicate
(katēgorēma), which is explained as an incomplete lekton (DL VII.64). According to
the same testimony, the article and the conjunction were defined by reference to their
function as well as their morphology. An article is “a declinable element of speech
distinguishing gender and number,” while a conjunction is “an indeclinable part of
speech conjoining the parts of speech.”102 It has, however, been argued by Pinborg
(1975, p. 99–100) and others103 that the Stoics gave purely semantic definitions also
of the article and the conjunction. The Stoic Posidonius is reported by Apollonius
Dyscolus (2nd century AD) to have written a work “on conjunctions” where he opposes
those (including Aristotle) who held that the conjunction does not signify anything
(cf. GG II.1 214,4ff.). The same Apollonius characterized the article (or at least
the demonstrative and indefinite pronouns, considered articles by the Stoics)104 as
signifying existence (ousia) without quality (GG II.1 9,9–10), and Pinborg argues
that this definition is in fact of Stoic origin.
4.2. Categories and the parts of speech. The question seems to have oc-
curred already to the ancient commentators on Aristotle what the relation is between
the parts of speech and the categories. Some recent commentators hold that the
relation was a tight one in Stoic doctrine (4.2.1). Some have also seen a relation
between Aristotle’s categories and the parts of speech, though we shall follow the
ancient commentators in emphasizing the contrast between the two (4.2.2)
4.2.1. In the Stoics. The presumably Stoic definition of the article as signifying
existence without quality, together with the definitions of the two kinds of noun, have
led scholars to see a connection between the Stoic parts of speech and what is known
101According to the scholium referred to in fn. 95 above (GG I.3 160,26) Dionysius Thrax treated common
noun and proper noun as separate parts of speech. Matthaios (1999, pp. 214–244) argues that Aristarchus
classed them as one part of speech, as indeed reported by Quintillian (cf. fn. 89 above).
102The Stoics are said to have conceived of prepositions as “preposed conjunctions” (so e.g. Priscian, GL II
54,20–22; for more passages, see Schmidt 1979, p. 136–137, and for a discussion Barnes 2007, pp.190–
192). Cf. the view of Jespersen (1924, p. 89): “The so-called conjunction is really, therefore, a sentence
preposition.”
103E.g. Lloyd (1971, pp. 67–69) and Frede (1978, pp. 330–332).
104Apollonius (GG II.1 5,13–9,6) also criticizes the Stoics for their treating pronouns in general as belonging
to the same part of speech as articles.
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as their categories. The Stoics are said to have assumed four categories:105 substrate
(hypokeimenon), qualified (poion), somehow disposed (pōs echon), and somehow dis-
posed in relation to something (pros ti pōs echon). Since the two kinds of noun
are both said to signify quality, and the article presumably substrate, the following
correspondence between parts of speech and the categories has been suggested.106
Part of speech article
common and intransitive transitive




There is, however, an obvious problem with this table, for at DL VII.58 nouns are
said to signify a quality (poiotēs) and not a qualified (poion), while a verb is said
to signify what the Stoics called a predicate, i.e. an incomplete lekton (DL VII.64),
and not something’s disposition. An elegant solution is offered by Christensen (1962,
pp. 43–52): one must take account of all vertices in the Stoic “semantic triangle”—
the sign, the sense (let us adopt that word here for what resides at the level of the
lekton), and the reference. This “triangle” is sketched by Sextus Empiricus in Adversos
Mathematicos 8.11–12 (text 33B in Long and Sedley 1987):107
three things are connected with one another, the sense (sēmai-
nomenon), the signifier (sēmainon), and the reference (tygchanon).
Of these the signifier is a vocal sound, for instance ‘Dion’, the
sense is the very thing (pragma) revealed by it, and which we
apprehend as it subsists in our thought, and which foreigners do not
understand even though they hear the utterance; and the reference
is the external substrate, for instance Dion himself.
The parts of speech obviously belong at the level of the signifier. And for the Stoics,
items categorized reside at the level of reference. The level of reference is not free
of language, according to Christensen: the Stoic categories are “reference classes” (p.
51), that is, “classes of objects in so far as these are denotata of meanings of the basic
types” (p. 48). The Stoic conception of the categories is, accordingly, a semantic
105For this, see especially Menn (1999), but also Christensen (1962, pp. 48–52), Rist (1969, pp. 152–172),
and Lloyd (1971). The status of the whole doctrine is uncertain; Barnes (2005, p. 26) concludes a general
discussion of the sources that “Bref, la théorie stoïcienne des catégories est un mythe.”
106The first to have done so appears to be Schmidt (1839, p. 37), who, however, placed conjunction instead
of transitive verb as corresponding to relative disposition. For the table below, see Lloyd (1971, p. 69),
and Pinborg (1975, p. 101).
107 Its relation to Aristotle’s semantic triangle is discussed by, for instance, Christensen (1962, pp. 44–47)
and Barnes (1993).
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conception (cf. section 3.1 above), where the categories cannot be thought apart from
the meaning relation.
The solution to the problem is then to point out that what DL VII.58 describes
the various parts of speech as signifying resides not at the level of reference, but at
the level of sense. In particular, quality is now taken to reside at the level sense,
together with the predicate. Common nouns as well as proper nouns have as their
sense a quality (poiotēs), and as their reference a qualified (poion).108 Corresponding
to the distinction between intransitive and transitive verbs the Stoics distinguished
between unary and binary predicates (the latter were called direct predicates, ortha
katēgorēmata, DL VII.64). An intransitive verb has as its sense a unary predicate,
and as its reference a disposition, while a transitive verb has as its sense a binary
predicate, and as its reference a relative disposition. It remains to account for the
article. Here we have Apollonius’s characterization, reported above, that the article
reveals (dēlein) only existence (ousia), and is as such contrasted with the noun,
which reveals (epangellesthai) a quality; hence, assuming that this was also the Stoic
characterization, the mark of existence is taken to be the sense of the article, while
its reference is substrate. The following table results (cf. Christensen, 1962, p. 50).109
Part of speech article
common and intransitive transitive








4.2.2. In Aristotle. In light of this apparent correspondence between categories
and parts of speech in Stoic doctrine it is natural to ask how Aristotle’s categories
relate to the parts of speech. In traditional grammar it was common to appeal to
Aristotelian categories in the definitions of noun and verb. Priscian, for instance,
defined the verb by appeal to the categories of action and affection, and the noun by
appeal to the categories of substance and quality:
108The Stoic notion of ptōsis appears to have satisfied the following relation: a verb stands to a noun as a
predicate stands to a ptōsis (cf. esp. Plutarch, Questiones Platonicae 1009c). The question therefore arises
how this notion of ptōsis relates to that of quality. Pinborg (1975, p. 81) insists that they are in fact one
and the same, “with quality implying the physical reality behind language, ptōsis the logical structure as
seen in itself.” Frede (1994, p. 20) appears to make the same identification.
109Menn (1999, pp. 226–227) argues that it is participles which have as their denotation the somehow
disposed and the somehow relatively disposed. According to Priscian (GL II 54,9ff.) the Stoics counted
participles among the verbs (cf. Schmidt, 1979, p. 135, for more examples), so Menn’s view may be
reconcilable with that presented above.
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The characteristic of the verb is to signify action or affection or
both. . . 110
The characteristic of the noun is to signify substance and quality.111
A similar definition of the verb was given by Donatus in his Ars Minor,112 and there
is reference to action and affection also in the definition of the verb in the Technē
(GG I.1 46,5), although there energeia and not the Aristotelian poiein or any of
its derivatives is used as the name for the category of action. However, I know of
no attempt in traditional grammar at defining all the various parts of speech solely
in terms of Aristotle’s categories. Indeed, as we have just seen, more often than
not both morphological and syntactic characteristics played a role in that definition
besides semantical ones. The only attempt I am aware of at defining all parts of
speech purely in terms of Aristotle’s categories was carried out by the Danish linguist
Viggo Brøndal in his work Ordklasserne (1928).113 Brøndal there defined a system
of 15 word classes, many of them with subclasses, from the Aristotelian categories of
substance, relation, quantity, and quality. The system purported to be universal in
the sense that all word classes of all languages are among these 15. It lies outside the
scope of this dissertation to go further into Brøndal’s work.
Robert Kilwardby (13th century) denied that there could be any correspondence
between the parts of speech and Aristotle’s categories:
The parts of speech are not distinguished after the distinctions
of things, but after the distinctions of modes of signifying [. . . ]
Things of all categories can be signified by the noun, e.g., quantity
and quality and the rest. For that reason there are not ten parts
of speech as there are ten categories of things.114
110GL II 55,8–9: “Proprium est verbi actionem sive passionem sive utrumque cum modis et formis et
temporibus sine casu significare.”
111GL II 55,6: “Proprium est nominis substiantiam et qualitatem significare.”
112GL IV 359,4–5: “uerbum quid est? pars orationis cum tempore et persona sine casu aut agere aliquid
aut pati aut neutrum significans”
113See also hisMorfologi og Syntax (1932), where the Aristotelian categories of substance, relation, quantity,
and quality are used in defining various functional categories, such as subject, predicate, and object. The
class of prepositions is studied in Brøndal (1940).
114Kilwardby, in Priscianus minorem, (cited by Pinborg 1967, p. 48): “Non distinguuntur partes orationis
secundum distinctionem rerum, sed secundum distinctionem modorum significandi. Possunt autem omnes
res eodem modo significari, scilicet permodum habitus; ideo res omnium predicamentorum possunt per
nomen significari, ut quantitas et qualitas et sic de aliis. Et hac de ratione non sunt decem partes orationis,
sicut sunt x predicamenta rerum.”
A similar sentiment is expressed in Kilwardby’s commentary on the Categories (cited by Ebbesen 2005,
p. 259): “Est igitur, ut dicit Boethius, scientia Praedicamentorum de X vocibus X prima rerum genera
significantibus. Non enim est de vocibus penes diversas figurationes vocum, quae sunt inflectio casuum aut
temporum, sed de vocibus in quantum sunt significativae.”
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According to Kilwardby, the noun provides a counterexample, for it may signify el-
ements of any category. In fact, the modistae, of which Kilwardby may be counted
a member, held that, in general any thing may be the signification of all the vari-
ous parts of speech (cf. Pinborg, 1967, p. 81). One and the same dictio, which is a
sound (vox ) furnished with reference, can be formed into any part of speech so long as
the reference is compatible with the relevant form, the relevant “mode of signifying”
(modus significandi),115 that determines the part of speech. The words dolor, doleo,
dolens, dolenter, and heu!, for instance, all signify pain, but differ in their mode of
signifying it, namely as a noun, a verb, a participle, an adverb, and an interjection
respectively (cf. Pinborg, 1982, pp. 257). So according to the modistae the corre-
spondence between the parts of speech and the categories fails in both directions:
neither is the category of the thing signified determined by the part of speech of the
signifier, nor is the part of speech of the signifier determined by the category of the
thing signified.
Aristotle’s own language in Categories 4 indicates that he had not conceived of
any correspondence between parts of speech and the categories: the examples of each
of the four categories of action, affection, position, and having are all equally verbs.
One could, however, argue that these are different kinds of verb, and in the extension
of this set up a correspondence between the categories and a finer grouping of the
parts of speech. That was indeed done by Trendelenburg (1846, pp. 23–24), who
suggested the correspondence of substance to the noun, quantity and quality each to
a kind of adjective, when and where to adverbs of place and time respectively, relative,
at least its prototypical cases, to the comparative form of the adjective, and the four
other categories to four kinds of verbs—action to verbs in the active voice, affection
to verbs in the passive voice, position to “at least a part of the intransitives,” and
having to verbs in the perfect tense.116 Trendelenburg was certainly well aware that
no such correspondence is indicated in Aristotle’s works, and indeed that Aristotle had
not made the necessary grammatical distinctions; but he nevertheless thought that
grammatical reflection was instrumental to Aristotle’s conceiving of the categories (cf.
section 5.2 below).
115See Pinborg (1967, pp. 30–46) for the genealogy of this notion.
116Benveniste (1966, pp. 66–70), without citing Trendelenburg, argues for the same correspondence except
that he lets position correspond to verbs in the middle voice. For some discussion of Benveniste and Tren-
delenburg, see Kahn (1978, pp. 233–237). More recently Baumer (1993) has suggested the correspondence
of substance to noun (and other “nominal forms”), quality to adjective, relative to oblique cases of the noun,
quantity to grammatical number, when to tense, doing to the active voice, affection to the passive voice,
and where to preposition (cf. ibid. page 428). It is not clear to me how one should understand this, since a
noun always has number and may well be in an oblique case (does it then signify substance, quantity, and
relative?) and a verb has tense as well as voice (so it signifies a when as well as an activity or a passivity?).
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It is in any event clear that the division of linguistic items into categories differs
in character from its division into parts of speech; let us try to specify some of the dif-
ferentiae. According to Kilwardby, the parts of speech do not follow “the distinctions
of things.” We saw (p. 32) that according to Porphyry the division of language into
categories does indeed follow the distinctions of things, namely into genera of beings;
but Porphyry introduced the notions of primary and secondary imposition precisely so
as to be able to differentiate the division into categories from the division into parts of
speech (in Cat 58,30–59,14; cf. 57,29–58,6). Ammonius, in his commentary on the De
Interpretatione, raised the question (9,28–10,1) “why, when he has treated of simple
vocal sounds [=things said without combination]117 at book length in the Categories,
he here again undertakes to speak about name and verb, each of which is obviously a
simple vocal sound.” His response (10,4–10,12) nicely spells out Porphyry’s point:118
For when we consider that simple vocal sounds are significative
of the things to which they have been assigned, this is all we
call them—simple vocal sounds—since we do not here distinguish
names from verbs; but when we have seen some lack of correspon-
dence among these and find that some of them are combined with
articles while others are not, or also that some additionally signify
a certain time, while others do not, then we distinguish them from
one another and we call those which are combined with articles and
do not additionally signify time ‘nouns’; and those which cannot
be combined with articles but are said according to a certain time
we call ‘verbs’.
Given our identification of the notion of term with that of thing said without combi-
nation, and so with Ammonius’s “simple vocal sounds,” and generalizing Ammonius’s
response to all parts of speech, Porphyry’s point is the following. Terms are divided
into categories by considering them primarily as signifying things (and, according to
Porphyry, by letting them inherit the generic differences of the things they signify).
Words are divided into parts of speech by considering them not only according to
their signification, but also according to their grammatical properties; the latter re-
quires a reflection on the words themselves (secondary imposition) and not only on
their signification (primary imposition). Hence the criterion of classification in the
two cases concern different aspects of the linguistic items classified. Moreover, the
two divisions divide different items. Items categorized are terms; but not all words
117For this identification, cf. e.g. Ammonius in Cat 11,19.
118See the similar passage of Ammonius in Cat 11,7–11,17, where he employs the terminology of primary
and secondary imposition.
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of a given language are terms. In fact, if we adhere strictly to the ‘S is P ’–form,
then only noun, participle, and pronoun are grammatically suited as terms (a verb
we may perhaps think of as a “proto-term,” namely proto to its various participial
forms). On the other hand, any word belongs to a part of speech. And, as we argued
above, terms may be of arbitrary complexity; but the members of the parts of speech
are single words.
4.3. Syncategorems. In his commentary on the De Interpretatione Ammonius
divided the parts of speech into three classes: noun, verb, pronoun, and participle
are “significant of certain natures or simply of persons or activities or some combina-
tion of these” (11,9); the main function of the adverb is “to make clear some relation
of the predicate to the subject” (11,15);119 while article, preposition, and conjunc-
tion are “absolutely without significance by themselves” (12,14). What occasioned
this distinction in Ammonius was the question, just quoted, why Aristotle in the De
Interpretatione had discussed only noun and verb among the eight parts of speech.
About 400 years earlier Plutarch (1st century AD), in his tenth Platonic question,
had asked the same question with regard to Plato and as a response drawn, albeit
somewhat less perspicuously, distinctions along similar lines.120 It is in the context
of a discussion of such distinctions, moreover, that we first meet the word ‘syncate-
goremata’. Priscian reports that “according to the dialecticians” there are only two
parts of speech, namely noun and verb, while all other words are called syncategorems
(GL II 54,5–7). Since this division was suggested by dialecticians, it is presumably
meant to separate the words that can function as terms from those that cannot; hence
‘noun’ and ‘verb’ must here be understood, not in the manner of the grammarian,
but rather so as to include both pronoun and participle.121 Ammonius may have been
among the dialecticians Priscian had in mind, for at one place in his commentary
Ammonius says that only noun and verb are parts of speech (logos), while adverb,
conjunction, article, and preposition are merely parts of diction (lexis) (in Int 12,16–
13,6). Here a part of diction is any articulate sound, hence unlike a part of speech it
need not be significant.122
119On Ammonius on adverbs and his related treatment of modality, see Barnes (1991).
120Plutarch’s Platonic Questions are found in Book XIII of his Moralia. Luhtala (2005, pp. 129–137)
collects parts of this as well as several of the other texts discussed in this paragraph.
121 Hence the following statement by Apuleius (2nd century AD), grouping pronouns and participles
together with adverbs and conjunctions, is odd: “Indeed, adverbs, pronouns, participles, conjunctions and
other such things which grammarians list are no more parts of speech than ornamented curved sterns are
parts of ships and hair of men; or at least they are fit to be classed in the general structure of speech like
nails, pitch, and glue” (Londrey and Johansen, 1987, p. 85).
122According to Aristotle Poet 1456b20, where the roots of Ammonius’ terminology presumably lie, the
parts of lexis are letter (stoicheion), syllable, arthron, syndesmos, noun, verb, case, and logos itself.
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Ammonius was, however, not of the opinion that articles, prepositions, and con-
junctions are altogether void of significance. They are “absolutely without significance
by themselves” (ibid. 12,14); but that is probably to say that they are significant only
in conjunction with other expressions. Such a view was held already by Apollonius
Dyscolus, who compared articles, prepositions, and conjunctions to consonants, and
the other parts of speech to vowels (GG II.2 13,1–14,2): vowels can be pronounced by
themselves, but consonants need for their pronunciation the company of one or more
vowels, as do for instance /bi:/ and /keI/. Such, in fact, is the main characteristic
of syncategorems according to Priscian. He glosses this apparently Greek word123 as
“consignificantia” (GL II 54,7), which he in turn glosses as “signifying when conjoined
with other items, but not in itself” (GL III 114,19–20). The Latin verb consignificat
was Boethius’s translation of prossēmainei, a word Aristotle had employed in the De
Interpretatione for three not obviously related modes of signification:
• the verb’s signifying time in addition to whatever else it signifies (16b6);
• the mode of signification of the copula ‘is’: “by itself it is nothing, but it
prossēmainei some combination, which cannot be thought of without the
components” (16b24);
• the mode of signification of the quantifiers ‘every’ and ‘no’, which prossēmai -
nousi that the subject is “taken universally.”
If any of these senses survive in Priscian’s characterization of syncategorems as “sig-
nifying when conjoined with other items, but not in itself” it must be the second:
the copula signifies nothing by itself but joined to two terms it comes to signify a
combination.
That the meaning of a symbol is to be explained within a larger context is char-
acteristic of what Russell and Whitehead in the Principia Mathematica (p. 66) called
incomplete symbols; such symbols have only a “definition in use,” or what is some-
times called a contextual definition. A syncategorem is, however, not an incomplete
symbol in Russell’s sense. If, as seems reasonable, we take definite descriptions as
paradigms of such incomplete symbols, then their incompleteness is one which is not
apparent in the surface grammar, but which is seen only after logical analysis. This
is unlike syncategorems, which already on the surface is seen to require the company
of other expressions in order to have any use at all. Definite descriptions could seem
on the surface to be of use in naming entities, though according to Russell’s analysis
that is not the case—although the definite description appears as a subject term in a
123The components syn- and katēgorēma are Greek, but synkatēgorēma has apparently not been found in
any Greek sources (cf. Meier-Oeser, 1998, p. 787). The form of the word listed in the OED is ‘syncategorem’,
which will therefore be used here.
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proposition, there is no subject in the defining expression which the definite descrip-
tion abbreviates; rather, this is split up into an existential quantifier, a uniqueness
stipulation, and a predication. Syncategorems, by contrast, do not, not even on the
surface , seem to be of use in naming entities, or of any other use that does not involve
other expressions.
This could be taken to suggest that syncategorems have another sort of incom-
pleteness appealed to in modern logic, namely the incompleteness that according to
Frege is characteristic of function, predicate, and relation symbols (see section 1 of
chapter 2 below). Their incompleteness, or unsaturation, is evident on the surface,
hence in that regard they are closer to syncategorems than are Russellian incomplete
symbols. One should, however, not identify syncategorems with functions in Frege’s
sense. As we shall in section 1.3 of chapter 2, function symbols, just as all other
symbols of Frege’s logic, must be regarded as categorems of that logic, for they are
all assigned a type. The general point is that the notion of syncategorem can only
be understood in the context of traditional logic and grammar, where a distinction
is made between form and matter, and syncategorems are taken to be form elements
(more on this a few paragraphs below); in function–argument syntax, by contrast,
no distinction is made between form and matter. Notions of incompleteness found in
modern logic and grammar can therefore not be used in elucidating the incomplete-
ness of syncategorems. Thus, if following Barnes (2007, pp. 246–250) one seeks to
clarify the incompleteness of a syncategorem a by saying that its meaning can only
be explained in a context Xa, then this must be understood against the background
of traditional logic and grammar; for in modern logic and grammar that clarification
will apply to Fregean function symbols and Russellian incomplete symbols, neither of
which are syncategorematic.
Owing most likely to the problems that syncategorems caused in the logical anal-
ysis of various propositions there developed in the late 12th and early 13th century a
separate literature entirely devoted to their study.124 In this literature the notion of
consignification is never described along Priscianic lines. In what appears to be one of
the earliest instances of this literature consignification is rather glossed as “signifying
nothing that is complete and limited in itself (in se ipsis terminatum vel finitum),
124See Braakhuis (1979) for a study of this literature. The historical background in the logical analysis of
problematic propositions is treated extensively there (pp. 27–90), and is emphasized in the overview article
of Kretzmann (1982). One can find treatises on syncategorems published as late as the early 16th century
(cf. Meier-Oeser, 1998, p. 788).
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but signifying the dispositions and circumstances of things (dispositiones et circum-
stantias rerum)” (Braakhuis, 1979, p. 117).125 It is not clear to me in which sense
this characterizes a notion of consignification, but be that as it may; there is namely
another, more syntactic, characterization of syncategorems that appears to have been
dominant in this literature. It is found, if not expressly in the description of what
in general characterizes a syncategorem, so at least implicitly in the treatment of the
individual syncategorems (cf. ibid. p. 385). William of Sherwood, for instance, in
his Syncategoremata treatise describes syncategorems as “determinations of principal
parts [=categorems] insofar as they are subjects or predicates” (Kretzmann, 1968, p.
15). Syncategorems are thus not characterized in terms of any notion of consignifi-
cation, but rather by their role as specifying how the predicate is to be predicated
of the subject or the subject subjected to the predicate. Thus, the quantifier ‘every’
specifies how the subject is to be taken as subject of the predicate, namely that it is
“universally subjected to the predicate” (ibid. p. 17); and the modal adverb ‘necessar-
ily’ specifies how the predicate is to be taken as predicate of the subject, namely that
its composition with the subject is necessary (ibid. p. 101). William moreover distin-
guishes between categorematic and syncategorematic uses of the same word, and at
least in some cases (such as ‘all’ and the numerical quantifiers) this distinction comes
down to whether the word is to be considered as part of the subject or predicate, or
whether it modifies them along the lines indicated for ‘all’ and ‘necessarily’. But it
was not part of William’s characterization that those words are syncategorems which
cannot function by themselves as subject or predicate. This characterization, which
is implicit in the earlier tradition from Plutarch to Priscian, seems to appear again
only in the 14th century; it is found expressly in Albert of Saxony’s Logic I.3:
a categorem is said to be what, taken significatively, can be a sub-
ject or a predicate. . . a syncategorem is said to be what, taken
significatively, cannot be the subject or the predicate126
Buridan (14th century) in his Treatise on Consequences I.7 connects syncate-
gorems with the notion of form of the proposition. Having explained the notions of
formal and material consequence, Buridan remarks that he must add “what we take
to be the form of a consequence or proposition and what matter.” He continues
125Similar glosses are given in the logic of William of Sherwood (Kretzmann, 1966, p. 24) and in the
Syncategoremata treatise of Henry of Ghent (Braakhuis, 1979, p. 351).
126Albert von Sachsen (2010, p. 23): “Terminus categorematicus dicitur, qui significative acceptus postest
esse subiectum vel praedicatum vel pars subiecti vel pars praedicati propositionis categoricae. . . Sed ter-
minus syncategorematicus dicitur, qui significative acceptus non posse esse subiectum vel praedicatum vel
pars subiecti vel pars praedicati propositionis categoricae. . . ”
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by the matter of a proposition or consequence we understand the
purely categorematic terms, namely the subjects and predicates, as
distinguished from the syncategorematic terms adjoined to them,
by which they are connected or negated or distributed or deter-
mined to some particular manner of supposition; but we say that
everything else pertains to form.127
Thus Buridan identifies the matter of a proposition with “the purely categorematic
terms,” and holds that the syncategorematic words “pertain” to form. From the
ensuing discussion it appears that what he means by this pertaining is that the syn-
categorems contribute to determining the form of the proposition.128 From the same
discussion it is also clear that more factors contribute to determining this form, in
particular, the order of the syncategorems and the possible relation of the categorems
to each other (e.g. repetition of a term). Similar notions of the form and matter
of a proposition are found in Alexander of Aphrodisias’s commentary on the Prior
Analytics (2nd–3rd century AD).129 At the opening of APr I.2 Aristotle had said
(25a1–5):
every proposition states either that something belongs or that it
belongs of necessity or that it may belong, and of these some are
affirmative, others negative,. . . , and again of the affirmative and
negative propositions some are universal, others particular, and
others indeterminate. . .
Alexander calls the property of being affirmative or negative the proposition’s quality
and its property of being universal, particular, or indeterminate its quantity (in APr
11,29–34);130 the property of stating that something belongs, or belongs of necessity,
or that it may belong, Alexander calls the mode of the proposition (in APr 26,25–
28,30). Commenting on the quoted passage Alexander notes that “there will be in
all three times six propositions differing from one another in form” (in APr 27,20–
21). Thus he holds that the proposition’s quantity, quality, and mode all contribute
to the form of a proposition, in the sense that a difference in one of these yields a
difference in form. Alexander moreover speaks quite freely of terms as the matter of a
127Buridan (1976, p. 30): “Per materiam propositionis aut consequentiae intelligimus terminos pure cate-
gorematicos, scilicet subiecta et praedicata, circumscriptis syncategorematicis sibi appositis, per quae ipsa
coniunguntur aut negantur aut distribuuntur vel ad certum modum suppositionis trahuntur; sed ad formam
pertinere dicimus totum residuum.”
128For a helpful discussion, see Moody (1953, pp. 16–18).
129See Lee (1984, pp. 37–44) and Barnes (1990, esp. pp. 39–55).
130This terminology is also found in Apuleius (Londrey and Johansen, 1987, p. 82/83–84/85).
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proposition. For instance, Aristotle is said to use “letters in his exposition in order to
indicate to us that the conclusions do not depend on the matter” (in APr 53,29).131
A final characteristic of syncategorems that will be relevant for the following is
their role as connectors. It was of course part of the definition of the conjunction
that it conjoins other parts of speech, but, discussing the relation of categorems to
syncategorems, Ammonius suggests that all syncategorems—not only conjunctions—
conjoin other parts of speech; conjunctions, articles, prepositions, “and even adverbs”
(in Int 13,1–3)
are useful for combining and constructing the parts of speech with
one another, just as a bond is useful for adding unity to things
bound and glue to the things held together by it.
This view, and especially the comparison of the syncategorems with glue, is used or
mentioned by several philosophers and grammarians in Antiquity.132 But the char-
acteristic of having as their main function the binding of other parts of speech was,
as far as I know, never taken to define syncategorems, neither in Antiquity nor in
the Middle Ages. It, or something very close to it, was, however, used by Locke in
defining what he called particles. This group of words corresponds more or less to
the syncategorems, for it includes the copula as well as prepositions and conjunctions.
Locke introduced the notion thus (Essay III.vii.1):
Besides Words, which are names of Ideas in the Mind, there are a
great many others that are made use of, to signify the connexion
that the Mind gives to Ideas, or Propositions, one with another.
So the distinction here is between words that signify ideas133 and words that signify
connections established by the mind of ideas or propositions. It is then worth men-
tioning that in the Port-Royal grammar of Arnauld and Lancelot (1676) a similar
131From many, perhaps most, of the relevant passages it appears that for Alexander hylomorphism applies
not at the level of the proposition, but at the level of the syllogism; so for instance at the often quoted
in APr 6,26–28: “The figures are like a sort of common matrix (tupos tis koinos)—by fitting matter into
them, it is possible to mould the same form in different sorts of matter.” But we have seen that Alexander
also talks of the form of a proposition; and from in APr 36,2–9 it is likewise clear that terms may be
thought of as the matter of a proposition.
132Besides Ammonius in Int 12,25–13,6, see Dexippus in Cat 32,17–33,8 and the corresponding passage
in Simplicius in Cat 64,18–65,2. See moreover the passage from Apuleius quoted in footnote 121 above.
Plutarch used a different simile, saying that syncategorems contribute to speech “as salt does to a dish
of food and water to a barley-cake” (1010C). For grammatical references, see GG I.3 515,19ff. and GL II
551,18.
133E.g. Essay III.ii.2: “Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas
in the Mind of him that uses them.”
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distinction led to quite another division of the parts of speech. There, words sig-
nifying “objects of thought” are distinguished from words signifying the “form and
manner of thought” (p. 30). The former class is associated with the first operation of
the mind in traditional logic, the act of conceiving, while the latter class is associated
with the second operation, the act of judging (pp. 26–30). Since the verb is seen as
primarily signifying affirmation (p. 101), it is placed in the latter class together with
conjunction, which signifies the operation of the mind that joins or disjoins or negates
propositions, considering them absolutely or conditionally (p. 151);134 to this group
interjections belong as well, for an interjection is a word signifying (naturally rather
than by convention) “the movements of our soul”(p. 153). The preposition, on the
other hand, is not placed together with the conjunction, for it signifies an objective
relation which itself is an object of thought (p. 88),135 and so belongs to the former
group together with the noun, pronoun, and participle. In this group Arnauld and
Lancelot also include the adverb, which apparently is merely an abbreviation of a
prepositional phrase, as in the equation X-ly = with X-ness (p. 93); as well as the
article, for it merely specifies the meaning of the noun (p. 52). In other words, for
Arnauld and Lancelot the categorematic parts of speech, those that are “names of
ideas in the mind,” are noun, pronoun, participle, article, preposition, and adverb;
while the syncategorematic parts of speech, those that “signify connexion,” are verb,
conjunction, and interjection.
5. Kantian themes
The discussion of syncategorems in the previous section may shed light on the
relation of Aristotle’s to Kant’s categories. One can say that Kant’s categories stand
to syncategorems as Aristotle’s categories stand to categorems. Like syncategorems,
Kant’s categories are associated with the form of a proposition and with the notion
of connection; like categorems, Aristotle’s categories are associated with the matter
of a proposition and what is connected by the syncategorems. In a formula: Kant’s
categories synthesize what are categorized by Aristotle’s categories.
5.1. Kant’s table of categories. According to Kant, his table of judgement
provides “the clue to the discovery” of the table of categories (the latter can be found
in Appendix 2 on page 66 below). The elements of the table of judgement are first
134This is a slight distortion of the truth, since conjunctions at the cited place are said to signify “l’operation
mesme de nostre esprit, qui joint, ou disjoint les choses, qui les nie, qui les considere absolument, ou avec
condition”; so it is not propositions, but things, which are joined or disjoined, etc. by conjunctions.
135“les Cas & les Propositions avoient esté inventez pour le mesme usage, qui est de marquer les rapports
que les choses ont les unes aux autres.”
52
introduced as “functions of the understanding (in judging)” and “moments of thinking
(in judging)” (A70/B95ff.), though Kant also speaks of these items as forms of judge-
ment.136 These functions or moments or forms, of which there are twelve in total, are
placed in four groups of three under the headings of ‘quantity’, ‘quality’, ‘relation’,
and ‘modality’.137 Under the heading of ‘quality’, for instance, one finds the forms
of general, particular, and singular, and under the heading of ‘relation’ the forms
of categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. As the study of Tonelli (1966) shows,
all of Kant’s twelve forms of judgement were recognized in logic books of the time,
indeed most of them are part of Aristotelian syllogistics; but the precise combination
assumed by Kant is apparently original, as is the idea of listing them in a table.138
The argument that the table of judgement can serve to uncover the table of cate-
gories is roughly as follows. The categories are primitive pure concepts; concepts are
the business of the understanding; being pure, the categories must therefore some-
how lie in the understanding in advance of all experience, and being primitive, they
are not derived from other concepts; the categories are Stammbegriffe (A81/B107)
or Elementarbegriffe (A64/B89, Prolegomena, § 39, p. 323). According to Kant, the
exercise of the understanding is exhausted by its exercise in judgement,139 hence we
can discover the categories only by paying attention to the notion of judgement itself;
not by paying attention to the possible terms of a judgement since these in general
have an empirical origin, but to the forms of judgement, or to the “functions of the
understanding” by means of which the terms of the judgement are unified.140 In fact,
136See, for instance, Prolegomena § 22 (p. 304). In another context (A266/B322) Kant reports that,
according to logicians, the form of a judgement is the relation in it by means of the copula of the “given
concepts.”
137As we have seen above, the use of ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ for forms of judgement can be traced back at
least to the 2nd century AD, being present in both Alexander of Aphrodisias and Apuleis; Alexander also
speaks of the tropos of a proposition as its stating that “something belongs or that it belongs of necessity or
that it may belong,” and ‘mode’ is just the translation of tropos in this sense. What Kant calls the relation
of a judgement (which name is not found before Kant, cf. Tonelli 1966, p. 151) was called its “substance”
by William of Sherwood (Kretzmann, 1966, pp. 27–29).
138Tonelli (1966, p. 140) reprints a table found in a logic of a certain Boehm, published in 1749, but this
has a very different structure from Kant’s table. As Kneale and Kneale (1962, p. 356) point out, Kant’s
tabulation is confusing. In syllogistics each proposition has a quantity, a quality, and a modality, but
that is no longer so when one includes conditional and other complex judgements: what, for instance, is a
negative hypothetical judgement?
139A69/B94: “Wir können aber alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urteile zurückführen, so daß der
Verstand überhaupt als ein Vermögen zu Urteilen vorgestellt werden kann.” These acts of the under-
standing include apart from judging itself what is traditionally known as simple apprehension, and reasoning
(cf. footnote 81 above). For a detailed explication of Kant’s argument as set out in the surrounding text,
see Wolff (1995, esp. pp. 87–110).
140Cf. A78/B104: “Aber nicht die Vorstellungen [∼terms], sondern die reine Synthesis der Vorstellungen
auf Begriffe zu bringen, lehrt die transz. Logik.”
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the categories are the concepts derived from the unity that these functions of the
understanding bring to a manifold of intuition.141
Kant famously concludes (A79/B105) that
In this manner there arise just as many pure concepts of the un-
derstanding, which relate a priori to objects of intuition, as there
in the previous table were logical functions in all possible judge-
ments.142
Not only do the categories and the forms of judgement have the same number, as Kant
states here, but their tables have a similar construction: the categories are divided into
the same four headings with three items under each standing in a one-one correlation
with items of the table of judgements. Precisely how the forms of judgement and the
categories relate is, however, a complicated question. On the one hand there is the
statement of the complete coincidence of the categories with the “logical functions of
thinking,” that is, the forms of judgement (B159). On the other hand there is the
statement that the categories require apart from these logical functions of thinking
some aspect of sensibility (the so-called “schemata”), for without that we do not yet
have concepts (A245). But to get into the details of all of this would only take us off
track.143
Following the table of categories Kant glosses ‘category’ as “original pure con-
cept of synthesis” (A80/B106); a few pages earlier he had described a category as
a “pure synthesis generally represented” (A78/B104). This hints at the fundamental
role played by the categories in Kant’s critical epistemology: from the Transcenden-
tal Deduction (especially in the B-edition) and the System of Principles it emerges
that the categories are what primarily bring about connection and unity among our
representations, thereby making experience (Erfahrung) possible. Such a conception
of the categories, as “conditions for the possibility of experience” (e.g. A94/B126), in-
deed as the “originator” (Urheber) of experience (B127), is of course not to be found
in Aristotle, nor in any other doctrine of categories that we shall deal with in this
dissertation, but is a peculiarity of Kant’s doctrine.
141A79/B104–105: “Dieselbe Funktion, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen in einem Urteile Einheit
gibt, die gibt auch der bloßen Synthesis verschiedener Vorstellungen in einer Anschauung Einheit, welche,
allgemein ausgedruck, der reine Verstandesbegriff heißt.” For a helpful discussion of this passage, see Allison
(2004, pp. 152–156).
142“Auf solche Weise entspringen gerade so viel reine Verstandesbegriffe, welche a priori auf Gegenstände der
Anschauung überhaupt gehen, als es in der vorigen Tafel logische Funktionen in allen möglichen Urteilen
gab: denn der Verstand ist durch gedachte Funktionen völlig erschöpft, und sein Vermögen dadurch gänzlich
ausgemessen.”
143One relevant distinction worth mentioning, in effect made by Kant at A245, is that between pure and
schematized category, for which see, for instance, Paton (1936, vol. 1, pp. 260–261).
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Above we saw that syncategorems are described both as pertaining to form in
contrast to the matter of a proposition, and as signifying a connection by the mind
of ideas signified by categorems. The foregoing shows that these two characteristics
also fit Kant’s categories: they stand in an intimate relationship with the forms of
judgement and are indeed themselves described as “forms of thought” (Gedankenfor-
men, B150, B305); and they serve to connect and unify our representations. Both of
these characteristics, being the form of thought and what unifies it, are alluded to
when Kant calls the categories “the mere form of connection as it were” of experience
(Prolegomena § 39, p. 323). A syncategorem was, however, also described as what
cannot by itself be the term of a syllogistic proposition. Hence, according to our inter-
pretation of what falls under Aristotle’s categories, syncategorems are precisely those
elements of a syllogistic proposition that are not categorized. But then we see that
Kant and Aristotle must have been led by quite different motives. For if we consider
a propositional schema of modal syllogistics, such as ‘all A are possibly B’, and ask
which elements of this proposition are of relevance to the doctrine of categories, then
we shall get directly opposite answers according as to whether we assume Aristotle’s
or Kant’s doctrine. According to Aristotle’s doctrine it is the terms A and B that
are of relevance to category theory, for these are then the items categorized. Accord-
ing to Kant’s doctrine, however, it is all the other elements that are of relevance,
namely the universal quantity, the affirmative quality, the categorical relation, and
the problematic modality, for these correspond to the categories. Thus the locus of
the proposition from the point of view of Kant’s doctrine is the complement of its
locus from the point of view of Aristotle’s doctrine.
This complementarity of the two doctrines may help to explain the difficulty in
answering in the case of Kant the questions we posed in sections 1 and 2 regarding
Aristotle’s categories. What are the items categorized by Kant’s categories? They
are said to be concepts of objects überhaupt (B128, A242, A290/346), so one could
perhaps say, quite straightforwardly, that it is objects which fall under the categories.
But the main role of the categories is to bring synthetic unity to a manifold of intuition,
and that happens when such a manifold is brought under one or more of the categories.
Hence it seems that one could equally well say that it is manifolds of intuition that
fall under the categories; but a manifold of intuition in the relevant sense is not yet an
object, indeed it is an object only when subsumed under one or more categories (cf.
A104–105, B137). Matters do not get more tractable when considering the individual
categories. I would not know what to say to the question of which items fall under
the category of plurality (Vielheit); or under this category rather than under the
category of totality (Allheit); or under the category of negation? Under each of
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Kant’s categories of relation there would seem to fall not single items, but rather
pairs or even greater pluralities of items. That is clear enough for the categories of
cause and effect, and of community, but even the category of substance is not one
under which single items fall, since Kant’s category is in fact that of substance and
accident, corresponding to the subject and predicate of a categorical judgement (cf.
B128–129). The categories of modality are said to express the relation of a concept
to the capacity for knowledge (Erkenntnisvermögen), and not help determining the
object itself (A219/B266); so these would seem to be modifications of concepts rather
than concepts themselves.
With no clear answer to the question of what the items categorized are according
to Kant’s doctrine, it is not easy either to characterize the generality of Kant’s cat-
egories. They are conditions for the possibility of thought of objects—that may be
taken to entail high generality, since the categories must then be involved somehow
in all thought of objects; but it is not a description of the kind of generality that
pertains to them as concepts. We should probably want to say that this is a formal
kind of generality, for the categories are called the intellectual form of experience
(A310/B367) and contrasted with its matter (cf. A86/B118). In section 6.2 of chap-
ter 2 below we shall consider a notion of generality, or rather formality, that may
seem pertinent to Kant’s categories. But that, as we shall see, is a kind of generality
to be explained by analogy with the relation of a constant term to a variable, an
explanation which hardly is adequate in the case of Kant’s categories: what would be
a variable corresponding to the category of negation, or to the category of existence
and non-existence?
On the basis of Kant’s logical doctrine of concepts—in particular the doctrine
of the “extension and intension” of concepts144—and some remarks at the end of the
Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection (A290–291/B346–348), Tolley (2012, pp. 433–
440) has suggested that we understand the generality of the categories in terms of
extension and intension. Being of high generality, the categories are concepts of minor
intension but vast extension. In particular, the categories are conceived to have only
the concept of an object überhaupt and a very few other concepts in their intension.
Indeed, the suggestion is that the categories are reached by a number of divisions
144The doctrine is found in the Port-Royal Logique (I.vii): “J’appelle comprehension de l’idée, les attributs
qu’elle enferme en soi, & qu’on ne lui peut ôter sans la détruire. . . J’appelle étendue de l’idée, les sujets à
qui cette idée convenient.” Kant employs Inhalt for the former and Umfang or Sphäre for the latter (cf.
Jäsche Logik § 8). Hamilton in his Lectures on Logic introduced ‘intension’ instead of ‘comprehension’
(cf. Kneale and Kneale 1962, p. 318; OED), a word that after Carnap (1947) has taken on a different
significance in logic. For the doctrine of the extension and intension of concepts in Kant, see De Jong
(1995, pp. 622–627).
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from the concept of an object überhaupt, where a division must consist in adding
marks to the intension of a concept so as to obtain a more specific concept.145 As
there are 12 = 2 · 2 · 3 categories, they should be reached after three such divisions,
and one of these divisions would need to be trichotomous; that would presumably be
the division of each of the four headings of quantity, quality, relation, and modality
into the three categories under each. Kant calls the categories of quantity and quality
‘mathematical’ and those of relation and modality ‘dynamical’ (B110), and that could
perhaps be taken to correspond to the first division (cf. Tolley ibid. fn. 47).
I am rather sceptical of this suggestion. Firstly, it owes us an an account of the
subsumption of items under the categories. As long as it is unclear what it means
for an item to fall under a category—and whether this means the same for all the
categories—it is also unclear what it means to talk of the extension of a category. One
could insist that the extension of a concept, according to Kant, consists of the concepts
contained under it, while the complications discussed above concern what it means for
an individual to fall under a category; these are two quite different things for Kant, as
he did not accept individual concepts. If, however, an individual is subsumed under
the concept ‘man’, then it is presumably also subsumed under all the concepts in the
intension of ‘man’, and the suggestion was that in the intension of any concept there
will be one or more categories. Hence, if one or more categories belong to the intension
of any concept, then we should need an account of the subsumption of individuals
under the categories. Secondly, a question Duns Scotus had asked concerning attempts
to derive Aristotle’s categories by division (a topic to be discussed in the next section)
now arises with regards to Kant’s categories: when the categories have several other
concepts above them in the hierarchy of extension and intension, why is it that they
are of such special interest; why are precisely the concepts reached after three divisions
of such importance?
Another token of the complementarity of Aristotle’s and Kant’s notions of cate-
gory lies in their relation to the principle of mutual exclusion discussed above, namely
the principle that the same item does not fall under two categories. We saw that,
although Aristotle denies this principle, it is nevertheless natural to assume it for his
145Both De Jong (1995, p. 624) and Tolley (2012, p. 434) connect the doctrine of extension and intension
of concepts to the Tree of Porphyry. Indeed, according to the Jäsche Logik §§8–10, a concept A in the
intension of another concept B, is called a genus of B. Since Porphyrian differentiae as well as genera
belong to the intension of a concept, this conception of genus breaks with the Porphyrian doctrine, for it
requires us to identify genera and differentiae. It is not clear to me that concepts ordered according to their
extension and intension will in fact form a tree: directly above any concept apart from a highest there will
be more than one concept; for instance directly above man there will be animal and rational; hence there
is no unique way upwards in the ordering; but that is what characterizes a tree.
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categories. In the case of Kant’s categories, however, it is more natural to deny than
to accept the principle. Already the table of categories suggests that an object is
determined with respect to one category under each of the four headings of quantity,
quality, relation, and modality. That is also the picture emerging from the System of
Principles, where each trio of principles deals with a determination of the object not
settled by any of the other trios. Paton (1936, vol. 1, pp. 226, 303), in fact, insists
that the categories are universal concepts, that is, concepts under which all objects
fall, hence conversely, that each object falls under all the categories.
5.2. Generating the categories. Kant famously objected that Aristotle in his
conception of the categories followed no principle, but “amassed them as he stum-
bled upon them.”146 Without such a principle the list of categories remains a mere
“rhapsody” and not a system on which one can build philosophical theory.147 In Kant
this demand for a principle of generation is coupled with a demand for a proof of
completeness of the list of categories, a proof that the list contains all and only the
categories. As we saw in section 2.1.1, Aristotle did offer a proof of completeness for
his list or predicables, but we do not find anything similar in his writings for his list
of categories.
5.2.1. Completeness. Kant, by contrast, held that his own derivation of the cate-
gories from the forms of judgement showed the former to be complete. The parallelism
between the forms of judgement and the categories “provides a rule according to which
the place of each concept of the understanding and the completeness of all of them
together can be determined a priori ” (A67/B92). Kant thus bases the assertion of the
completeness of his table of categories on the assumption that his table of judgement
is complete. The question then arises whether this assumption is correct. Since it is
difficult to find in Kant’s text any principle governing the construction of the table
of judgement, it is natural to think that it was simply assembled by Kant from what
he had found in logic textbooks of the time, with no guarantee that the outcome
should be complete. This thought has been challenged in the classic work of Reich
(1948) and in a more recent study of Wolff (1995). Reich argued that a principle for
the construction of the table of judgement can be found in the “synthetic unity of
apperception” and the definition of judgement following in its wake in the Transcen-
dental Deduction of the B edition (B141). For Wolff the key to completeness is Kant’s
notion of function, defined in the section of the Critique where the table of judgement
146:A81/B107): “Es war ein eines scharfsinnigen Mannes würdiger Anschlag des Aristoteles, diese Grund-
begriffe aufzusuchen. Da er aber kein Principium hatte, so raffte er sie auf, wie sie ihm aufstießen, und
trieb deren zuerst zehn auf, die er Kategorien (Prädikamente) nannte.”
147This point is emphasized in the Prolegomena § 39 (pp. 322–326).
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is given, namely as “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under
a common one” (A68/B93). Kant does, after all, say that the four headings in the
table of judgement correspond to four “functions of the understanding” (A70/B95).
A more detailed account of the arguments of Reich and Wolff lies outside the scope
of this dissertation.
It is perhaps not so well known that Kant’s criticism of Aristotle had ancient
forerunners. Porphyry remarks in his commentary on the Categories that not everyone
had accepted Aristotle’s list as the list of categories or highest genera (in Cat 86,31):
There are three sorts of objections: some object that his list con-
tains too many items, some that it contains too few, and others
that he has included some genera instead of others.
No attempt is found in Porphyry’s text to refute these objections,148 but Simplicius in
his more extensive discussion of the problem of completeness suggests that one may
derive the categories by a division (diairesis) in the sense of Plato (cf. section 2.2.1).
Simplicius starts with the notion of beings (ta onta) and obtains the ten categories
by successively adding differentiae (in Cat 67,26ff.). A similar idea is found in Olym-
piodorus (in Cat 54,4ff.) and Elias (in Cat 159,9ff.), although their division yields
only the four categories of substance, quantity, quality, and relation, while the other
six categories are obtained from these four by composition.149
Simplicius introduces his division in a dubitative tone, and it can indeed be ques-
tioned how Aristotelian it is, for it seems to render being, namely the top node of
the division, a genus. Aristotle had, however, argued that being is not a genus (Met
B.3 998b21): the divisive differentiae of a genus do not fall under it as species (cf.
Top 122b20–23); hence if being were a genus its divisive differentiae, not falling under
the genus of being, would not have being, which Aristotle assumes cannot be the
case.150 In the High Middle Ages the question of the completeness of Aristotle’s list of
categories became known as the question of sufficientia praedicamentorum, and was
commented on by a number of authors.151 Among these was Thomas Aquinas, who
148The editor Busse suggests that there may be a lacuna at the place in the text (namely after the quoted
passage) where such a refutation could have been found.
149Brentano (1862, p. 179) cites a passage of Ammonius where one also finds this idea of obtaining the
six latter categories by composition, but I have not been able to locate this passage in the CAG edition of
Ammonius’s commentary on the Categories.
150At Top IV.1 passim; IV.6 127a26–38 Aristotle considers both being (to on), unity (to hen), and object
of belief (to doxaston, 121a22) as candidate genera and species, but he does so in the context of examples,
and these need not reflect Aristotelian doctrine (cf. SE 178a19 where ‘to see’ is called a passivity, while
according to DA II.5 seeing is precisely not a passivity (esp. 418a2)).
151For an overview, see e.g. Bos and van der Helm, A. C. (1998) and Pini (2003), as well as Pini (2002, pp.
185–189).
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before responding to the question in his commentary on Met ∆.7 (in Met ∆ lect. 9 nn.
889–894) repeats Aristotle’s argument that being is not a genus. This may well have
been an implicit criticism of Simplicius’s suggested derivation;152 his own division, in
any event, is not one of being, but rather one of kinds of predication.153
What is perhaps the most sophisticated derivation of Aristotle’s categories by
division, hence the most sophisticated derivation in the tradition going back at least
to Simplicius, is that offered by Brentano (1862, esp. 144–178). Brentano gives a
division terminating in Aristotle’s categories which not only can be reconciled with the
doctrine that being is not a genus, but which also purports to be through and through
Aristotelian, each branching being justified by reference to Aristotelian texts and
doctrines (mainly taken from theMetaphysics).154 An idea of considerable importance
to Brentano’s division is that of analogical unity. The unity of a notion may be of
different sorts. In particular, a notion may have a weaker sort of unity than that
possessed by a genus, namely what Brentano, following Aristotle Met ∆.6 1016b31ff.,
calls analogical unity. According to Brentano, this is the sort of unity that the notion
of healthiness has in its application to men as well as to their appearance, their diet,
and their habits. A healthy appearance is indicative of a man’s good health, while
a healthy diet and healthy habits are productive and preservative of it. In each case
‘healthy’ means something else, so the word is homonymous, but all of its various
senses are related to the idea of a man’s good health, and this relation furnishes the
notion of healthiness with unity, namely analogical unity, which it preserves through
all of its applications. Aristotle famously argues that the same holds for ‘being’ (e.g.
Met Γ.2): this term is homonymous across the categories, but all of its senses are
in some way related to the notion of substance. Being is not a genus, but it has
152Simplicius’s commentary on the Categories was translated into Latin by William of Moerbeke in 1266;
it is reasonable to assume that Thomas read this work, since he apparently refers to it in the Summa
Theologica (cf. McMahon, 1981, p. 86); he might have done so by 1268, when he begun writing the
commentary on the Metaphysics (cf. Bos and van der Helm, A. C., 1998, p. 187). Radulphus Brito,
writing around 1300, claims that his division agrees with that of Simplicius (“ista sufficientia concordat
cum sufficienta Simplicii,” McMahon, 1981, p. 91); this is not quite right, for the two divisions disagree
already in their first branching: where Simplicius divides ta onta into “existences” (hyparxeis) and activities
(energeiai), Radulphus divides ens into ens per se substistens and ens in alio; the latter corresponds rather
to Simplicius’s division of existences into those that have their being per se (kath heautos echousi to einai)
and those that come to be in others (en allois hyphestēkasin).
153Cf. Wippel (1987) for more details.
154See Brentano (1862, p. 177) for an overview of passages justifying each branching. Brentano (ibid.
pp. 147–148) even suggests that Aristotle himself would have known of the possibility of this division. If
one accepts the reconstruction of the development of Aristotle’s conception of the homonymy of ‘being’
offered by Owen (1960), or indeed simply that the Categories or the Topics were written before most of
the Metaphysics, then the most one can say is that Aristotle saw the possibility of this division only after
he had conceived of the categories.
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analogical unity, and according to Brentano, so do all the various notions that feature
in his division above the categories, such as the notions of accidence (symbebēkota)
and passive state (pathē).
Brentano’s division is therefore compatible with the doctrine that being is not a
genus. The division is not one from a notion enjoying generic unity, but one from
a notion enjoying analogical unity. We reach genera in the division only when we
reach the categories. Brentano therefore has a response to the objection of Duns
Scotus, already mentioned, that no derivation of the categories by division is possible,
since any such division shows that the categories are not the most general terms,
the elements higher up in the tree being more general:155 according to Brentano
these higher nodes are not themselves genera; it is only with the categories that the
division yields genera. Brentano’s division is, moreover, not affected by an objection
raised by Bonitz (1853, p. 645): according to APo I.7 a demonstration presupposes
an underlying genus, and in the case of a derivation of the categories that genus will
have to be being; but being is not a genus; hence no derivation of the categories, be
it by division or otherwise, can be Aristotelian. However, it is sufficient for Aristotle
that the underlying domain has analogical unity: the case of ontology shows this, for
its domain is being qua being, and that is a notion having only analogical unity (cf.
Brentano, 1862, pp. 145–147).
A few remarks may be made here on the recent work of Studtmann (2008b), who
purports to show by means of division that “Aristotle’s categorial scheme is derivable
from his hylomorphic ontology” (p. 15, repeated at p. 141).156 As far as derivations
155This is one of Duns Scotus’s arguments in the following passage from the Questions on Metaphysics
V q. 5–6, quoted by Pini (2002, p. 188): “Notae: variae sunt viae divisivae ostendendi sufficientiam
praedicamentorum, quae videntur dupliciter peccare. Primo, quia ostendunt oppositum propositi, scilicet
quod divisio entis in haec decem non sit prima. Si enim prius fiat in ens per se et in ens non per se,
et ultra unum membrum subdividatur vel ambo: aut quaelibet divisio erit tantum nominis aequivoci,
in aequivocata, quod nihil est probare – quia nomina sunt ad placitum; aut aliquo istorum decem erit
conceptus communior immediatior enti, et ita ens non immediate dividitur in decem. Exemplum patet:
ponendo quod per divisiones multas subordinatas in genere substantiae tandem deveniritur ad decem
species specialissimas, illae non primo dividerent substantiam. Secundo, quia omnes illae viae divisivae
non probant. Oportet enim probare quod divisum sic dividitur, et praecise sic, et hoc ad propositum,
scilicet quod dividentia constituant generalissima.”
156Shields (2007, p. 168) writes that “an older tradition sought. . . to show how the theory of categories could
in fact be derived from hylomorphism,” and (p. 170) that “no genuine attempt has been made since the
Middle Ages” at doing so, but he provides no references. The section in question, Generating the categories
(pp. 159–172), seems, however, to rely heavily on the useful presentation of this topic in Studtmann (2008a),
to which Shields does refer. Studtmann there cites a passage from Thomas’ derivation (in Met ∆ lect. 9
n. 892) where it is said that if a predicate is taken as being in a subject essentially and absolutely and as
flowing from its matter (ut consequens materiam), then it is a predicate of quantity; and likewise for form
and quality. This is part of Thomas’ division, but only a part of it, namely that part yielding the categories
of quantity and quality. There is no indication in Thomas’ text that all of the categories can be derived
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are concerned, however, what this work actually accomplishes is at most to show how
the two categories of quality and quantity each may be divided into various species
and subspecies by means of a certain understanding of the notions of form and matter
developed by Studtmann in the first part of his book. That is, instead of deriving the
categories of quantity and quality by division from some other notions, Studtmann
derives by means of a certain understanding of hylomorphism various species falling
under the categories of quantity and quality. But such a derivation of the various
species of a category is not a derivation of the category in the relevant sense. We
want to be shown a path taking us from certain notions—which in this case would be
form and matter—to the categories, not a path taking us from the categories to various
terms falling under this category. And even if Studtmann had given a derivation of
the categories of quantity and quality from the notions of form and matter, one could
still not talk of a derivation of the categories, for the whole point of such a derivation
is to show that Aristotle’s ten categories are all and only the categories. A derivation
only of quantity and quality suggests that there are no other categories than these
two, and so jeopardizes the whole project of showing the completeness of Aristotle’s
list.
5.2.2. Derivation without completeness. A derivation of the list of categories by
means of division will, to the extent that it succeeds, also show the completeness of
the list: being the result of a division from a universal concept or quasi-concept, they
exhaust conceptual space. Kant’s primary objection to Aristotle’s list was, however,
not that it came with no proof of completeness, but rather that it was not the outcome
of an underlying principle. That proposing such a principle need not mean providing
a proof of completeness is clear from two ways of accounting for how Aristotle may
first have conceived his categories. One account is associated with Trendelenburg, the
other with several interpreters from Ockham to Ackrill.
Trendelenburg (1846, pp. 23–34) was perhaps the first to attempt to defend Aris-
totle against Kant’s criticism.157 Although Trendelenburg does nothing to show the
completeness of Aristotle’s list, he argues that it is an outcome of an analysis of
grammar.158 The categories are thus taken to correspond to various grammatical
distinctions. Apart from pointing to the relevant grammatical distinctions and the
from the notions of form and matter, and as far as I know, there is no older tradition of attempting such
a derivation. (There is a tradition, manifest e.g. in Porphyry Isag 11.12–11.17, and perhaps going back
to Aristotle (Met 1045a14–b7; cf. 1024b8), of likening genus to matter and differentia to form, but that is
something else.)
157Brentano (1862, p. 144) associates the problem of the “deduction” of the categories with Simplicius; as
far as I can see, he never mentions Kant.
158Trendelenburg (1846, p. 33): “. . . dass die logischen Kategorien zunächst einen grammatischen Ursprung
haben und dass sich der grammatische Leitfaden durch ihre Anwendung durchzieht.”
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correspondence reported in section 4.2 above, Trendelenburg supports his account by
adducing a number of passages from the Sophistical Refutations (SE 166b10ff.; ch.
22) that touch on the relation between the surface grammar of a word and its cate-
gory. The point of several of these passages, however, is that the category of a term
is not always indicated by surface grammar; hence, they cannot support the claim
that the categories were conceived by reflection on surface grammar. Trendelenburg’s
more considered claim is therefore that only in the early stages of uncovering the
categories did grammatical consideration play an important role, while “the content
of the concept” led the way thereafter.159 Trendelenburg offers two further lines of
support for his interpretation.160 Firstly (ibid. pp. 27–30), he argues that there is a
close correspondence between the grammatical notion of ptōsis and that of a cate-
gory.161 Secondly (ibid. pp. 30–33), he refers to the role that grammatical case plays
in Aristotle’s definition of the category of relation: a relative term always requires a
genitive or dative for its completion.162 It is difficult to find in these considerations
any support for the grammatical origin of Aristotle’s doctrine of categories; but we
may indeed take them to support the more moderate contention that reflection on
grammar played an important role at the initial stage of its conception.
According to Ockham (Summa Logicae I.41) and Ackrill (1963, pp. 78–79) and
others163 the categories correspond to questions that may be asked about a given
primary substance, typically a man. To the question of where a man is, only a term
from the category of where is appropriate; to the question of when a man is, only
a term from the category of when is appropriate; to the question of what a man is,
only a term from the category of substance—sometimes called ‘what it is’ (ti esti)
by Aristotle—is appropriate.164 This thesis thus gains support from the fact that
159Cf. ibid. p. 25: “dass sich die Kategorien zunächst nach der Gestalt des Ausdrucks zurecht gefunden,
sodann aber über diese hinaus den Inhalt des Begriffs verfolgen.”
160For a critical discussion, see Bonitz (1853, pp. 626–640).
161Aristotle seems to have thought of all words derived from another (so-called “paronyms”) as ptōseis of
the parent word (Cat 1a12–15). Thus a noun in an oblique case (Int 16b1, Poet 1456b19–21), verbs
not in the present tense (Int 16b7), as well as adverbs derived from adjectives, as ‘justly’ from ‘just’
(Top 106b29–107a2, 114a33–36, 136b15–32), are all ptōseis.
162Cf. Cat 6a37: “We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other
things. . . ” Here the “of or than other things” translates a genitive (heterōn), but Aristotle goes on to give
examples where a dative complement is used (e.g. at 6b9).
163For instance Gomperz (1909, p. 29), Gillespie (1925), and Ryle (1938).
164Thus in Ockham Summa Logicae I.41 (translated by Loux, 1974, p. 130):
the distinction among the categories is taken from the distinction among interrog-
atives appropriate to substance or an individual substance. The different questions
which can be asked about a substance can be answered by different simple terms,
and a simple term falls under a category accordingly as it can be used to answer
this or that question about substance.
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the category names ‘where’ and ‘when’ (or the Greek words they translate) may
serve as interrogatives, and that one of Aristotle’s names for substance, ti esti, in the
appropriate context means, What is it? It gains further support from the fact that
the Greek, unlike the English, names for the categories of quantity and quality, and
likewise the Greek name for the category of relatives, may serve as interrogatives. The
names of the four last categories are all verbs in the infinitive; but they correspond
naturally to questions one may ask of a substance, or at least of a man: what is he
doing; what is he undergoing; what is his position; what does he wear (what is his
habit)?
The suggestion is thus that Aristotle had, perhaps while developing the method
for dialectic presented in the Topics, found occasion to distinguish these various ques-
tions, and thence ordered the appropriate answers into “classes of predicates” (genē
tōn katēgoriōn).165 A proof of completeness for the list of categories cannot be derived
from this account, since there are interrogatives in Greek, such as ‘how’ (pōs), that
do not correspond to any categories;166 and, as we just saw, there are categories whose
names do not correspond to interrogatives. But the account may perhaps support the
claim that Aristotle followed a principle in constructing the list, hence that he did
not merely “amass the categories as he stumbled upon them.”
The category of relatives, however, shows that simply considering the questions
that may be asked of a substance cannot quite have been Aristotle’s procedure. For
the question pros ti;, which we may translate as ‘relative to what?’, asked of Socrates
cannot be answered with a relative term such as ‘father’ or ‘husband’.167 Terms in the
category of relatives are not in general felicitous answers to the question, Relative to
what? On the contrary, the predication of a relative term of a subject is a predication
that prompts the question, Relative to what? To ask, Relative to what?, of Socrates
makes little sense, but if we say that he is a husband, we may ask, Relative to what
is he that, who is his wife? Socrates is a father; relative to what is he that, who is
his son? The possibility of asking this question is characteristic of relatives. To the
predications ‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘Socrates is white’, for instance, it does not make
sense to ask, Relative to what is he that? But it does make sense if we predicate a
relative of Socrates; indeed, it is then often called for. Hence, while the category of
relatives may be taken to correspond to the question derived from its name, pros ti,
165For this reading, see Gillespie (1925, esp. pp. 81 ff.). For a detailed argument that the Categories is to
be read as a manual of dialectic, see Menn (1995).
166Recall from section 4.2 above that two of the Stoic categories were called pōs echon and pros ti pōs
echon, employing precisely this interrogative/adverb.
167The same holds for the question tinos;, or cuius?, suggested by Ockham (ibid.).
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the nature of this correspondence is not as that between, for instance, the categories
of where and when and the questions derived from their names. In the latter case the
categories may be viewed as the classes of possible answers to the question associated
with the category, while the category of relatives has to be viewed as the class of
predicates to the predication of which it makes sense to ask the question, Relative to
what? The conjecture of Kahn (1978, p. 243) is therefore plausible, that reflection on
interrogatives was only a part of what led Aristotle to distinguish ten categories, the
sort of linguistic considerations emphasized by Trendelenburg perhaps being another
motivation, and logical or ontological “intuition” a third.
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Synopsis
In this chapter we study the theory of types in its various forms: the simple and
the ramified type hierarchy, types of individuals defined as ranges of significance of
propositional functions, and types in the sense of constructive type theory. In the first
section we introduce the simple type hierarchy, both its logical variant going back to
Frege, and the grammatical variant going back to Ajdukiewicz. Russell’s ramified
types are considered in section 2.1. Russell defined a type as a range of significance,
but we shall see that ramified types are not ranges of significance. In both the simple
and the ramified hierarchy there is just one domain of individuals. If a type is a range
of significance, however, that domain must be split up into several domains. That idea
is introduced in section 2.2. If a type is defined as a range of significance the notion of
a type depends on the notion of significance. We scrutinize the relation between types
and significance in the third section. The topic of the fourth section is what I shall
call type predications, judgements in which an entity is assigned to a type. Several
philosophers, including Frege, Wittgenstein, and Carnap have found such predications
problematic. The notion of a sortal is also a notion of a type of individuals; it is
discussed in section 5. In the last section Husserl’s distinction between formal and
material categories is presented and compared to similar distinctions in Frege and
Carnap.
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1. The simple type hierarchy
The simple type hierarchy is intrinsically tied to function–argument syntax. Both
are introduced in section 1.1. A language directed variety of the simple type hierarchy
is discussed in section 1.3. In section 1.2 we consider the relation between simple types
and Aristotle’s so-called ontological square.
1.1. Frege: function and argument, and function and object. Frege’s
revolution in logic was in large part a revolution in logical syntax. In place of the
basic form ‘S is P ’ Frege introduced the basic form ‘F (a)’, function F applied to
argument a. To be more precise, this is the form of the content of a Fregean Begriff-
sschriftsatz (Gg § 5), i.e. a of theorem of Frege’s ideography.1 The theorem itself is
a judgement, indicated by ` F (a), that a content of the form F (a) is true. Frege’s
logical syntax thus draws a distinction between judgement and the content judged
to be true, where it should be emphasized that this is a logical, and not a “merely
psychological,” distinction.2 No such distinction was drawn in syllogistic syntax; there
the copula was taken to serve in effect two functions, namely as a connector of the two
terms and as a mark of affirmation. Indeed, we saw that according to a reasonable
interpretation of Aristotle, an affirmation is for him just a combination of terms; and
this combination is signified by the copula. Likewise, in the Port-Royal grammar of
Arnauld and Lancelot (1676) the verb is taken primarily to signify affirmation (ibid.
pp. 95, 101), but the “the verb itself” is also said “to serve no other function than to
mark the connection which we make in our mind of the two terms of a proposition”
(ibid. p. 96), there being therefore in fact only one true verb, namely ‘is’ (other forms
of this verb, as well as all other verbs and their various forms being in principle dis-
pensable but invented for the convenience they afford).3 To make Frege’s distinction
in traditional logical doctrine one would therefore have to separate these two func-
tions of the copula. A judgeable content is obtained by the combination of two terms
S and P . The mere combination is, however, not yet a judgement—a judgement is
1For reasons to prefer ‘ideography’ as the translation of the German ‘Begriffsschrift’, cf. Barnes (2002, esp.
pp. 75–76).
2On the importance of distinguishing judgement and the content judged to be true for systematical pur-
poses, see e.g. Martin-Löf (1996, 1987) and Sundholm (2004); the most extensive study of the distinction
in Frege is found in Stepanians (1998); a history of forms of judgement assumed in modern logic is given
by Sundholm (2009). As emphasized in the works of Martin-Löf and Sundholm there is in addition to the
act of judgement also the object of such an act; this object judged is different from the content judged to
be true, and it belongs to the domain of logic and not to that of psychology; for a different account of the
non-psychological nature of the judgement stroke, see Dummett (1973, pp. 311ff.).
3For yet another example, see the discussion of the copula in Joseph (1916, pp. 159–170), e.g. p. 163: “to
think the copula is the synthesis of judgement,” and p. 166: “to express a combination of which I think is
real, I use the verb to be.”
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obtained by asserting that the judgeable content is true.4 It is the Fregean judgeable
content F (a) that will be our point of interest here, and which, in spite of the slight
inaccuracy this involves, we shall think of as a parallel to the syllogistic form ‘S is P ’.
The analysis of judgeable content into function and argument is offered in the
Begriffsschrift (1879) as an alternative to the traditional analysis of propositions into
subject and predicate, which we discussed in section 1.2 of the previous chapter. The
notions of function and argument adopted in that work therefore share the relational
character of the latter notions: as ‘man’ is the subject of ‘man is mortal’ but the
predicate of ‘Socrates is a man’, so the same expression can now be the function
and now the argument of a proposition. The characterization Frege gives of his pair
of notions is, however, considerably different from the traditional characterization of
subject and predicate. The subject of a sentence was the name of what the proposition
is or says something about, while the predicate was what is said of the subject (or
of what is signified by the subject). An argument in Frege’s sense is, by contrast,
an element in a sentence that is regarded as replaceable, while a function is the part
not regarded as replaceable. Thus, given a sentence such as ‘Caesar killed Cato’ we
may regard ‘Caesar’ as replaceable by ‘Clodius’, yielding ‘Clodius killed Cato’; or
as replaceable by ‘Cato’, yielding ‘Cato killed Cato’; or as replaceable by any other
name. On this analysis ‘Caesar’ is the argument to the function ‘killed Cato’, yielding
the value ‘Caesar killed Cato’. This notion of a value of a function is not quite in
accordance with how the notion is usually understood in mathematics: the value
of the factorial function ! applied to the argument 4 is not the expression ‘4!’, but
the number 24. Anscombe and Geach (1961, p. 143) therefore introduced the name
‘linguistic function’ for functions whose values are expressions in this way; linguistic
functions will be important in section 1.3 below. Returning to our example sentence,
‘Caesar killed Cato’, we are in fact free also to regard ‘killed Cato’ as replaceable,
for instance by ‘conquered Gaul’, yielding ‘Caesar conquered Gaul’, thereby regarding
‘Caesar’ as the function. In the sentence ‘Caesar killed Cato’ one and the same element
‘Caesar’ may therefore be regarded on one analysis as argument and on another as
function; as Frege remarks, what is the function and what is the argument in a
sentence is “purely a matter of point of view” (allein Sache der Auffassung, Bs § 9),
that is, what is function and what is argument depends completely on the analysis
we choose.
4That the two roles of the copula thus should be separated from each other was clearly perceived by Mill
(1843, Bk. I ch. v § 1), though his insight did not usher in a revolution of logical syntax, perhaps because
he regarded assertion as not belonging to logic (loc. cit.).
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This distinguishes Frege’s notion of function and argument from the notions of
subject and predicate. For while there is only one analysis of a sentence into subject
and predicate, there are in general several analyses into function and argument (or
arguments).5 In the sentence ‘Caesar killed Cato’, ‘Caesar’ is the subject while ‘killed
Cato’ is the predicate; but as we have just seen, not only may we regard ‘Caesar’
as the argument to the function ‘killed Cato’, we may also regard ‘Cato’ as the
argument to the function ‘Caesar killed’, or ‘Caesar’ and ‘Cato’ as the arguments
to the binary function ‘killed’. In fact, we may also regard ‘Caesar’ or ‘Cato’ or
indeed ‘Caesar. . . Cato’ as functions of the arguments ‘killed Cato’, ‘Caesar killed’, and
‘killed’ respectively. Thus, at least for sentences of this simple form there is complete
freedom: any part of our example sentence may be regarded as the function, hence
also any part as argument. In sentences of more complex structure, this is probably
not so: at the time of the Begriffsschrift Frege would probably not have been open
to regard connectives as functions, a point I shall return to below. Natural languages
offer means of rewriting sentences that preserve sense but change the subject: by
employing, for instance, the passive instead of the active form of the verb our example
sentence would read ‘Cato was killed by Caesar’, hence with ‘Cato’ as subject. But
‘Cato’ is now the subject of a new sentence. Frege’s method, by contrast, allows ‘Cato’
to be the function according to one analysis and the argument according to another
analysis of one and the same sentence. This flexibility of the notions of function and
argument in contrast to the notions of subject and predicate is emphasized by Frege
on several occasions and seems to have been a main reason for his replacing the latter
pair with the former.6
In the preface (p. x) to the Grundgesetze (1893) Frege remarks that the distinction
between function and object is drawn more sharply in the present work than what
it was in the Begriffsschrift. Indeed, he now employs an absolute notion of function,
one not depending on a given analysis of a sentence.7 A function in the absolute sense
5Geach (1962, §24) insists that one and the same sentence may admit of several subject-predicate analyses.
Thus one analysis of ‘Peter loves her’ yields ‘Peter’ as subject and and another yields ‘her’ (cf. footnote 19
of the previous chapter). Here Geach is presumably following Frege rather than the tradition in linguistics
(cf. the criticism of a suggestion like Geach’s in Hockett, 1958, pp. 6–7).
6In addition to Bs §§ 3, 9 there is UGG1 p. 372, fn. 1 which makes precisely this point. At BG pp. 198–200
Frege may seem to say that we are free in regarding this or that as subject and predicate; but what he
actually says is that the same thought can be expressed by different sentences (differing for instance in
whether the verb is in the active or the passive voice), in which, therefore, what is subject and what is
predicate varies.
7Given the identification of concepts with functions of a certain kind this absolute notion of function is
presumably present already in the Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); this work famously urges its reader
“never to loose sight of the distinction between concept and object” (p. xxii). Hints of the notion are found
even in the following passage from Bs § 9:
71
is in general characterized by its being “unsaturated,” “incomplete,” or “in need of
completion,”8 and as such functions are contrasted with objects, which are “saturated,”
“wholes,” or “not in need of completion.”9 Thus, expressions such as ‘the king of’ or
‘+3 = 5’ are felt to be incomplete, unsaturated, to have a gap in them, while the ‘the
king of Norway’ and ‘2+3 = 5’ are felt to be complete, saturated; and this distinction
at the level of expressions is taken by Frege to correspond to a distinction at the
level of what is signified by these expressions, namely as one between unsaturated
and saturated entities.10 There are problems here of how one should understand the
notion of signification, both for incomplete expressions and for sentences (such as
‘2 + 3 = 5’), but the primary task for one who wishes to understand the distinction
between function and object is to understand what Frege alludes to by means of his
metaphors. Frege made himself vulnerable to criticism by this use of metaphor; but
he was clear that no foolproof mode of description was available for primitive notions
such as those of function and object.11 He therefore famously asked that his reader
be willing to meet him halfway (that he have an entgegenkommendes Verständnis,
UGG1 p. 372); in other words, he asked his readers to employ the metaphors as
steppingstones to their own understanding of these primitive notions. It is perhaps
only as it should be that not everyone has found the metaphors fit for this task.12 That
provides one motivation for our looking for a different characterization of functions.
Church (1956, p. 15) remarks that “it lies in the nature of any given function to
be applicable to certain things and, when applied to one of them as argument, to yield
a certain value.” The essence of a function, Church says, is that it can be applied to
certain things so as to yield a value. Indeed, whatever else a function might be, it
is certainly something that can be applied to certain things, and that when applied
to one of them as argument yields a value. It is perhaps this characteristic of being
Für uns haben die verschiedenen Weisen, wie derselbe begriffliche Inhalt als Func-
tion dieses oder jenes Arguments aufgefasst werden kann, keine Wichtigkeit, solange
Function und Argument völlig bestimmt sind. Wenn aber das Argument unbes-
timmt wird [. . . ] so gewinnt die Unterscheidung von Function und Argument eine
inhaltliche Bedeutung.
8The descriptions ungesättigt and ergänzungsbedurftig are found e.g. at Gg § 1; FB p. 6 adds unvollständig.
The description ergänzungsbedurftig is in fact found already in Frege’s discussion of relations at GLA § 70.
9The description gesättigt is found e.g. at Gg § 2; UGG1 p. 371 adds “ein Ganzes, das keiner Ergänzung
mehr bedarf,” and BG p. 205 abgeschlossen.
10See Gg §§ 1–2, 26, and more explicitly UGG1 p. 371, WF p. 665 for a statement of this correspondence.
11See BG p. 193, UGG1 pp. 371–372, WF p. 665. At UGG2 p. 301 Frege introduces the name ‘elucidation’
(Erläuterung) for the mode of explanation appropriate for primitive notions; for further discussion of this
notion of elucidation, see Klev (2011, § 6.2).
12Black (1954) is a classic example.
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applicable to certain things as arguments and thereby yielding values that Frege aimed
at with his metaphors of unsaturation and incompleteness. Frege in fact explains
application in terms of completion: “the function is completed by the argument; that
to which it is completed I call the value of the function for that argument.”13 But
if application to an argument is completion, then applicability to an argument is
“completability,” which is just bad English for ‘incompleteness’: applicability to an
argument is a form of incompleteness. The completeness characteristic of a Fregean
object, on the other hand, consists in its not being thus applicable. Thus we have
characterized Frege’s notion of function and its difference from the notion of object
by employing the notion of application, a notion with which anyone who has studied
Calculus will be familiar.14 This characterization should be less open to criticism of
the kind leveled against Frege’s metaphors of unsaturation and incompleteness.
What is a function according to the Grundgesetze is thus not a matter of our
point of view, but lies in the nature of things. This is therefore a novel notion of
function compared to that adopted in the Begriffsschrift.15 One consequence of the
novel characterization is that there can be functions of functions. In the Begriffsschrift
there is no such thing: there is function and argument, and the question of whether
the argument really is a function is ill posed, for a function is not what anything can
be irrespective of an analysis of a judgeable content. According to the characterization
in the Grundgesetze, however, a function is a function independently of any analysis
of a given content, whence there may well be functions of functions.16 Frege notes
that functions of functions are common in mathematics, for a definite integral is just
that (FB p. 27): in
∫ 1
0
x2 dx the function
∫ 1
0
. . . dx is applied to the function x2.
Of more significance for his ideography, however, is Frege’s characterization of the
universal (and thereby also the existential) quantifier as the function of a function:
in ‘everything is equal to itself’, the quantifier ‘everything’ is taken to be a function
applied to the function ‘is equal to itself’. If there is no such thing as the function of
a function in the Begriffsschrift we are therefore led to ask how Frege there regarded
the quantifier. Frege remarks already in Bs § 1 that variables by themselves serve to
13Gg § 1: “Durch das Argument wird die Function ergänzt; das, wozu sie ergänzt wird, nenne ich Werth
der Function für das Argument.”
14For other ways of formulating the distinction, see Strawson (1959, § 6.1.2), Geach (1962, § 27).
15When Frege remarks in the already cited passage at Gg p. x that “the essence of the function as distinct
from the object is more sharply characterized than in the Begriffsschrift,” he refers, to my mind, to the
development from a relative to an absolute notion of function (and not a development from a linguistic
to an objectual notion of function, as is sometimes suggested in the literature, perhaps first by Anscombe
and Geach 1961, p. 151).
16Likewise, in the Grundlagen there are concepts of concepts (e.g. GLA § 53); but it is clear from Gg p. x
that Frege did not regard the notion of a second-level function as present in the Begriffsschrift.
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express generality:17 the associative law, for instance, can be expressed by k + (l +
m) = (k + l) + m. The mere use of letters to express generality, although it suffices
for expressing simple laws of arithmetic, and although it suffices for expressing the
generality of a negative content, as in n + 1 6= n, does, however, not suffice for
expressing the negation of a general content. A sign is needed that indicates the
scope of the letters within the formula, a sign that shows to which part of the formula
the letters are to confer generality. That is the role of the cavity according to Frege
(Bs § 11): “it restricts the domain to which the generality indicated by the letter
pertains.” Thus, in the Begriffsschrift the quantifier is merely a scope indicator.18
The quantifier does of course also serve as a scope indicator when it is regarded, as
in the Grundgesetze, as a function—its scope is then simply its argument—but in the
Begriffsschrift a scope indicator is all that the quantifier is.
Once one has admitted functions of objects as arguments to other functions, there
is no reason not to continue, namely to consider, for instance, functions of functions of
functions of objects, or binary functions whose first argument is a function of objects
and whose second argument is an object. In the Grundgesetze Frege does precisely
that. In line with his treatment of quantification over objects Frege treats quantifica-
tion over functions of objects as a function of functions of functions of objects; and
he notes that differentiation is a binary function whose first argument is a function of
objects and whose second argument is an object. He remarks that such examples show
“the great variety of functions,” yet he does not carry these considerations of various
kinds of function into infinity: in the Grundgesetze Frege never considers functions
of arity higher than 2 or of level higher than 3 (a function of functions of functions
of objects). The reason may have been that, lacking a method for giving a general
description of the resulting infinite hierarchy, Frege restricted himself to describing
the types of function that he would make use of in his development of arithmetic.
It seems clear from a remark Frege makes at Gg § 25 concerning the possibility of
limiting oneself to functions of level 3 that he would have no qualms with building the
hierarchy higher had that been required.19 And there is at least one place in Frege’s
17Cf. the remarks on the function of Latin letters at Bs §§ 1, 11, Gg § 17, UGG2 pp. 307–308, 377ff. Frege’s
Latin letters correspond to what Peano (1901, p. 2), and following him Russell, called real variables; their
apparent variables correspond to Frege’s Fraktur letters.
18As is noted by Heck and May (2013, p. 833).
19Gg § 25: “Man könnte meinen, dass dies [sc. functions of level 3] noch längst nicht genügte; aber wir
werden sehen, dass wir mit dieser auskommen, und dass auch sie nur in einzigen Sätze vorkommt. Es
mag hier zunächst nur kurz bemerkt werden, dass diese Sparsamkeit dadurch möglich wird, dass die
Functionen zweiter Stufe in gewisser Weise durch Functionen erster Stufe vertreten werden können, wobei
die Functionen, die als Argumente jener erscheinen, durch ihre Werthverläufe vertreten werden.” I find
it difficult to follow Thiel (1965, p. 53), who refers to this passage and the similar FB p. 31 as grounds
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works where he speaks of ternary functions (NS pp. 269–270);20 he does so without
any ceremony, suggesting that he would have had no reservations against employing
n-ary functions for arbitrary n had that been required.
A hierarchy of functions, functions of functions, functions of functions of functions,
etc., built over certain ground types we shall call a hierarchy of simple types. Such
a hierarchy can be defined inductively; perhaps the first to do so was Carnap (1929,
pp. 30–31).21 Carnap’s definition can be used to describe the infinite hierarchy latent
in Frege’s considerations. There is a ground type ι of objects in Frege’s sense; and if
α1, . . . , αn are types, then (α1, . . . , αn) is a type, namely the type of functions with
n arguments of types α1, . . . , αn respectively and values of the type ι of objects. The
sign ι may be eliminated from this presentation, rendering () as the type of objects;
but keeping ι makes for easier readability. In this notation, (ι) is the type of functions
of one argument of the type of objects; (ι, ι) is the type of functions of two arguments,
both of the type of objects; ((ι)) is the type of functions of one argument of the type
(ι); and ((ι), ι) is the type of functions of two arguments, the first of the type (ι)
and the second of the type ι. In the simple type theory of Church (1940) there are
two ground types, rather than just one as in Frege’s hierarchy. That is, Church has
a type ι of individuals and a type o of propositions. This distinction was not made
by Frege, for he held that what ordinary grammar calls sentences are to be equated
with names of truth-values (SB p. 34).22 Church moreover restricts the hierarchy
to unary functions. Since he allows functions to take values in types other than the
ground types, this restriction does not imply any restriction of logical power. By the
technique of “Currying,” 23 namely, we have for any n-ary function f a unary function
h satisfying the equation
f(a1, . . . , an) = h(a1) . . . (an)
for asserting that “Frege von einer unendlichen Stufenhierarchie der Funktionen ausdrücklich Abstand
genommen hat.”
20That this is a place in his Nachlass is of no consequence for the point to be made here.
21Carnap’s hierarchy is one of classes and relations, but he remarks (1929, p. 20) that a similar hierarchy
exists for functions.
22Dummett’s Frege follows Church in distinguishing the two types. Dummett (1973, p. 50) says that it is
only in Frege’s “later doctrine” that sentences are regarded as singular terms; that may well be true, but
it is only in the later doctrine as well that there is any type hierarchy.
23This technique in the case of n = 1 is employed by Frege in his treatment of so-called “Doppelwertver-
lauf” in Gg § 36; it is also employed by Dedekind (1888) in his defining addition, multiplication, and
exponentiation as families of unary functions, e.g. m+n := ϕm(n), where ϕm is defined by the recursion
equations m + 0 = m and m + n′ = (m + n)′. Systematic employment of the technique stems from
Schönfinkel (1924, § 2).
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Thus, by applying h to a1, applying h(a1) to a2, applying h(a1)(a2) to a3,. . . , and
finally applying h(a1) . . . (an−1) to an, we reach the value f(a1, . . . , an). The proof for
the existence of the function h goes by successively reducing the arity of the original
function according to the following scheme. Given a k + 1-ary function g we define a
k-ary function g′ satisfying
g(a1, . . . , ak, ak+1) = g
′(a1, . . . , ak)(ak+1)
Thus, g′ is a k-ary function whose values are of the type of functions from the type of
ak+1 into the type of g(a1, . . . , ak+1). By iterating this reduction we reach the unary
function h. Employing a notation apparently due to Schütte,24 Church’s simple type
hierarchy can be defined as follows. There are ground types ι and o; and if α and β are
types, then (α)β is a type, the type of functions from α into β. The type (α1, . . . , αn)
of the Fregean hierarchy then corresponds to to the type (α1) . . . (αn)ι in Church’s
hierarchy. The notation (α)β will in this dissertation be the default notation for the
type of functions from α to β.
It seems that we may say without any significant reservations that the hierarchy
latent in Frege’s description of the various kinds of function is the hierarchy of simple
types.25 Church thought that such an identification would be “based on a misun-
derstanding” (1976b, p. 409). He holds that “with Frege a function is not properly
an (abstract) object at all, but is a sort of incompleted abstraction” (loc. cit.), and
that presumably rules against such things forming a type. Frege assumes, however,
that his functions may both be the arguments to other functions and lie within the
range of quantifiers; it seems strange to deny that such things would form a type. So
Church’s argument should rather have to be that Frege’s notion of function is inco-
herent: incomplete entities like Frege’s functions cannot be the arguments to other
functions nor lie within the range of quantifiers. But if incompleteness is understood
in the way suggested above, as the characteristic of being applicable to certain things
as arguments and yielding certain things as values, then Church’s claim would in
effect be that there can be no type of functions whatsoever, since any function must
have this characteristic of being applicable etc. And that is not a plausible claim.26
As a further argument Church maintains that Frege “vigorously rejects the charac-
teristic feature of the simple theory of types” (p. 410) namely that the laws of logic
24Cf. e.g. Diller and Schütte (1971).
25As is done by Resnik (1965, p. 330) and Dummett (1973, pp. 44–45).
26Although Church may have accepted it, as he may not have accepted this characterization of functions:
he says namely ibid. that “on the whole it is the Werthverlauf which corresponds to the notion of function
as used mathematics”; but a Werthverlauf is a notion function for which application is not primitive, but
needs to be introduced separately as Frege does at Gg § 34 (cf. section 4.2.5 below).
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are stated first for the ground domain and thereafter restated successively for other
domains. This judgement seems to me mistaken. Frege’s basic laws for propositional
logic apply only to the ground domain, and Frege states the rules of propositional
logic for this domain. The rule relevant for higher types is the rule of universal in-
stantiation, and Frege states separate such rules for each of the two domains he needs
for his purposes,27 obviously being aware that he should have to state new rules if he
needed universal instantiation for yet other domains. Hence I do not share Church’s
misgivings and shall not hesitate to speak of the various kinds of function explicit or
implicit in Frege’s work as types of function.
An important tenet of type theory is that all symbols are assigned a type. Disre-
garding the special sign of assertion, which, as noted, does not occupy us here, this
tenet is honoured by the ideography of the Grundgesetze. The universal quantifier
over a type τ is of type ((τ)), a function of unary functions of elements of type τ .
The truth-values of true and false are of the type ι of objects. Frege’s treatment of
sentences as names of truth-values allows the assignment of types to the connectives:
implication is of type (ι, ι), a binary function of objects, while negation is of type (ι),
a unary function of objects. This contrasts with Frege’s treatment of the connectives
in the Begriffsschrift. There can be no question of whether the propositional logical
operators were there regarded as functions (pace Baker, 2005), for such a question
presupposes an absolute notion of function, which Frege did not adopt in the Be-
griffsschrift. It is unlikely that Frege in the Begriffsschrift would have been open to
regarding for instance negation as the function of an argument in a judgeable content
of the form ¬p; for, given the flexibility afforded by the analysis into function and
argument, Frege should then also have had to be open to regarding negation as the
argument to a function. In light of the explanation of quantification in the Begriffss-
chrift that in turn would have allowed quantification into the position of negation; the
latter makes good sense in the Grundgesetze, but does not seem in line with Frege’s
explanation of the logical connectives in the Begriffsschrift, which is not very different
from that given already by the Stoics (DL VII.73).
Although the notion of function and argument in the Grundgesetze is no longer
intrinsically tied to the analysis of judgeable contents, there is still the possibility
of analyzing such a content into function and argument. Such an analysis will now
have to be in accordance with how these notions are understood in the Grundge-
setze. In particular, what is deemed the function in such an analysis needs to be a
function in the absolute sense; and what is the argument needs to be the argument
27These are basic laws IIa–b and III (Gg § 47).
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to the function in the absolute sense. An argument to a function F is according to
the Grundgesestze just what fills the gap in F . Considering our example sentence
from above, ‘Caesar killed Cato’, we see therefore that we cannot, according to the
new doctrine, regard ‘Caesar’ as a function of the argument ‘killed Cato’, as we can
according to the Begriffsschrift : Caesar is an object, and therefore not a function
in the absolute sense. There is, however, a second-level function ϕ(Caesar) (cf. Gg
§ 22),28 and we may regard the given content as the value of this function applied to
the first-level function ‘killed Cato’. So what might initially seem like a restriction
on the analysis into function and argument in the Grundgesetze when compared to
the Begriffschrift is overcome by noting that the change in point of view that in the
latter allowed what was previously regarded as an argument to be regarded instead as
a function corresponds in the former to a change in point of view of the composition
of the proposition from its elements: these are not ‘Caesar’ and ‘killed Cato’ but
‘ϕ(Caesar)’ and ‘killed Cato’. Thus Frege’s notion of function and argument in the
Grundgesetze affords the same degree of flexibility in analysis that he had emphasized
in the Begriffsschrift as distinguishing this pair of notions from the pair of subject and
predicate. Given the treatment of the quantifiers and the connectives as functions,
it is moreover clearer now than earlier that the analysis into function and argument
has much wider applicability than the analysis into subject and predicate: any judge-
able content can be analyzed into function and argument, including content of forms
not expressible in syllogistic syntax, such as hypothetical form, ‘If it is day, then it
is light’, or multiply quantified form, ‘For every ε there is a δ such that. . . ’. Thus,
elements that traditional logic would treat as syncategorems are treated as functions
of one or more arguments of suitable type.
With each expression being assigned a type independently of its occurring in
a given sentence, we may regard the hierarchy of types as a categorization of the
language. In the previous chapter we interpreted Aristotle’s categories as providing a
categorization of the language of syllogistics. Our thesis here is that Frege’s hierarchy
likewise affords a categorization of languages of function–argument syntax, that is, of
languages of the sort that is associated with “modern logic.” More precisely, Frege’s
hierarchy affords a prototype for the categorization of such languages. If, for instance,
one does not follow Frege in treating sentences as names, then Frege’s hierarchy
does not provide a categorization of the language; but a slight modification of it
does, namely one that introduces another ground type. And one can think of several
other modifications of the type hierarchy to match modifications in the syntax of the
28On the “type-raising” involved here, cf. p. 90 below.
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language. The general point is that a language of function–argument syntax can be
categorized by a hierarchy of functions, of which Frege’s hierarchy is a special case.
The categorization of the symbols of a function–argument language by a suitable
hierarchy of types is, in a certain sense, more perfect than the categorization of
the symbols of the language of syllogistics by Aristotle’s categories. The latter is
a categorization only of the terms of the propositions of syllogistic language: the
syncategorematic words indicating the form of the proposition are not categorized.
Frege’s types, by contrast, categorize all the symbols of the language, including the
quantifiers and the connectives.
1.2. Frege’s types and Aristotle’s ontological square. We thus propose
to regard Frege’s hierarchy of types as a categorization of his logical language on
a par with how we have interpreted Aristotle’s categories as a categorization of his
logical language. Against this proposal it may be objected that what most naturally
corresponds to Frege’s distinction between object and function in Aristotle’s logic is
not Aristotle’s categories but rather his distinction between what is said of a subject
and what is not said of a subject (Cat 1a20). These characteristics combine with
those of being in and not being in a subject to form what is traditionally known as
the ontological square, the fourfold distinction Aristotle makes of beings (ta onta) in
the second chapter of the Categories:29 1) what is neither said of a subject nor is in
a subject; 2) what is said of a subject but is not in a subject; 3) what is said of a
subject but is not in a subject; 4) what is not said of a subject but is in a subject.
Aristotle does not provide an explanation of what he means by being said of a
subject. In seeking to supply one we should first analyze out the relation of being said
of: in the phrase ‘said of a subject’ the phrase ‘subject’ may be regarded as a variable
bound by an existential quantifier, so that we paraphrase ‘x is said of a subject’ as
∃y(xRy), with R signifying the relation of being said of. It seems reasonably clear
from what Aristotle says about the relation of being said of in the Categories (chs.
2, 3, 5), and commentators seem to agree to this, that it is the relation of ‘being
the genus of’ extended so as to encompass individuals. In other words, the relation
of being said of is the relation > (or <) introduced in section 2.2 of the previous
chapter with its field extended to individuals. For general terms s and g, if s < g is
true, then g is “predicated in the what it is” of s (Top 102a31), another way of saying
which is to say that s is essentially g (cf. 102a32–35). A natural way of including
individuals in the field of the relation < is therefore to say that i < s is true if the
individual i is essentially s. Socrates, Gabriel, and Jemima are thereby included in
29Ammonius in Cat 25,12 draws a square. I have not found a square in any earlier source.
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the field of the relation >, for the one is essentially a man, essentially an animal,
etc., while the other is essentially an angel, essentially an animal etc., and the third
essentially a cat, essentially an animal, etc. What we in effect have done then is to
follow Porphyry in including species among the predicables. A species, according to
Porphyry, is namely “what is predicated in the what it is of several items differing in
number” (Isag 4,12).30 A genus, according to Porphyry, and according to Aristotle,
is what “is predicated in the what it is of several items differing in species” (102a31).
In general, therefore, we should say that x is said of y if and only if x is said in the
what it is, or predicated essentially, of y. Consequently, x is said of a subject if there
is a y such that x is predicated essentially of y. It appears that Aristotle thought
that any predicate is predicated essentially of some individual, that is, that for any
predicate there is some individual such that the predicate is predicated essentially of
it. It follows that x is said of a subject if and only if it is a predicate, what Aristotle
elsewhere calls a universal (ta katholou, Int 17a3). Hence, what is said of a subject is
a universal. What is not said of a subject is an individual, or a particular.
The other notion underlying the ontological square, that of being in a subject, is
explained as follows: “by in a subject I mean what is in something, not as a part, and
which cannot exist separately from what it is in” (1a24). There is disagreement in the
literature on how to read this passage, related to a disagreement that will be outlined
in the next paragraph;31 but it is clear enough, and the different parties agree, that
what is in a subject is in some way dependent on something else. A substance, which
we are prone to think of as not thus dependent,32 should therefore not be in a subject
(Cat 3a7); and indeed, Aristotle thinks that it is only substances which are not in a
subject (cf. Cat 2a34). Assuming the categories, we may therefore say that the char-
acteristic of being in a subject distinguishes non-substances from substances. The
categories other than substance, are also traditionally called accidents.33 Since the
characteristic of being said of a subject distinguishes universals from particulars, or
in other words, general from individual items, we can therefore give the vertices of the
30We speculated in section 2.1.1 of chapter 1 that Aristotle in the Topics may not have countenanced
singular essential judgements; since the Categories assumes that the field of the relation of being said of
includes individuals, we now see that he the latter work must have countenanced such judgements.
31See e.g. Heinaman (1981, pp. 295–297) for an overview.
32E.g. Spinoza’s definition (Ethics def. I.3): “By substance I understand that which is in itself and is
conceived through itself, that is, that which does not need the concept of another thing, form which
concept it must be formed.”
33Through the identification of what is in a subject with accidents they were so-called by Porphyry (in
Cat 73,22ff., Isag 13,5 with Barnes 2003, pp. 230–232); this use of the word ‘accident’ may have originated
with him.
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Figure 1. The ontological square
ontological square the following names, more illuminating perhaps than Aristotle’s:34
1) individual substances, for instance Socrates, Gabriel, and Jemima; 2) general sub-
stances, for instance, man, angel, cat, and animal; 3) general accidents, for instance
colour and shape; 4) individual accidents. We get a picture as in Figure 1 (the arrows
will become important a few paragraphs below).
We did not give any examples of the rubric of individual accidents, as it is con-
tested what it should be taken to encompass. The traditional interpretation, assumed
for instance by Porphyry (e.g. in Cat 75,36ff.) and Ackrill (1963, pp. 74–75), regards
individual accidents as what are variously called abstract particulars, dependent parts,
moments, tropes, modes, etc.35 A hand is an independent part of the body and the legs
of a table independent parts of the table: the hand can exist also independently of the
body to which it is now affixed and the legs can exist also independently of the table
which they now support. This is in contrast to for instance the particular shape of the
hand or the particular colour of the table, which cannot exist independently of that
hand or those table legs: the particular colour of the table legs would vanish should we
use these as firewood; and a gory example would reveal that something similar can be
said of the shape of the hand. According to the traditional interpretation, individual
accidents are therefore like the colour of the table legs or the shape of the hand; they
34Ammonius ad loc. (in Cat 25,13): “If Aristotle had used these words, what he said would have been
clear; but he used other names in pursuit of obscurity.” (On Aristotle’s pursuit of obscurity Ammonius
has the following to say (ibid. 7,10): “Aristotle uses the obscurity of his philosophy as a veil, so that good
people may for that reason stretch their minds even more, whereas empty minds that are lost through
carelessness will be put to flight by the obscurity when they encounter sentences like these.”)
35The terms ‘dependent part’ and ‘moment’ were employed by Husserl (LU III §§ 13, 17); ‘abstract
particular’ is employed by Stout (1923); ‘trope’ in this sense was introduced by Williams (1953); ‘mode’ is
preferred by Lowe (2006) with a nod to Locke (Essay II.xii.4, etc.—cf. Spinoza Ethics def. I.5 and perhaps
Descartes Principles Part I art. 56). There are of course differences in doctrine between these philosophers
that influence how they conceive of the relevant entities.
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are “non-repeatable” particulars that cannot exist apart from what they are in, or in
other words, they are individuated by means of the particular substances they are
in. Owen (1965) argued against this traditional interpretation, claiming instead that
Aristotle’s particular accidents are lowest species in categories other than substance;
examples would be a fully specific shade of red or a particular object of knowledge,
like the paradigm for the inflection of a French verb. These are species, hence they
can be found in several particular substances, and are therefore not individuated by
means of the particular substances they are in. Their individuality consists rather
in there not being anything of which they are the genus. Owen’s interpretation, in
other words, claims that individual accidents are lowest species that are not said of
anything. According to the traditional interpretation, by contrast, lowest species in
non-substance categories are said of tropes, the dependent parts of substances, which
in their turn are not said of anything.
We do not here have to adjudicate between these opposing interpretations of
Aristotle’s particular accidents; let us instead turn to the objection that the appro-
priate parallel in Aristotle’s logic to Frege’s distinction between function and object
is not the categories but rather his distinction between the general and the individ-
ual. It must then be emphasized that Frege’s distinction is not simply a distinction
between object and function. There is, as we have seen, latent in the ideography of
the Grundgesetze an infinite hierarchy of functions; and patent in it is the distinc-
tion between e.g. unary and binary functions, and between both of these and unary
functions of functions of objects. All these various types of function are essentially
distinct, a function of one type is as distinct from a function of another type as is a
unary function of objects from an object (cf. Gg § 21, FB pp. 29–31). Frege’s ideog-
raphy thus stratifies the notion of function; but no such stratification obtains among
Aristotle’s genera. There is indeed a hierarchy of genera ordered by the relation of
being said of. The relation ‘being said of’, however, differs in important respects from
the relation that obtains between a function and any of its arguments. The type of
a Fregean function is determined by the type of its argument. This means that the
relation of function to argument cannot be transitive: from the fact that a function
F may be applied to the function F , and the function F applied to the function f , it
does not follow that F may be applied to f ; on the contrary it follows that F cannot
be applied to f . The relation of being said of, by contrast, is (as we saw in section 2.2
of chapter 1) transitive: “Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a sub-
ject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also” (Cat 1b10).
Moreover, if g is said of s, then g is predicated not only truly, but essentially of s.
No such relation is required to hold between a function and its argument—here the
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only requirement is that function and argument be of matching types. Hence Frege’s
hierarchy of functions is quite unlike Aristotle’s hierarchy of genera. There is also a
difference between Aristotle’s individuals and Frege’s objects. However we interpret
Aristotle’s accidental individuals, they are such as “cannot exist separately from what
they are in.” Fregean objects, by contrast, are “in no need of completion,” and could
quite naturally be called independent (though we should not identify Frege’s notion
of unsaturatedness with any form of dependence). I cannot see that there is any place
at all for tropes in Frege’s order of things.
If ‘t1 is t2’ (including quantity and quality) is a well-formed proposition of syllo-
gistics, then so is ‘t2 is t1’. Aristotle’s reduction of imperfect moods to perfect ones
rests on syllogistic proposition’s having this property; even the formulation of Barbara
rests on it. This syntactic similarity of terms is not upset if we impose Aristotle’s
category scheme on his syllogistics. Given the distinctions made in the ontological
square between the singular and the general, and the substantial and the accidental,
it is to be expected that the same will not be the case if we impose it on Aristo-
tle’s syllogistics. A logical syntax reflecting Aristotle’s ontological square has recently
been proposed by Lowe (2012, pp. 377–382), who in other work has defended the on-
tological square—assuming the traditional interpretation of individual accidents—as
a basic set of kinds of being, or categories (Lowe, 2006). The logical system Lowe
proposes is not quite perspicuous in its syntax, and it moreover misrepresents Aris-
totle’s said-of relation. The following proposal is therefore a slight revision of Lowe’s
system. Corresponding to the four vertices in the ontological square, there must be
four sorts of variables.
substance accident
a, b α, β individual
F , G Φ, Ψ general
Unlike what is the case in syllogistics this system distinguishes general from individual
names and variables. The role of general names in this system is, however, not like
that of functions in Frege’s ideography, for a general name may here combine with
another general name just as well as with an individual name. Animal, for instance,
may combine with man just as well as with Socrates—it stands in one and the same
syntactic relation to both man and Socrates. The names and variables are here
therefore terms, and the resulting system is a term logic, just as Aristotle’s syllogistics.
The system departs from syllogistics not only in distinguishing general and individual
names, but also in requiring two copulae, one used for the proposition that t1 is said
of t2, the other used for the proposition that t1 is in t2. Just as the four types of
variables correspond to the four types of item in the ontological square, so these two
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types of copulae correspond to the two relations that generate the square. Let us
write
t1  t2 for t1 is said of t2
t1  t2 for t1 is in t2
Lowe recognizes that the variables of the system are terms, but in his system terms
are conjoined by mere concatenation, as in function–argument syntax, and not by
means of copulae. A concatenation of terms is, however, not a proposition, but a list
of names. At this point our system therefore departs from Lowe’s.
With four types of term variables and two copulae we get 4×2×4 = 32 candidates
for basic categorical propositions. The seven arrows in Figure 1 correspond to the
seven admissible forms of categorical proposition:
G F a general substance G is said of a general substance F
F  a a general substance F is said of an individual substance a
Ψ Φ a general accident Ψ is said of a general accident Φ
Φ α a general accident Φ is said of an individual accident α
Φ  F a general accident Φ is in a general substance
Φ  a a general accident Φ is in an individual substance a
α  a an individual accident α is in an individual substance a
Lowe does not recognize the two forms Ψ  Φ and Φ  α, in which accident terms
feature in subject position. But since the said-of relation is just the relation ‘being the
genus of’ extended so as to encompass individuals, be they substantial or accidental
individuals, it is clear that propositions whose subject is an accident term must also
be recognized.
Of the listed basic propositions we can of course take negations, hence we do
get distinctions of quality; but we do not yet have distinctions of quantity. We may
provide for distinctions of quantity by introducing the following forms of proposition:
G ∀F G is said of all F
G ∃F G is said of some F
Φ  ∀F Φ is in all F
Φ  ∃F Φ is in some F
Ψ ∀Φ Ψ is said of all Φ
Ψ ∃Φ Ψ is said of some Φ
Thus, for each basic proposition with a general term as subject, that subject can be
quantified by means of either ∀ or ∃. In other work, Lowe (cf. his 1989, esp. chs.
8, 9) has emphasized the difference between these quantified propositions and the
basic propositions. An instance of a basic proposition, such as Φ  F , is a generic
proposition, such as ‘a raven is black’, or ‘black  raven’, in which something is said
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about the genus of ravens, namely that blackness inheres in it, that it is a disposition
of ravens to be black, say. The general proposition ‘all ravens are black’, by contrast,
says something about all (actually existing) ravens, that blackness inheres in each and
every one of them, that they are all black. The general proposition thus corresponds to
an a-proposition in Aristotle’s syllogistics. A generic proposition of the form Ψ Φ,
such as ‘colour  yellow’, where the subject is not a substance but an accident,
presents no special difficulties: it says merely that colour is a genus of yellow. The
corresponding quantified proposition, ‘colour  ∀ yellow’, by contrast, does present
difficulties of interpretation; for, over which domain do we here quantify? There are
two alternatives: (i) all yellow substances in the domain of discourse; (ii) all individual
accidents therein falling under the genus of yellow. Alternative (i) yields an ordinary
a-proposition of syllogistics, ‘colour follows everything yellow’. Alternative (ii) seems
to me more natural, however, given that we have now admitted variables ranging over
individual accidents. If we settle for alternative (ii), then the truth-conditions for a
proposition of the form A/ ∀B can be given uniformly: it is true if and only if A
is said of/inheres in all individuals that B are said of. If we settle for alternative (i),
however, then this rule holds only if the subject is a substance; if the subject is an
accident, the rule is rather that Ψ ∀Φ if Ψ inheres in everything that Φ inheres in;
in that case, therefore, truth-conditions cannot be given uniformly. Likewise, if we
settle for alternative (ii), then the rule providing the truth-conditions for A/ ∀B
may be generalized to provide truth-conditions for yet another form of proposition,
namely those along the line of ‘all mammals are warm-blooded’, where one quantifies
over all species falling under a genus (cf. Lowe, 2012, p. 380). We could write a
formula of this form as
Φ  ∀∀F
and similarly for the other quantified propositions above. This formula Φ  ∀∀F is
true if Φ inheres in all species of which F is said. Similar truth-conditions could be
given for other formulas of the form A / ∀∀B, though we shall not pursue the
matter further here.
Owing to the asymmetries that now have been introduced, both between the
general and the singular and between the substantial and the accidental, we shall in
any event not be able to develop syllogistics within this new system. Each valid mood
of syllogistics gives rise to a set of valid moods in the new system. From the mood of
















Aristotle demonstrates the validity of Darapti by converting the second premiss,
thereby obtaining the first figure mood of Darii (APr I.6 28a18–22). That demonstra-
tion can be carried over to Darapti∗. What we cannot do with Darapti∗ is to permute
the premisses and convert the conclusion. In syllogistics that can be done with any
syllogism in Darapti, but it cannot be done with Darapti∗ since we should then get
a syllogism whose conclusion is the nonsense F  ∃Φ, namely that the substance F






Aristotle reduces Disamis to Darii by converting the first premiss, permuting the
premisses, then converting the conclusion (APr I.6 28b5–11).36 It is clear that this
reduction will not work for Disamis∗, since conversion of the first premiss as well as
of the conclusion results in nonsense.
A logical system that reflects the ontological square will thus not be syllogistics.
Each valid mood of syllogistics gives rise to a number of valid moods in such a system,
but there is no straightforward way of transforming a valid mood of syllogistics into
the corresponding valid moods of the new system, namely such that both premisses
and conclusion are well-formed. From Darapti, for instance, we cannot form moods
whose major term is a substance and whose minor term is an accident, since that
will not yield a well-formed conclusion. Hence, the operation of permuting the pre-
misses and converting the conclusion, which in ordinary syllogistics takes a syllogism
in Darapti into another syllogism in Darapti, is not admissible in the new system.
The important lesson is that conversion is no longer valid in general, since it now
could take a well-formed proposition into nonsense. We saw an instance of this in the
attempted reduction of Disamis to Darii. Hence a system of logic that reflects the
ontological square upsets the syntactic similarity that is so important to the function-
ing of syllogistics. In the absence of conversion there is no way of simply reproducing

















Aristotle’s syllogistics in the new system, for syllogistics is more than just a set of
valid moods, namely also a system for demonstrating the validity of moods by reduc-
tion to moods of the first figure. It is clear at once also that a logical syntax reflecting
the ontological square, being a term logic, is not predicate logic, hence it does not
reflect Frege’s type theory.
1.3. Categorial grammar. According to Porphyry and Ammonius terms are
divided into categories by virtue of their signification, while they are divided into
parts of speech by virtue of such properties that they have as elements of a language
(cf. section 4.2.2 of chapter 1). The first division is therefore object directed, while the
second is language directed. That the divisions differ is evident from the fact that the
number of categories differ from the number of parts of speech. This difference would
not be denied by Trendelenburg, although he sought to show the affinity between
Aristotle’s categories and the parts of speech; for he did not argue that the two
divisions are isomorphic. Several modern readers have argued that an isomorphism
obtains between the Stoic’s list of categories and their list of parts of speech, although
we have no ancient source that is explicit on the matter (cf. section 4.2.1 of chapter 1).
Frege, in any event, is explicit that an isomorphism obtains between types of object
in his hierarchy and types of expressions.37 A language directed simple type hierarchy
was defined by Ajdukiewicz (1935) as a means for determining when a string of words
is what Ajdukiewicz called syntactically connected (syntaktisch konnex ), namely when
it is not a piece of word salad, when it has a unitary sense (more on “word salad” in
section 3.1 below). Any sentence as well as any single word is syntactically connected,
as is any phrase, e.g. the verb phrase ‘smells very nice’; but a mere assortment of
words, such as ‘perhaps horse if will however shine’, is in general not syntactically
connected.
In Ajdukiewicz’s type hierarchy there are two ground types, the type s of sentences
and the type n of nouns; these correspond in Church’s hierarchy to the types o and ι of
propositions and individuals respectively. Ajdukiewicz’s hierarchy agrees with Frege’s
in allowing functions with several arguments, while it agrees with Church’s in allowing
functions to take values in types other than the ground types. The rule for generating
function types in Ajdukiewicz’s hierarchy is the following: if α and β1, . . . , βn are
types, then (α : β1 . . . βn) is a type, namely the type of n-ary functions whose i-th
argument is of type βi and whose values are of type α.38 When mentioning a type the
37Cf. the references in footnote 10 above.
38Ajdukiewicz uses fractional notation α
β1...βn
, but the colon notation is preferred here for reasons of
typesetting.
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outermost parentheses may be omitted. Thus, s : n is the type of functions that take
a noun as argument to yield a sentence as its value: it is the type of intransitive verbs.
The type of transitive verbs is s : nn. A function in this sense is a certain expression
whose arguments and values are also expressions; it is a linguistic function in the sense
of Anscombe and Geach (1961, p. 143). As was noted above (page 70), functions in
mathematics are not ordinarily understood as linguistic functions: the function +, for
instance, is a binary function on numbers and not on numerals. Presumably in order
to mark the contrast between linguistic functions and functions in the objective sense
common in mathematics Ajdukiewicz used the term functor for the elements of the
function types of his hierarchy.39 Assuming that numerals are of type n, the functor
+, which takes two numerals and yields a numeral, is of type n : nn. Binary sentence
connectives such as ‘and’ and ‘or’ are functors of type s : ss; the adverb ‘nice’ is a
functor of type (s : n) : (s : n), taking a verb phrase and yielding a new verb phrase;
while the adverb ‘very’ is a functor of type ((s : n) : (s : n)) : ((s : n) : (s : n)), taking
an adverb and yielding a new adverb.
Applying the functor ‘very’ to the functor ‘nice’ we obtain a new functor ‘very
nice’ of type (s : n) : (s : n). Applying this functor to the functor ‘smells’ we obtain
yet another functor ‘smells very nice’, of type (s : n). This functor can be applied to
a noun n, such as ‘rosemary’ to yield ‘rosemary smells very nice’ of type s. According
to Ajdukiewicz’s definition any expression that can be analyzed into functor and
argument or arguments in the manner thus illustrated for ‘very nice’, ‘smells very
nice’, and ‘rosemary smells very nice’ is syntactically connected. The definition may
be given recursively as follows (cf. Ajdukiewicz, 1935, p. 11). Any single word is
syntactically connected. A string of words is syntactically connected if it is analyzable
into functor and argument or arguments of matching types; in this analysis neither
the functor nor any of its arguments has to be a single word, but if it is a phrase,
it is itself required to be syntactically connected. Our analysis above shows that the
phrases ‘very nice’ and ‘smells very nice’ satisfy the definition. The latter phrase is
analyzed into the unary functor ‘very nice’ with argument ‘smells’, where the functor
‘very nice’ is analyzed into the unary functor ‘very’ with the argument ‘nice’. By
39Both Ajdukiewicz (1935, p. 3) and Tarski (1936, p. 274) attribute the term ‘functor’ to Kotarbinski. It
is well known that this word is employed by Carnap (1934, p. 13), but he may very well have adopted
it from the Polish logicians; it is, for instance, found in Tarski and Łukasiewicz (1930), a paper Carnap
refers to. Curry (1963, p. 33) uses the suffix -or for words indicating kinds of linguistic expression, for
instance ‘predicator’ and ‘connector’; Potts (1978, p. 8) also forms the unlovely ‘argumentor’ and ‘valuor’.
Geach was an authority on Polish logic, so it is surprising that he did not adopt Kotarbinski’s term, using
‘linguistic function’ instead.
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contrast, ‘very or’ is not syntactically connected, for ‘very’ and ‘or’ are not of types
such that the one can be applied to the other.
Ajdukiewicz gives an algorithm for testing whether a string of words equipped
with types is syntactically connected. This algorithm requires that the string in
question be given in so-called Polish notation, namely that a functor always precedes
its arguments.40 The verb phrase ‘smells very nice’ should accordingly be given as
‘very nice smells’ and the sentence ‘Ann sings and Peter dances’ should be given as
‘and sings Ann dances Peter’. In order to test the syntactic connection of a string
of words in ordinary word order Bar-Hillel (1953) introduced a modified simple type
hierarchy, namely a hierarchy of functions that apply to some arguments to the right
and to some arguments to the left. In mathematics a function is sometimes written
to the left of its argument; thus aϕ is the function ϕ applied to the argument a. This,
however, is merely a notational convention, useful especially when one is interested in
the composition of functions: fg is the function obtained by first applying f and then
applying g, according to the order in which f and g occur in ‘fg’.41 In Bar-Hillel’s
simple type hierarchy, by contrast, it is an essential matter whether a function should
be written to the left or to the right of its argument. This makes sense when one
considers that the functions in question are functors, for it may well make a difference
to syntactic connection whether one word is written to the left or to the right of
another. The hierarchy is generated by the following rule: if α, β1, . . . , βm, γ1, . . . , γn
are types, then
(α : β1 . . . βm|γ1 . . . γn)
is a type, the type of functors applying to the left to m arguments of type βi and
applying to the right to n arguments of type γi. In this hierarchy the binary sentential
connectives ‘and’ and ‘or’ are of type (s : s|s), for they connect with one sentence to
the left and one sentence to the right. An intransitive verb, such as ‘smells’, is, in
English at least, of type (s : n|), since in English the subject of a verb stands to the
left of the verb. A transitive verb is of type (s : n|n) with one argument to the left
for the subject and one argument to the right for the object of the verb.
If we require that all functors in Bar-Hillel’s hierarchy be unary, then it can given
the following more perspicuous presentation, stemming from Lambek (1958). If α and
β are types, then (α/β) and (β\α) are types, the types of functors applying to the
right and left respectively to an argument of type β and yielding an element of type α.
The type of intransitive verbs is then written n\s, indicating that if we place an n to
40This notation stems from Łukasiewicz. It is for instance employed in Tarski and Łukasiewicz (1930).
41Dedekind (1894) makes use of this convention, perhaps as one of the first to do so.
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the left, then we get an s. The sentential connective ‘and’, however, which intuitively
is a binary functor, belongs in Lambek’s hierarchy both to (s\s)/s and to s\(s/s),
and that may seem counterintuitive. That a single word may belong to different types
was, however, recognized also by Bar-Hillel (1953, pp. 49–50). In fact, one and the
same word ‘and’ seems prima facie to be used not only to conjoin sentences, but also
to conjoin verbs, adverbs, adjectives, or indeed almost any pair of words of the same
type. Lambek’s syntactic calculus, nowadays also known as the Lambek calculus, is
a systematic presentation of this “typical ambiguity” of words. The calculus consists
of formulas x → y, where x and y are types, whose intended interpretation is that
any expression of type x is also of type y. The calculus consists of eight simple rules
(three axioms and five rules of inference), all of which are evident by the intended
meaning of the formulas (Lambek, 1958, p. 163). By means of these rules one can




The first of these formulas has (s\s)/s  s\(s/s) as an instance, whence Lambek’s
(s\s)/s may be equated with Bar-Hillel’s s : s|s. From the second formula follows
what is known as the Geach rule: if xy → z, then x(y/w)→ z/w.43 This rule is used
repeatedly by Geach (1970) in his discussion of natural language syntax. The instance
n → s/(n\s) of the third formula is the rule of type raising used when moving from
a name such as ‘Socrates’ to the second order functor taking an intransitive verb and
placing it to the right of the name ‘Socrates’. The rule is in effect used by Frege
at Gg § 22, when he notes that ϕ(2) is a second-order function (where ‘2’ of course
could be replaced by any other Fregean proper name), and it underlies the treatment
42That is, both (x\y)/z → x\(y/z) and x\(y/z)→ (x\y)/z can be derived.
43Using the primitive rules as well as the derived rules listed by Lambek (1958, pp. 163–164), the following
simple derivation can be given of the Geach rule from the formula z/y → (z/w)/(y/w).
xy → z
x→ z/y z/y → (z/w)/(y/w)
x→ (z/w)/(y/w) y/w → y/w
x(y/w)→ ((z/w)/(y/w))(y/w) ((z/w)/(y/w))(y/w)→ z/w
x(y/w)→ z/w
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of singular terms in Montague grammar as second-order functions, hence as being of
the same type as quantifiers.44
Ajdukiewicz (1935) calls the types of his linguistically directed simple type theory
meaning categories (Bedeutungskategorien); the doctrine of such meaning categories
is nowadays often called categorial grammar.45 The basic idea of categorial grammar
appears to stem from Leśniewski, namely the idea of distinguishing ground types and
functor types, and defining functor types inductively in the manner of the simple type
hierarchy.46 Leśniewski (1929, p. 14), Ajdukiewicz (1935, p. 2), and Tarski (1936, p.
335) all refer to Husserl as the inventor of the notion of meaning category. In his
Fourth Logical Investigation (LU IV) Husserl introduces this term and characterizes
it in effect as a maximal class of meanings that are substitutable for each other salva
congruitate (LU IV § 10). Husserl as well as the Polish logicians regarded the relation
of being of the same meaning category as an equivalence relation;47 hence a meaning
category is the range of admissible arguments of a suitable propositional functor.48 It
is what we shall call its range of significance, a notion to be discussed extensively in
the following sections of this dissertation.
Husserl introduces the notion of a meaning category in the context of a presenta-
tion of what he calls pure logical grammar (reinlogische Grammatik).49 Husserl’s pure
logical grammar has in common with categorial grammar that it is pure, having the
presumption of being applicable to any actual language. In doctrine, however, the two
differ significantly. The basic difference is that categorial grammar adopts a function–
argument syntax, while Husserl’s pure grammar adopts a broadly syllogistic syntax.
In particular, Husserl assumes that a proposition contains both formal elements and
44The explicit type assignment is made at Montague (1973, p. 249). For a useful discussion, see Gamut
(1991, pp. 158–165). The assignment of singular terms to the type of quantifiers is criticized by Geach
(1970, p. 4).
45The term ‘categorial grammar’ appears to stem from Bar-Hillel et al. (1960).
46Leśniewski apparently conceived of the notion of a semantic category in 1922 as a replacement for the
simple type hierarchy (cf. Leśniewski, 1929, p. 14). A definition of the hierarchy is not found in Leśniewski’s
published writings, but see e.g. Luschei (1962, pp. 84–104) and Simons (2011, § 4.1).
47Tarski (1936, p. 335) is explicit on the matter, Ajdukiewicz not. For Leśniewski, see his “terminological
explanation” T.E. XXXV at (Leśniewski, 1929, p. 68) and the ensuing discussion; see also (Luschei, 1962,
p. 213). It is clear that Husserl regards meaning categories as disjoint.
48Cf. the characterization of meaning categories by Ajdukewicz (ibid., p. 3) and Tarski (loc. cit.).
49This is a main topic of LU IV, especially of §§ 10–14. More detailed accounts of Husserl’s ideas can be
found in his lecture notes, especially Husserl (1996), but also Husserl (2001) and Husserl (2003). Material
from these lecture notes was published in a compressed form in Husserl (1929, Beilage 1). The sometimes
significant additions to LU IV §§ 10–13 in the second edition of the work also stem from these lecture notes.
I am not aware of any secondary literature on Husserl’s ideas concerning pure logical grammar taking into
account all the material that has now been published.
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material elements,50 and as I shall argue one paragraph below, such a distinction
has no place in categorial grammar. Husserl’s meaning categories collect the mate-
rial elements of propositions. In categorial grammar there is an infinite hierarchy of
meaning categories. For Husserl, by contrast, the number of meaning categories is
fixed. He mentions the following four: categories of propositional meanings, of nomi-
nal meanings, of adjectival meanings, and of (binary) relational meanings. Forms of
meaning are for Husserl closely related to syncategorems.51 Each of the connectives,
for instance, being a syncategorem, is associated with a form of meaning. Thus, there
are forms of meaning A and B and if A then B, where A and B are place holders for
propositions. There is a form S is p where S is a nominal and p an adjectival meaning;
a form Sp, which is the qualification of S by p, for instance ‘white snow’; and a form
this S, an instance of which is ‘this house’. The two latter forms thus result in nominal
meanings when their “open places” are filled. Since the set of meaning categories is
fixed, something else must account for the variety of linguistic structure. In Husserl’s
pure grammar this is accounted for by recursive rules for constructing forms of mean-
ing. The forms of meaning we have listed so far belong to the base clause of the
recursion. For each of these it is laid down what category the meanings must belong
to that fill its “open places” as well as which category the result of filling the form
by suitable meanings belongs to. New forms of meaning can be constructed on the
basis of this knowledge. Thus, since the result of filling A and B with propositions
is another proposition, there is therefore a form (A and B) and C, as well as forms
if (A and B) then C and if A then (B and C). Likewise there is a form this S is p. The
primary task of pure logical grammar is to find the set of meaning categories, the set
of basic forms of meaning, and the set of rules for constructing forms of meaning.52
While the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic parts of speech
is basic to Husserl’s conception of pure grammar, it is obliterated in categorial gram-
mar. What traditional logic would treat as syncategorems are in categorial grammar
instead treated as functors of one or more arguments of suitable type. There is thus
a distinction between words of ground type and words of functor type, but this is
not at all like the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words.53
50Cf. e.g. LU p. 329: “Alles in allem erkennen wir, [. . . ] daß jede konkrete Bedeutung ein Ineinander von
Stoffen und Formen ist.”
51There appears to have been a general interest in syncategorems in the Brentano school; see Schmit (1992,
pp. 38–41).
52See especially LU pp. 337–338, and also Husserl (1900, p. 245). It is clear from the lecture notes cited
in footnote 49 that pure logical grammar in fact has a wider task than this, that the logical structure of
language is not exhausted by meaning categories and forms of meaning; but we shall not go into that here.
53I therefore disagree with Bocheński (1949, p. 266), who equates functors of functors with syncategorems;
and with Leclercq (2011, p. 184), who equates functors quite generally with syncategorems.
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Although all syncategorematic words may be of functor type, not all categorematic
words are of ground type; in fact, by the type raising rule y → z/(y\z) any word
of ground type is also of functor type. Moreover, functors are indeed words of a
type, they belong to the lexicon of the language, hence they have meaning by them-
selves, and not only in the company of other words. Syncategorems, by contrast, were
conceived as words that have meaning only in the company of other words. Syncat-
egorems are also words that cannot by themselves function as terms in a syllogistic
proposition; a fortiori, no predicate is a syncategorem; but a predicate is a functor.
The general point, already mentioned in section 4.3 of chapter 1, is that the notion
of a syncategorem makes sense only against the background of traditional logic and
grammar. With the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words
obliterated, so is the distinction between the form and the matter of a proposition
obliterated in function–argument syntax. We cannot point to a word in a proposition
of function–argument syntax and say “that is a formal element” or “that is a material
element.” If hylomorphic terminology is applicable at all here, then we should have
to say of any element, be it of ground type or functor type, that it is a form–matter
composite rather than just a formal element or just a material element.
In categorial grammar there is only one basic mode of syntactic construction:
functor applied to argument or arguments. In traditional grammar, by contrast, each
syncategorem is associated with its own mode of syntactic construction; hence there
are as many modes of syntactic construction as there are syncategorems. This can
be seen as following from two characteristics of syncategorems: (i) that they have no
meaning by themselves, in modern terms, that they do not belong to the lexicon of
the language; (ii) that, in the words of Ammonius (in Int 13,1–3), they “are useful for
combining and constructing the parts of speech with one another.” The latter was,
for instance, the characteristic mark of syncategorems according to Locke. With this
in mind one sees that the account of grammar in Quine (1986, pp. 15–30) is quite tra-
ditional, for Quine there treats the connectives and the quantifiers as syncategorems;
indeed, he calls them particles, employing Locke’s term for syncategorems. Quine
does regard a formula of the form Fx to be obtained by applying the functor F to the
argument x. But the formula ¬Fx, for instance, is for him not obtained by applying
a functor ¬ of type (s : s) to the formula Fx of type s. Rather, ¬ is, as Quine says,
“incidental to the negation construction” (ibid. p. 28), viz. the construction that from
a formula Fx constructs a new formula ¬Fx. The other connectives and the quanti-
fiers are likewise incidental to constructions. Thereby each connective and quantifier
is associated with a mode of sentence construction different from the basic mode of ap-
plying a functor to an argument. Also Montague (1973) treats the connectives and the
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quantifiers of the “fragment” of English that he studies as incidental to constructions,
hence as not belonging to the lexicon.54 Montague is, however, not as a consequent in
this treatment of the connectives and quantifiers as Quine is, for Montague applies it
only to the object language. By Montague’s so-called translation function an English
sentence of the form A and B is translated into a formula ϕ ∧ ψ (ibid. p. 262). This
formula is in turn interpreted in a so-called intensional type hierarchy, a simple type
hierarchy with three ground types, of individuals, of truth-values, and of “possible
worlds.”55 In this type hierarchy the connectives and the quantifiers are interpreted
as objects. The connective ∧ for instance is interpreted as an object of type (t)(t)t,
where t is the type of truth values; and the universal quantifier over a type α is inter-
preted as an object of type ((α)t)t. In their interpretation, therefore, the connectives
and quantifiers are for Montague not syncategorematic.
Objects in a simple type hierarchy combine with each other without the need for
any “glue” from outside the hierarchy. This contrasts with the terms of syllogistics,
which do not by themselves combine to form propositions, but need a certain form,
expressed by one or more syncategorematic words, in order so to combine. Let us
say that a category scheme is syntactic if it determines the modes of combination of
the members of the categories into some new item. Simple type theory constitutes a
syntactic category scheme, for a function of type τ is defined precisely by the type of
the item or items with which an item of τ may combine in order to form a new item.
In fact, all the category schemes that we shall consider in what follows that define a
type as the range of significance of a propositional function are syntactic. The type
of an object is there namely determined by which predicates it may combine with,
and the type of a predicate is determined by which objects it may combine with.
Aristotle’s category scheme, by contrast, is not syntactic. A term may combine with
any other term so as to form a syllogistic proposition. This is the principle of syntactic
similarity, which we saw to be essential to the workings of Aristotle’s syllogistics. Ryle
(1938), comparing Aristotle’s category scheme with that provided by type theory,
criticized the former precisely for its not be syntactic. According to Ryle, laying
down the categories and describing the syntax of a language are intimately related
activities. To treat the category of terms independently of the syntax of propositions
is therefore to treat as separate what are really two sides of the same thing; “it is,” in
Ryle’s memorable words (ibid. pp. 195–196), “to treat as freely shuffleable counters
54See Montague’s syntactic rules (ibid. pp. 251–251). Gamut (1991, p. 154) fittingly calls Montague’s
manner of proceeding syncategorematic introduction of the connectives and quantifiers.
55See Gamut (1991, ch. 5). Montague in addition has a ground type of time instances.
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factors the determinate roles of which in the combination into which they can enter
are just what constitute their types.”
2. Ranges of significance
In speaking of Frege’s hierarchy of types, we are using the word ‘type’ in a sense
deriving from Russell, and corresponding roughly to the sense of the word recorded in
the OED as “kind, class or order as distinguished by a particular characteristic.” This
is a relatively recent use of the word—the earliest occurrence recorded by the OED is
dated 1854—and certainly not the only one current in philosophy.56 Whewell (1840,
Bk. VIII ch. ii sec. iii art. 10) defines a type as “an example of any class. . . which is
considered as eminently possessing the characters of the class.” This is not a type
in Russell’s sense, but rather what nowadays is more commonly called a prototype.
There is, secondly, the sense of ‘type’ as contrasted with ‘token’, stemming from
Pierce, and still current in philosophy today;57 and, thirdly, a closely related sense of
the word used by mathematicians when they speak of order types, or more generally
of isomorphism types: ‘type’ then has the sense of the abstract shape or form of
something.58 In the Principles of Mathematics (1903) Russell in fact employs ‘type’
in both the first and third of these other senses. He speaks of Socrates as the type of
humanity (§ 15), indicating that he serves as a typical or generic example of a man;59
and of ‘x is a man’ as the type of a certain class of propositions, namely the class of
those propositions obtained by substituting x by a suitable constant term (§ 22). But
in the technical sense of that work a type is the range of significance of a propositional
function (§ 497). It is this notion of a type as a range of significance that will occupy
us in the current section.
2.1. Russell’s type theories. The Principles contains nothing more than the
sketch of a type theory, “put forward tentatively, as affording a possible solution of
the contradiction” (§ 497), namely the Zermelo–Russell paradox.60 A more developed
doctrine of types is found in the paper Mathematical logic as based on the theory of
types (1908) and in the first volume of the Principia Mathematica (1910). But here
as well a type is defined as the range of significance of a propositional function (1908,
56See e.g. Heyde (1941) and Lessing (1998).
57See Wetzel (2014).
58The notion of order type appears to stem from Cantor (1895, p. 497). See also (Dedekind, 1890, p. 275),
who calls the natural numbers the “abstract type” of simply infinite systems.
59PoM § 15: “For example, when it is said that ‘Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal’ Socrates
is felt as a variable: he is a type of humanity, and one feels that any other man would have done as well.”
60Regarding Zermelo, see a note recording an oral communication of his to Husserl published in (Husserl,
1979, p. 399).
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p. 236; PM p. 161); and again the motivation is the need to avoid “the contradictions
and paradoxes which have infected logic and the theory of aggregates” (PM p. vii).
Types being ranges of significance, the doctrine of types should show that statements
on which these contradictions and paradoxes rest are in fact nonsense. I will not say
much pertaining to the paradoxes here. What interests me in the following is rather
the idea of a range of significance. We shall see that, contrary to what Russell says,
one cannot take his types as being defined as ranges of significance of propositional
functions. Within Russell’s type theory types are ranges of significances; but they
cannot be that by definition.
Before considering the doctrine of types in the Principles and in the Principia a
note should be made about Russell’s notions of proposition and propositional function.
In the Principles a proposition is defined as “anything that is true or that is false”
(§ 13). A propositional function is a function all of whose values are propositions,
or in Russell’s language “φx is a propositional function if, for every value of x, φx is
a proposition” (§ 22). The definition of a proposition leaves it open what it is that
is true or that is false, and obscurity at this point remains in Russell’s discussion; it
is in particular not clear whether he takes a proposition to be linguistic or ontic in
character, whether, that is, he takes a proposition to be something apt for expressing
or rather as something apt for being expressed.61 A propositional function is in any
event something which it is natural to view as linguistic in character: since Russell
defines a type as the range of significance of a propositional function, he of course
assumes that propositional functions are the sort of things that can be or can fail
to be significant, and it is primarily linguistic items which are of that sort.62 In the
Principia a propositional function is, accordingly, understood to be “an expression
containing an undetermined constituent, i.e. a variable, or several such constituents”
(p. 92). The value of a propositional function for a given argument may then be
regarded either as the linguistic item that results upon substituting the argument
viewed linguistically for the variable in the propositional function—in which case a
propositional function would be a sentential functor in the sense of Ajdukiewicz. Or
else the value must be regarded as whatever one takes to be the signification of the
value of this functor, for instance a proposition in the ontic sense.
61PoM § 13 speaks of propositions as expressions, whereas PoM § 51 speaks of them as ontic, namely
as containing the entities signified by words. PM p. 44 distinguishes propositions as expressed from
propositions as expressing (Russell now views the former as “a false abstraction”). In the Introduction to
Mathematical Philosophy (1919a, p. 155) Russell holds that a proposition is “primarily a form of words
which expresses what is either true or false.”
62Cf. PM p. 48 fn.: “Significance is a property of signs.”
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That the types in the theory sketched in the Principles cannot in general be
taken to be ranges of significance seems clear from inspection of Russell’s text. There
is a type of individuals which contains, besides “simple individuals,” such things as
“persons, tables, chairs, apples, etc.” (§ 497); but Russell does not point to any
propositional function whose range of significance is constituted by this varied lot;
and it is difficult to think of any function that would do the job. The same must be
said about the type of sets of individuals. Russell claims that (loc. cit.)
‘Brown and Jones’ is an object of this type [sc., of sets], and will in
general not yield a significant proposition if substituted for ‘Brown’
in any true or false proposition of which ‘Brown’ is a constituent.
That a substitution of ‘Brown’ for ‘Brown and Jones’ yields nonsense may be true for
propositions whose predicate is collective in the manner of ‘make a good team’; but it
is a matter of linguistic accident, namely grammatical number, that such substitutions
in general result in nonsense. We cannot, however, take the purely grammatical
fact that the number of the verb matches ‘Brown’ but not ‘Brown and Jones’ as
an indication of the logical fact that Brown and the set of Brown and Jones belong
to different types. A logical notion such as the notion of a type cannot depend
on a surface grammatical notion such as the notion of number. In the cited passage
Russell must therefore be assuming a technical criterion of significance, namely that of
belonging to different types. The type of sets is not defined as the range of significance
of a certain propositional function; rather, that individuals and sets are of different
types is employed as a criterion of significance. Just as no propositional function is
provided in the case of sets, so none are provided for the further types in the hierarchy
of sets of sets, sets of sets of sets, etc. As far as I have seen, it is only for the type
of all sets and for the type of propositions that propositional functions are provided:
the type of all sets is the range of significance of the propositional function ‘x has
a number’ (§ 497), while the type of propositions is the range of significance of the
propositional function ‘x is true or false’.
To the extent that we grasp the type structure sketched in the Principles, we
grasp it therefore quite independently of the notion of a range of significance. It is
a structure like that of the hierarchy of simple types, although the elements of the
types are sets and relations rather than functions. Besides the type of individuals,
there is a type of sets of individuals, a type of sets of sets of individuals, and for any
n a type of sets of n-tuples of individuals, etc. That the structure is only like that of
the hierarchy of simple types, and not quite the same, is seen by Russell’s assumption
that types may be included in each other, and indeed that cumulative sums of types
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may themselves be types; in particular, and as already noted, Russell holds that there
is a type of all sets. The universe of types is, moreover, not exhausted by this modified
simple type hierarchy, for the types of numbers and the types of propositions are taken
to fall outside of it. Russell’s reasons for so taking them are obscure, but in the case
of propositions they may have to do with an antinomy pertaining to propositions, and
closely related to the original Contradiction. Russell notes that we have to admit sets
of propositions, “for we often wish to assert the logical product” of such a set (§ 500).
Consider, therefore, the set
w := {q ∈ prop | ∃m ⊂ prop[q = (∀p ∈ m)(p is true) ∧ q /∈ m]}
And consider the proposition
r := (∀p ∈ w)(p is true)
Then r ∈ w if and only if r /∈ w, a contradiction. Russell suggests a possible repair
but finds it wanting and concludes that this contradiction “is probably not soluble”
by the doctrine of types as conceived in the Principles.63
Following a number of other attempts at solving the original Contradiction and
related antinomies, Russell (together with Whitehead) settles in the Principia Math-
ematica on what is now called the ramified theory of types.64 As in the Principles
a type is here defined as a range of significance, but the type structure is consider-
ably more complex. In the course of a debate with Poincaré, Russell had become
convinced that a theory capable of solving the antinomies must comply with what
he called the vicious-circle principle (see esp. Russell, 1906a, p. 205). In one of its
formulations this principle says that “whatever involves all of a collection cannot be
one of the collection” (1908, p. 225; PM p. 37). In a more technical formulation it
says that “any expression containing an apparent variable must not be in the range of
that variable, i.e. must belong to a different type” (PM p. 161; cf. 1906a, p. 204). As
Ramsey (1925a, p. 356) in effect remarks, the ramified hierarchy can be seen as the
natural outcome of the vicious-circle principle in this technical formulation together
with the principle that a function must be of a type, or an order, higher than that
of each of its arguments. The latter principle was accepted by Frege and was later
63Cf. the letter to Frege on September 29, 1902: “Mein Vorschlag über logische Typen scheint mir jetzt
unfähig das zu leisten was ich davon hoffte,” whereupon the above reasoning follows.
64For an overview of the former attempts, see Russell (1906b) with Urquhart (1988); for the so-called
substitutional theory in particular, see Russell (1906c) with Hylton (1980). It is worth remarking that the
latter does not comprise a type theory, even though Russell does speak of types of so-called matrices—these
matrices are not entities and do not belong to domains of quantification.
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dissociated from the ramified hierarchy by Chwistek (1921, p. 342–343; 1922, p. 241)
and independently by Ramsey (loc. cit.). It motivates the hierarchy of simple types.
No rigorous exposition of the ramified hierarchy can be found in the Principia, but
an elegant definition was provided by Church (1976a).65 There are two ground types,
one of individuals ι and one of propositions; and there is a hierarchy of functions (of
functions of functions of. . . ) from individuals into the ground type of propositions,
that is, a hierarchy of propositional functions.66 Russell seems moreover to have
conceived of a ramified hierarchy of propositions, in which one branch is derived
from the hierarchy of functions, while another branch arises through quantification
over types of propositions. The full extent of this hierarchy is, it seems to me, not
fully taken account of in Church’s exposition, but we shall not worry about that
here.67 Following Church, we define the ramified hierarchy of propositional functions
inductively as follows: ι is a type, the type of individuals; and if α1, . . . αm are types
and n ∈ N , then (α1, . . . , αm)/n is a type, the type of propositional functions of
variables of types α1, . . . αm and of level n; by metonymy we shall also say that the
type (α1, . . . , αm)/n has level n. Thus on top of the simple type structure there is
here a stratification into levels. The notion of level is not expressly employed in the
Principia, but is introduced by Church mainly as an auxiliary notion for giving a
rigorous definition of the notion of order, which is employed in the Principia, playing
in fact a crucial role in the sketch given there of the ramified hierarchy. Before giving
Church’s definition of the notion of order it seems wise to consider some examples.
Let us begin with ‘Socrates is a man’, which (let us assume, though see PM pp.
45, 50) is what Russell would call an elementary proposition (PM, pp. 91–92). By
substituting into this a variable for ‘Socrates’ we obtain a propositional function ‘x
is a man’, or man(x), which is what Russell would call an elementary propositional
function (loc. cit.), a function of individuals of lowest complexity. In Church’s notation
65For the case of unary propositional functions there is an alternative definition, assumed for instance by
Myhill (1974). Each function has a certain order (a notion to be defined below), and a type is here defined
as a sequence of orders: the type of a function of individuals is a sequence of two elements, of a function
of function of individuals a sequence of three elements, etc.
66Functions to individuals, or so-called descriptive functions more generally, are derivative for Russell (PM
p. 15), explained (officially at PM ∗30.01) in terms of the definite description operator; on this, see Hylton
(1994).
67For the first dimension, see PM pp. 54–55 and also the title of PM ∗9: “Extensions of the theory of
deduction from lower to higher types of propositions.” This notion of type of proposition seems to be
captured by Church’s types ()/n. It is this notion of type that motivates the doctrine of the typical
ambiguity of the propositional connectives (PM pp. 46–47), reflected in the definition in ∗9.01 of ¬∀xϕ(x)
in terms of ∃x and the negation of the elementary proposition ϕ(x). The second dimension is what Copi
(1971, p. 80) calls the hierarchy of propositions; it seems to be presupposed by Russell’s discussion of the
Liar.
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it is a function of type (ι)/1, a function of individuals of level 1. To obtain functions
of higher level, consider the function of x defined by
∀f (ι)/1(∀y(man(y) ⊃ fy) ⊃ fx)
This function is true of x if every function of type (ι)/1 that is true of every man is also
true of x. Like man(x), this is a function of individuals, but its definition involves
quantification over functions of type (ι)/1, so in accordance with the vicious-circle
principle it cannot itself be of this type; it is of type (ι)/2. In general, the function
of individuals x defined by
∀f (ι)/n(∀y(man(y) ⊃ fy) ⊃ fx)
is of type (ι)/n+1. The vicious-circle principle requires in general that if the definition
of a function of individuals involves quantification over functions of individuals of level
n, then it must itself be of level at least n+ 1.
Consider now what happens if we define a function of individuals by quantifying
not over functions of individuals, but over functions of functions of individuals. There
is an infinite range of such functions, so for concreteness let us consider functions of the
type ((ι)/1)/1. Quantifying over this type we can define, for instance, the following
function Φ(x) of individuals.
∃g(ι)/1[gx ∧ ∀F ((ι)/1)/1(F (man) ⊃ Fg)]
This function Φ is true of an individual x if there is a propositional function g of type
(ι)/1 such that gx is true and Fg is true for every F of type ((ι)/1)/1 that is true
of the function man(y). Then Φ is a function of type (ι)/k for some k; but which
k? A function of individuals defined by quantification over (ι)/1 is of type (ι)/2.
The function Φ, however, involves quantification over ((ι)/1)/1; thus it presupposes a
collection, namely ((ι)/1)/1, that in turn presupposes the collection (ι)/1. It should
therefore be of a level higher than that of functions involving quantification only over
the latter type, that is, we should have k > 2. It is in fact of type (ι)/3, so k = 3.
Hence quantification over ((ι)/1)/1 as well as quantification over (ι)/2 forces the level
of the defined function to be at least 3. We see that, in intuitive terms, moving up
one level in the simple type hierarchy has the same effect on the level as moving one
stage further in the stratification of the simple type of functions of individuals. It is
this interplay between the levels in the simple type hierarchy on the one hand and
the stages in the stratification of each such level on the other hand that is accounted
for by Russell’s notion of order. No definition of this notion is found in the Principia,
but illuminating examples of functions of order two are provided: these include not
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only functions of functions of individuals, but also functions of individuals defined by
means of quantification over other functions of individuals (PM pp. 50–53, 163–164).
By means of the notion of level Church gives a general definition of the notion of
order, in accordance, apparently, with everything Russell says; as a function ρ on
types it is defined as follows.
ρ(ι) := 0
ρ((α1, . . . , αm)/n) := n+ max{ρ(α1), . . . , ρ(αm)}.
By metonymy we shall also speak of the order of a function.
With the notion of order in hand we are able to assign types to defined functions
(PM p. 53):
If the highest order of a variable occurring in a function, whether
as argument or as apparent variable, is a function of the nth order,
then the function in which it occurs is of the n+ 1th order.
That is to say, when assigning a type τ to a function defined by some formula ϕ it is
required that the order ρ(τ) of τ should exceed the orders of all the variables occurring
bound or free in ϕ (and it should be no less than the order of all constants occurring
in ϕ). When finding the appropriate level of τ the main point of consideration will
therefore be the orders of the various types involved. From the definition of order one
sees that the level of a type is equal to its order minus the maximum of the orders of
the types of the arguments. Hence, the level of a function f is the “distance” between
the order of the bound variables and constants occurring in the definition of f and
the maximum order of the arguments of f . What Russell called a predicative function
(PM p. 53) is therefore just a function of level 1; it is a function “of the lowest order
compatible with its having the arguments it has.”
Let us consider some further examples. When we pass to functions of functions
of individuals we need to carry with us the stratification of the type of functions
of individuals into the types (i)/n. Among the resulting types there will again be
stratification, yielding types ((i)/n)/m. This double stratification needs in its turn
to be carried along into the type of functions of functions of functions of individuals,
etc. Besides these complications there are those involved in taking into account types
of n-ary functions for n > 1. We restrict ourselves here to unary functions of unary
functions of individuals. A standard example of such a function—which we have
already met in our discussion of Frege—is, for a given individual a, the function fa. In
the ramified hierarchy there is an infinite tower of such functions, corresponding to the
tower of levels. That is, for each n there is the function f (i)/na of type ((ι)/n)/1. As
these functions do not involve quantification over functions, they are all of level 1. The
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same is true of a function of individuals defined by quantification over individuals, as
for instance ∀xf (i)/nx. What about a function involving quantification over functions
of individuals? Let R be a relation of type (ι, ι)/1 and a an individual, and define the
function Ψ(g(ι)/1) as follows:
ga ∧ ∀f (ι)/1[fa ∧ ∀x, y(fx ∧Rxy ⊃ fy) ⊃ ∀x(gx ⊃ fx)]
Then Ψ(g) is true if and only if g is true precisely of the R-descendants of a. The
function Ψ is again of level 1, i.e. it has the type ((ι)/1)/1, for its definition quantifies
only over (ι)/1. Hence the definition of Ψ, itself of type ((ι)/1)/1, is analogous to
the definition of a function of type (ι)/1 that involves quantification over ι. What
distinguishes Ψ from such functions is that these also have order equal to 1, while Ψ
is of order 2. To get a higher level we need something like the function χ(g(ι)/1),
∃F ((ι)/1)/1(F (man) ∧ Fg),
in which we quantify over ((ι)/1)/1. In accordance with Russell’s principle for type
assignment just cited, the function χ is of order 3, since the order of the variable F
being quantified over is 2. The type of the argument of g is (ι)/1, hence the type of
g itself must be ((ι)/1)/2, since only then will its order be 3.
There are well-known problems, both of a philosophical and of a more exegetical
nature, pertaining to the ramified hierarchy and the vicious-circle principle that mo-
tivates it. One may, for instance, ask how the principle is best formulated; whether it
is valid; whether it is in fact needed for the solution of the paradoxes; and whether it
is compatible with Russell’s realism.68 There are also well-known, and perhaps more
serious, technical problems. Russell was aware that it will not in general be possible
to carry out proof by induction in ramified type theory unless one adopts what he
calls the axiom of reducibility (e.g. Russell, 1908, p. 242). This axiom, if that is what
it is, says that any propositional function is extensionally equivalent to a predicative
propositional function, that is, to a function of level 1. In Appendix B to the second
edition of Principia Russell purports to show the contrary, but a gap in this proof was
pointed out by Gödel (1944, pp. 145–146); and Myhill (1974) shows that it is in fact
not possible to justify proof by induction in general in ramified type theory without
the axiom of reducibility. The construction of arithmetic within ramified type theory
would therefore seem to require the axiom of reducibility. It is, however, difficult
to see the justification of this axiom: why should there always exist a predicative
68For a classic discussion of the first two questions, see Gödel (1944). Ramsey (1925a, p. 356) famously
argued that the antinomies pertaining to logical notions are solved already by the simple theory of types.
For the final question, see e.g. Goldfarb (1989).
102
function of the kind required? Indeed, if one accepts that there is such a baroque
structure as the ramified hierarchy it is curious that one should also accept that this
hierarchy in effect collapses to the simple type hierarchy (i.e. the hierarchy consisting
of level 1 functions of individuals, level 1 functions of level 1 functions of individuals,
etc.).
Let us now at last consider the claim that a type in the sense of Principia is defined
as the range of significance of a propositional function. The claim is false. For, if a is
an individual, then there is a propositional function fa, and the range of significance
of this propositional function consists of all functions of individuals. By Russell’s own
doctrine of ramified types, fa is significant so long as f is a function of individuals. In
ramified type theory there is, however, no type of all functions of individuals; instead
there is an infinite family of types (ι)/n, stratifying the functions of individuals into
various levels. Thus we have found something that in accordance with the ramified
theory of types is the range of significance of a propositional function, but that is not
a ramified type. What consideration of the range of significance of the propositional
function fa does yield is the simple type of functions of individuals. When Russell and
Whitehead explain at Principia pp. 47–48 “why a given function requires arguments
of a certain type” they seem in fact to have only simple types in mind. The principle
presupposed throughout this discussion seems to be that a function needs to differ in
type from its arguments; that principle, however, leads most naturally to the simple
theory of types, where the type of a propositional function is fully determined by the
types of its arguments. There is thus very little in the idea of a type as the range of
significance of a propositional function that should find its most natural realization
in the ramified hierarchy. With the ramified hierarchy already in place, however, one
can of course lay it down that any variable is to have a type as its range of values. It
will then follow that a well-formed propositional function, since it contains a variable,
has a type as its range of significance. Instead of the propositional function fa we
then have fτα, in which the variable f is restricted to the type τ . This function does
not straddle ramified types as the function fa considered above does; its range of
significance is simply the type τ . Hence, given the ramified hierarchy, it will follow
that a type is the range of significance of a propositional function; but the notion of a
range of significance of a propositional function will not by itself give us the ramified
hierarchy.
2.2. Sommers’s type theory. There is thus a range of significance of functions
of individuals that is not a ramified type. One can argue that the dual problem per-
tains to the type of individuals: within the universe of individuals—which is equally
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undifferentiated in simple and ramified type theory—there are plenty of ranges of
significance, which, being only proper parts of the type of individuals, are therefore
not themselves types. The argument appeals to propositional functions of ordinary
language: Socrates, but not the Illiad, is in the range of significance of ‘x has an
aquiline nose’, while the Illiad, but not Socrates, is in the range of significance of ‘x is
divided into 24 chapters’; and John, but not Saturday, is in the range of significance
of ‘x loves Mary’, while Saturday, but not John, is in the range of significance of ‘x
follows Thursday’. Such examples can be multiplied to show that there is a broad
variety of ranges of significance of individuals. Ryle (1938, p. 203) must therefore
have assumed a novel notion of type, one different from the ramified as well as the
simple notion, when he laid it down that two items a and b are of different types if
there is a propositional function ϕx such that ϕa is significant while ϕb is absurd.
It is this new notion of type, developed especially by Sommers (1963), that will now
occupy us.
One may ask, however, how novel Ryle’s notion of type in fact is, whether it is
not in fact Russellian. Russell (1924) defines
A and B are of the same logical type if, and only if, given any fact
of which A is a constituent, there is a corresponding fact which has
B as a constituent, which either results by substituting B for A,
or is a negation of what so results.
And Princinpia ∗9.14, slightly reformulated, says likewise that
a is of the same type as b if and only if ϕa is significant if ϕb is
significant, for any propositional function ϕ.
Ryle (1938, p. 203) denies the if-direction of this proposition, namely that a and b
are of the same type if the one can be substituted for the other in any proposition
without loss of significance, holding only the only if-direction, namely that a and b
are of different types if there is a function ϕ such that ϕa is significant while ϕb is
not. His reason for denying the former is, however, not a good reason. It is that ‘I’
but not ‘the writer of this paper’ lies in the range of significance of ‘x never wrote a
paper’; but ‘I’ and ‘the writer of this paper’ belong to the same type, for they have one
and the same signification (for Ryle the elements of categories are linguistic); hence
there is a propositional function ϕ and items a and b of the same type such that ϕa
is significant while ϕb is absurd. This argument fails because ‘the writer of this paper
never wrote a paper’ is not absurd in the manner of ‘the Illiad has an aquiline nose’,
but merely a plain falsehood in the manner of ‘the King of Norway is not a king’.
Thus Ryle agrees with the only if-direction of Principia ∗9.14, and he does not offer
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a valid reason for denying the if-direction. This increases the suspicion that Ryle’s
notion of type is Russell’s.
Ryle does, however, not understand significance as Russell does, and that of course
makes a difference to a definition of type as a range of significance. Principia ∗9.14
is a primitive proposition, and is presumably meant to gain its evidence from ∗9.131,
the definition of sameness of type. The latter is an inductive definition in whose basic
clause it is simply laid down that all individuals are of the same type (and that all
elementary functions, i.e.—assuming the type theory—functions of level 1, are of the
same type, and likewise with propositions).69 The primitive proposition ∗9.14 must
therefore assume a notion of significance such that any function of individuals can
be significantly applied to any individual, which is just what Ryle denies. With no
indication to the contrary in Russell (1924), I would say that the same notion of
significance—or of “being a fact”—is assumed there, namely such that any function
of individuals can be significantly applied to any individual. Hence Russell, in the
Principia as well as in the quoted passage, operates with a notion of significance that
differs from Ryle’s, whence with a notion of sameness of type that differs from Ryle’s,
thence with a notion of type that differs from Ryle’s. Ryle’s notion of type is, in other
words, not Russellian.70
The range of significance of a propositional function ϕx is the range of things a
such that ϕa is either true or false. This is one of the ways in which the notion of
range of significance is explained by Russell (PM pp. 161, 400). It is the primary way
of explaining the notion in Sommers (1963), a paper investigating the mathematical
properties of ranges of significance. Sommers in fact defines as many as four notions
of type, two notions of types of individuals and two notions of types of what he calls
predicates, what in our terminology are propositional functions of individuals. For a
propositional function ϕ, let |ϕ|, the “absolute value” of ϕ, be the range of significance
of ϕ. Naively employing set-theoretical notation, we can define these various notions
of type as follows.
α-type For any propositional function ϕ, the type |ϕ|, i.e. {a : a ∈ |ϕ|}
A-type For any α-type τ , the type {ϕ : |ϕ| = τ}
B-type For any individual a, the type {ϕ : a ∈ |ϕ|}
β-type For any B-type τ , the type
⋂
{|ϕ| : ϕ ∈ τ}
69This definition is not quite adequate, for it contains no clause saying when two functions of functions
(of whichever types) have the same type; one possible revision would be to substitute ‘predicative’ for
‘elementary’ in clause (2) of the definition.
70The first to have understood types in the manner of Ryle (1938) may have been Carnap (1928, §§ 29–
31) with his notion of Gegenstandsphähre, described by Carnap (loc. cit.) as “Russellian types applied to
non-logical concepts.”
105
Thus, α-types and β-types are types of individuals, while A-types and B-types are
types of propositional functions of individuals. An α-type is simply the range of sig-
nificance of a propositional function. An A-type is the type of propositional functions
whose range of significance coincides with some α-type. We may think of an A-type
as the intensional correlate of the α-type involved in its definition, namely as the
range of properties having the given α-type as their extension.71 A B-type is the
type of propositional functions having a given individual in their respective ranges
of significance. A β-type, finally, is the type of individuals contained in the range of
significance of all propositional functions of some B-type. Further explication of the
notions of B-type and β-type will be offered in a short while.
2.2.1. The law of categorial inclusion. Apart from these various definitions the
most important part of Sommers’s theory of types is what he calls “the law of categorial
inclusion,” which is a law governing the inclusion relation between α-types.72 Again
employing set-theoretical notation, it can be stated as follows.
If σ and τ are α-types, then σ ∩ τ 6= ∅ implies either σ ⊂ τ or
τ ⊂ σ.








Here we think of each node as representing an α-type; the type corresponding to a
node is included (qua range of significance) in all nodes above it, and—according to
the law of categorial inclusion—is disjunct to all nodes not above or below it. A path
in a tree is a maximal linearly ordered subset of it. One sees that B-types correspond
to paths in the tree of α-types. A β-type is formed by taking the intersection over
B-types, and will therefore correspond to the lowest node in a path, if it exists. In
other words, if there is a lowest node in a path, i.e. an α-type with no type below it,
71We are then employing ‘intension’ roughly in the sense of Carnap (1947); cf. footnote 144 of chapter 1.
72This “law” was first introduced in Sommers (1959, p. 172ff.).
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then that α-type is a β-type; if there is no lowest node, then we can obtain one by
adding the relevant β-type at the bottom of the path.73
In light of our discussion in section 2 of chapter 1 it is natural to ask what the
relation is between the tree of α-types and the tree of genera and species. A little
reflection shows that neither is Aristotle’s tree a tree of ranges of significance, nor is
Sommers’s tree a tree of genera and species. There are nodes in Aristotle’s tree that
do not occur in a tree of ranges of significance. The term ‘white’, for instance, is a
species of ‘colour’ (e.g. Top 123b26), and so occurs in Aristotle’s tree, namely under
‘colour’ and in the division of quality; but there is no range of significance of all the
white things in the world. This points to another difference, namely in the kind of
individuals that fall under the nodes in the tree. A node in the tree of α-types is
a range of significance such as |white|, and this consists of all individuals of which
‘white’ could be predicated. A node in the tree of species and genera, on the other
hand, is a general term, and if this term falls outside the category of substance, then
the individuals that fall under it are the individual accidents discussed in section 1.2
above. We mentioned two conceptions of individual accidents: as dependent parts
of individual substances, and as lowest species, which may have instances in several
individual substances; but on neither conception is it the case that the term ‘white’
includes mice and men, the sort of individuals that fall under |white|. Next one may
note a difference in how nodes in the two trees are related. In the tree of genera
and species nodes are related by an intensional link—we have s < g if g is essentially
predicated of s—while in the tree of α-types nodes are connected by the extensional
link of inclusion. The extension of a term s is indeed included in the extension of its
genus g (Top 121b3–4), but that is not the reason why the one is placed under the
other in the tree; in the tree of α-types, by contrast, it is only inclusion that plays
a role in placing one node above another. There is, finally, a fundamental difference
in the information the trees contain about the possibility of combining terms P and
Q in a proposition. The terms that may be combined with P in a proposition are
precisely those that belong to a path in the tree of α-types to which P belongs; for
then, and only then, do we have |P | ∩ |Q| 6= ∅, which is a necessary condition for
combining P and Q in a predication. In the tree of genera and species, by contrast,
no such property obtains, since, for instance, no non-substance belongs to a path to
which substances belong, while it is assumed that any term can be predicated of some
73One may well wonder what the purpose is of introducing the notion of a β-type. Sommers (1963, pp.
330–331) claims that the relation ∼α of being of the same α-type is not transitive, and he introduces
β-types to obtain a transitive relation ∼β . If the law of categorial inclusion holds it is, however, easy to
see that ∼α is transitive: if a and b are of α-type σ, while b and c are of α-type τ , then σ∩ τ 6= ∅, whence
either σ ⊂ τ or τ ⊂ σ, and so each of a, b, c is in the α-type σ ∪ τ , in particular we have a ∼α c.
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substance. For example, in the tree of α-types the ranges of significance |white| and
|man| belong to a common path; but in the tree of genera and species the quality
‘white’ and the substance ‘man’ belong to different paths.
One can ask of the tree of α-types, just as was asked of the tree of genera and
species, whether it has various order-theoretic properties. We saw in section 2.3 of ch.
1 that Aristotle failed at proving the existence of lowest genera. Sommers’s argument
to the similar conclusion that there are ⊂-minimal α-types fails as well. He claims
(ibid. p. 332):
it is evident that for any language of finite vocabulary—and every
natural language is finite in that sense—the number of α-types is
[. . . ] is finite.
It is, firstly, not the case that every natural language has a finite vocabulary. English,
for instance, contains infinitely many numerals. And, secondly, even with a finite
vocabulary one can define infinitely many predicates (e.g. x > 0, x > s0, x > ss0,
x > sss0, etc.), and so possibly have infinitely many ranges of significance. Indeed,
in both the simple and the ramified type theory one defines an infinite hierarchy of
types by means of a finite vocabulary. In particular, it may well be false, as it is
in the simple and the ramified type theory, that there are only finitely many types
defined in a language of finite vocabulary. But if a type is the range of significance of
a propositional function it nevertheless seems reasonable to assume that for any type
τ for which there is a type σ with σ ⊂ τ , there is a ⊂-minimal type ρ ⊂ τ , that is, to
assume that we cannot go on forever making finer and finer ranges of significance. It
is easy enough to define an infinitely ⊂-descending chain of sets of natural numbers
(the example in brackets above will do), but these are not ranges of significance. It
is indeed difficult to see how one could construct an infinitely descending chain of
ranges of significance.
Assuming the finitude of α-types Sommers moreover claims that the law of cate-
gorial inclusion entails that there is a universal α-type, one which includes all others
(ibid. p. 355). But again this does not follow from the premisses. What does fol-
low is that there must be ⊂-maximal α-types—types that have no other types above
them—but not that there is a single such type, a greatest α-type. The argument
thus rests on the faulty inference from the existence in a partial order of a maximal
element to the existence therein of a greatest element.74 Since the finitude of α-types
is in fact merely an assumption, it is thus also merely an assumption that there are
74A maximal element of a partial order (A,<) is an element m such that there is no a ∈ A with m < a.
A greatest element in (A,<) is an element such that m < a for all m 6= a.
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⊂-maximal α-types. But again, if a type is the range of significance of a propositional
function this nevertheless seems a reasonable assumption; that is, it seems reasonable
to assume that for any type τ for which there is a type σ with σ ⊃ τ , there is a
⊂-maximal type ρ ⊃ τ .
Sommers maintains that the law of categorial inclusion is a theorem. Its purported
proof runs, as I understand it, as follows (ibid. p. 362). Let P be a predicate whose
range of significance is σ, and Q a predicate whose range of significance is τ . If
σ∩ τ 6= ∅, then it is a significant, though perhaps not a true, proposition that some P
is Q. Sommers holds that the domain of discourse of this proposition is σ∩ τ , that is,
it consists precisely of those individuals of which it makes sense to predicate both P
and Q. That is reasonable enough, for thus the domain of discourse is rendered as the
maximal range of individuals of which it makes sense to say that it is “a P which is Q.”
I have more difficulty with what follows. For it is now claimed that the proposition
‘some P is Q’ (or all, or none, or most, etc.) is about either σ or τ . Sommers is
thus offering an explication of the ordinary notion of ‘about’: a proposition involving
two predicates is about everything in the range of significance of at least one of the
predicates. Granting the explication for the moment, only one further assumption
is needed, namely that whatever a proposition is about is included in the domain
of discourse. Putting the pieces together we find then namely that either σ or τ ,
being the range of what the proposition is about, is included in σ ∩ τ , the domain of
discourse; but this is just to say that either σ ⊂ τ or else τ ⊂ σ.
But should we grant the suggested explication of ‘about’; should we grant, for
instance, that the proposition ‘some men are snubnosed’ is about the cat Jemima?
As Jemima is in the range of significance of ‘x is a man’, that follows from the
explication; it also follows that the proposition is not about the number 7. But why
should the proposition ‘some men are snubnosed’ not be about the number 7 when
it is about Jemima? It is hard to tell, and Sommers does not tell us. He tells us
merely that what is explicated is one sense of ‘about’. That must, in any event, be a
non-standard sense.75 Without further elucidation it is therefore difficult to grant the
second premiss of the argument, where the word ‘about’ is a key element, namely the
premiss that a proposition ‘some P is Q’ is about either |P | or |Q|. Not understanding
what the relevant sense of ‘about’ amounts to, neither do we understand what this
75Goodman (1961, p. 12) holds that “a statement absolutely about any class or classes is absolutely about
each Boolean function of them,” hence that ‘all crows are black’ is about the class of non-crows. But it
is about the class of them, not about each of them; so even though Jemima is a non-crow, ‘all crows are
black’ is not, on Goodman’s account, about Jemima, but only about a certain class of things to which
Jemima belongs.
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premiss amounts to, hence neither can we grant the inference to the law of categorial
inclusion. Sommers’s purported proof of this law is therefore not conclusive.76
Another proof of the law of categorial inclusion is offered in Sommers (1971, p.
35). Also this proof seems to turn on obscurity as to precisely what an ordinary
English word means, in this case the particle ‘not’. Sommers (ibid. pp. 21–23) dis-
tinguishes two senses in which one can deny that a is P : firstly, one can say that a
is in the range of significance, but not in the range of truth of P ; secondly, one can
say that a is outside the range of truth of P , be it within or without the range of
significance of P .77 Following a similar distinction drawn by Mannoury (1934, p. 333)
the first sort of negation is sometimes called choice negation and the latter sort is
called exclusion negation. Let us write ‘a is ¬P ’ to indicate choice negation and ‘a is
{P ’ to indicate exclusion negation. Following Sommers, let us, for current purposes,
say that P is a category term if its truth range coincides with its range of signifi-
cance. Then it is obvious that if P is a category term, then ‘a is ¬P ’ is either false
or meaningless. Sommers now considers the following schema, which we may call the
¬-schema (pronounced ‘neg-schema’)
(some x is y)⇒ (every x is y) ∨ (some x is ¬y) ∨ (every y is x) ∨ (some y is ¬x)
This would seem to be universally valid. If we now substitute category terms P and
Q for x and y in the this schema such that ‘some P is Q’ is significant, then we see
that the second and the fourth disjunct are false. Whence we get
If some P is Q, then every P is Q or every Q is P ,
which is another formulation of the law of categorial inclusion. Hence we appear to
have a proof of this law. But using the other notion of negation we have an alternative
76Both Nelson (1964, pp. 520–521) and De Sousa (1966, pp. 43–47) criticize Sommers’s argument, but on
different grounds; responses to these can be found in Sommers (1964) and Massie (1967).
77Aristotle APr I.46 urges that we must distinguish between asserting ‘S is non-P ’ and denying that S is
P ; the denial that S is P entails that S is non-P , but the assertion that S is non-P does apparently not
in general entail the denial that S is P (51b36–52a14). The point appears to be that you may for instance
neither like nor dislike the relish of pineapple, but be indifferent to it, in which case it is true to deny that
you like the relish of pineapple, but not to assert that you dislike it. Notice that if we express the denial
of ‘S is P ’ as ‘∼(S is P )’, then Aristotle’s distinction corresponds to Sommers’s distinction only if ∼ is
such that applied to a category mistake it yields the value true; that is, only if, ∼ in the significance logic





This is the connective Goddard and Routley (ibid. p. 280) denote by ‘¬’.
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formulation of the schema, which we may call the {-schema:
(some x is y)⇒ (every x is y) ∨ (some x is {y) ∨ (every y is x) ∨ (some y is {x).
This would also seem to be valid, in fact it follows from the ¬-schema, since ‘some
x is ¬y’ entails ‘some x is {y’. If we substitute category terms P and Q for x and y
in the {-schema, however, the law of categorial inclusion does not result, for it may
well be true that some P is {Q. We must therefore ask whether the ¬-schema is in
fact universally valid; it may well be that it is only the weaker {-schema that is valid.
Suppose there are category terms P and Q related as in this Venn diagram:
P
Q
Substitution of P and Q into the {-schema yields a truth, since both ‘some P is {Q’
and ‘some Q is {P ’ are true. But the substitution of P and Q into the ¬-schema yields
a falsity, as one easily checks (the antecedent is true while each of the disjuncts in the
consequent is false). The terms P and Q also falsify the law of categorial inclusion.
Hence we have reason to accept the ¬-schema only if we have reason to accept the
law of categorial inclusion. This attempted proof is therefore circular.
There is, finally, an indirect argument for the law of categorial inclusion presented
in Sommers (1959). Its conclusion is that the law of categorial inclusion is “inviolable”
(ibid. p. 175), that it cannot be disproved. A counterexample to the rule would have
to present two predicates P and Q such that P can be meaningfully predicated of
some but not all |Q|’s and Q meaningfully predicated of some but not all |P |’s.
One could for instance suggest that ‘expensive’ can be predicated of some but not
every thing which is |hard|, and ‘hard’ predicated of some but not every thing which
is |expensive|: both can be predicated of chairs, while ‘hard’ can be predicated of
problems but not of restaurants, and ‘expensive’ can be predicated of restaurants
but not of chairs. The category terms |hard| and |expensive| would therefore seem
to provide a counterexample to the law of categorial inclusion, for we have |hard| ∩
|expensive| 6= ∅, but neither |hard| ⊂ |expensive| nor |expensive| ⊂ |hard|. Sommers’s
argument is now that what such an instance shows is that one of the two predicates
is homonymous. It is indeed not unreasonable to say that ‘hard’ does not mean the
same in its application to problems as it does in its application to chairs. When
we split the word into ‘hard1’ and ‘hard2’, with |hard1| ∩ |hard2| = ∅, we shall have
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|chair| ⊂ |hard1| ⊂ |expensive|, whence the law of categorial inclusion is not violated
after all. This strategy is available in all cases: one can always insist that a proposed
counterexample to the law of categorial inclusion instead of disproving the law only
shows that one of the predicates involved is homonymous. One could claim that
the strategy would be unsuccessful if it forced us to make judgements of homonymy
where our ordinary sense of language recognizes none. To this Sommers would most
likely reply that our ordinary sense of language is often an inadequate standard in
such judgements:78 we may well feel that ‘hard’ is homonymous, but what does our
ordinary sense of language tell us about ‘being’? Sommers insists that we need a
theory to guide us in deciding such matters.
2.2.2. Types and homonymy. Assuming the law of categorial inclusion Sommers
(1965) converts the above strategy into a method for showing that a term is homony-
mous. Such methods had been presented already by Aristotle in Topics I.15. One of
these methods involves what is one of the few obvious applications of the categories
in the Topics. Aristotle says that one must consider the term in question with respect
to the categories, “to see whether these are the same in all cases” (102a3–4). It is not
clear from the text precisely what it is that Aristotle wants us to check: the category
or categories of the term itself, or rather the category or categories of the subjects of
which the term in question may be predicated?79 The latter method certainly seems
the most promising, for to apply the former method one would already have to know
that the term signifies items of different categories, that it in effect exhibits what
Russell called systematic or typical ambiguity (e.g. PM pp. 64–65). Knowing that
would, however, seem to amount to knowledge that the term is in fact homonymous,
which is what the method was meant to tell us.80 In the famous examples of the
homonymy of ‘being’ with respect to the categories (Met ∆.7 1017a22–27) it seems
78Cf. e.g. the discussion at Sommers (1963, pp. 338–343).
79Two recent books on homonymy in Aristotle appear to assume opposite answers: Shields (1999, pp. 52,
54–56) seems to read the passage as telling us to check the category of the term itself (or, closer to Shields’s
language, whether it signifies things of different categories in different predications); while Ward (2008, pp.
65–66) clearly assumes the second reading, that the method consists in checking whether the term can be
applied to subjects of varying categories. In the course of the relevant passage, Top 107a2–12, it seems
in fact that Aristotle slides from the method of the first reading to that of the second reading. The term
considered is ‘good’. And according to the first part of the passage, ‘good’ as applied to food does not
belong to the same category as it does when applied to a man: in the second case it signifies a quality,
while in the first case it signifies what is productive of pleasure (to poiētikon hēdonēs), which presumably
is a doing (poiein). Here it is thus the predicate ‘good’ that shifts category, while the subject in each case
is a substance (I assume that food is indeed a substance). According to the latter part of the passage,
however, ‘good’ is said to mean different things when applied to items of different categories, in particular
to times and quantities. Here it is thus the subject that shifts category.
80Though see Top 152a38–39, where it is clear that Aristotle asks us to check the category of the term in
question, thus to apply the former method.
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in any event to be the second method that is assumed: since being is said of items of
different categories, ‘being’ is homonymous; it does, for instance, not mean the same
to say of a substance that it has being as what it means to say of a quantity that it
has being.
Thus Aristotle formulates, albeit ambiguously, in the Topics, and appears to
rely in his argument for the homonymy of ‘being’ in Metaphysics ∆, on the rule
that, if a term is predicated of two subjects belonging to different categories, then
the term is homonymous. Sommers notes that the corresponding rule for types as
ranges of significance has undesirable consequences.81 It does have some desirable
consequences, for instance that ‘hard’ is homonymous in its application to chairs and
problems: chairs and problems belong to different types, so hard means one thing in
its application to the one and another thing in its application to the other.82 But the
rule would also deem ‘lasted an hour’ homonymous in its application to headaches
and lectures, assuming, as seems reasonable, that these are of different types; and
that is an undesirable consequence, since I can very well say that my headache lasted
as long as the lecture. In place of the rule apparently assumed by Aristotle Sommers
(1965, pp. 264–266) therefore proposes the following:
If there are three things a, b, and c such that P can be predicated
of a and b, but not of c, while Q can be predicated of b and c, but
not of a, then P does not mean the same when predicated of a as
it does when predicated of b, or else Q does not mean the same
when predicated of b as it does when predicated of c.
The validity of this rule follows from the law of categorial inclusion, as the three
individuals a, b, and c would otherwise mess up the tree structure that the law entails.
Namely, if the antecedent of the proposed rule obtains, but not the consequent, then
we should have both |P | 6⊆ |Q| and |Q| 6⊆ |P |, but also b ∈ |P | ∩ |Q|, contradicting
the law of categorial inclusion; hence, if the antecedent obtains, then so must the
consequent obtain. The rule is in accordance with the examples just considered. The
predicate ‘hard’ will be deemed homonymous over chairs and problems, as one sees by
letting a be a chair and b and c be problems, and setting P = hard and Q = problem.
81Similar undesirable consequences of this rule were noted by Black (1944, pp. 237–240). The rule thus
applied to ranges of significance is stated and accepted by Carnap (1928, § 30).
82This instance of homonymy may also be established by means of one of Aristotle’s methods from Top
I.15 (107b13–18), noting that we cannot say that a problem is harder than a chair.
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On the other hand, since we presumably have
|headache| ⊆ |lasts an hour|
|lecture| ⊆ |lasts an hour|
|headache| ∩ |lecture| = ∅
there will be no way of applying the rule to show that ‘lasts an hour’ is homonymous
over headaches and lectures.
The consequent of Sommers’s homonymy rule states that either the predicate P
does not mean the same when predicated of a as it does when predicated of b, or else
Q does not mean the same when predicated of b as it does when predicated of c. Here
it is assumed that b is univocal in the two predications ‘b is P ’ and ‘b is Q’. If we drop
this assumption a third disjunct must be added to the consequent: or b does not mean
the same when P is predicated of it as it does when Q is predicated of it.83 It is with
this disjunct added that Sommers draws one of the more interesting consequences
from his rule, namely the thesis that certain entities of ordinary life are what one
may call categorially composite: they straddle several categories, and so must be
composites of several mono-categorial entities. Switzerland is both mountainous and
democratic; but while it makes sense to say of the Moon that it is mountainous, it
does not make sense to say of it that it is democratic; and while it make sense to say
of Viking society that it was democratic, it does not make sense to say of it that it was
mountainous; since neither ‘democratic’ nor ‘mountainous’ appear to be homonymous
in this argument, it follows that ‘Switzerland’ must be homonymous. In fact, in one
of its applications ‘Switzerland’ must fall under the type |democratic| and in another
of its applications it must fall under the type |mountainous|. In objectual terms,
Switzerland is the kind of thing that is both |democratic| and |mountainous|. Since
these are disjunct α-types, it follows that the type of Switzerland is composite; it is
a composite of a geographical region and a society and perhaps other things besides,
and therefore belong to several categories. A similar argument of more philosophical
consequence concerns the type of men.84 Bob is 1.80 m tall and worried; but while it
makes sense to say of the Eiffel Tower that it is 1.80 tall, it does not make sense to say
of it that is worried; and while it makes sense to say of a mind, or someone’s mind,
that it is worried, it does not make sense to say of it that it is 1.80 m tall; since neither
‘1.80 m tall’ nor ‘worried’ appear to be homonymous in this argument, it follows that
‘Bob’ must be homonymous. Bob is the kind of thing that is both |1.80 m tall| and
|worried|; and since there are things, e.g. the Eiffel Tower, that are |1.80 m tall| but
83The rule in that form is implicitly assumed at Sommers (1964, p. 524).
84Both arguments are found in Sommers (1971).
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not |worried|, and things, e.g. Bob’s mind, that are |worried| but not |1.80 m tall|, it
follows from the law of categorial inclusion that |worried| ∩ |1.80 m tall| = ∅. Whence
Bob, like any other man, straddles types, he is the composite of a mind and a body,
or, perhaps better, of a |mind| and a |body|.
2.2.3. Sommers and simple types. There are two conspicuous contrasts distin-
guishing the structure of Sommers’s types from the simple type hierarchy. Firstly, in
Sommers’s type theory the domain of individuals is divided into several types; there is
not just the one universe of individuals, but a collection of habitats known as α-types.
Secondly, in Sommers’s theory the only simple types distinguished are individuals and
predicates; there are for instance no relations and no second-order predicates such as
the quantifiers. Where the simple theory of types is occupied with building the tower
of predicates and relations, Sommers’s theory is occupied with cultivating the ground
of individuals. It is natural to ask whether the efforts of the two theories may be
combined. The answer is yes: their joint effort is just a simple type structure built
over all α-types as ground types. Instead of the one type ι of individuals in simple
type theory there are then the ground types ι1, . . . , ιn. As α-types, these need not be
mutually exclusive, but they do satisfy the law of categorial inclusion; that is to say,
any two ιk’s are either disjoint or else one is included in the other. Let us assume that
there is a type o of propositions (which may or may not be one of the ιk’s). Following
Frege, we may regard functions of type (ιk)o as predicates whose range of significance
is ιk. We call this type hierarchy, where the type ι has been split up into several ιk’s,
a many-sorted simple type hierarchy.
Let us recall Sommers’s notion of an A-type. An A-type is the type of predicates
whose range of significance is some α-type τ ; in set-theoretical notation it is for any α-
type ιk, the type {ϕ : |ϕ| = ιk}. A-types are thus just the types (ιk)o. The definition
of A-types is the only step Sommers’s theory makes into the simple type hierarchy.
In particular, Sommers offers no account of relations. That is clearly a lacuna in
the theory, since relations, at least binary ones, are just as prominent in natural
language as are predicates, and it was Sommers’s stated aim to articulate the theory
of types that governs natural language (e.g. Sommers, 1963, p. 327). That relations
have ranges of significance just as predicates do is clear from the fact that while
‘John admires the rainbow’ is a fine sentence, ‘the rainbow admires John’ is nonsense.
Since a binary relation has two argument places and these may have different ranges
of significance, we must distinguish the left and the right range of significance of a
relation: the range of arguments that are admitted in the first argument place and the
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range of arguments that are admitted in the second argument place.85 It is natural to
assume that any left or right range of significance coincides with an α-type. Binary
relations are thus of type (ιj)(ιk)o. Since α-types, and therefore the left and right
ranges of significance of relations, stand in relations of inclusion and disjointedness,
one can classify relations accordingly: if ι is the left and ι′ the right domain of a
relation we have either ι = ι′, ι ( ι′, ι′ ( ι, or ι ∩ ι′ = ∅.86 All of this can be
generalized to k-ary relations of individuals.
2.3. Ranges of significance and categories. Neither Frege nor Russell as-
sociated types with Aristotelian categories. The first to do so quite explicitly was
Ryle,87 who opened his paper Categories (1938) with the announcement that
Doctrines of categories and theories of types are explorations in
the same field.
In the opening pages of his paper Ryle explains how Aristotle’s categories may be
viewed as the value ranges of a certain propositional function, namely ‘Socrates is
x’. He does so by appealing to the account of the origin of the categories considered
at the the end of the first chapter above, according to which a category collects the
range of appropriate answers to a ‘wh’-question that may be asked of a primary
substance, typically a man. As noted by Cohen (1929), and as spelled out in more
detail by Carnap (1934, § 76), such a ‘wh’-question may be viewed as a propositional
function, and the range of appropriate answers to it as the range of significance of
that propositional function. Thus, an appropriate answer to the question, Where is
Socrates?, is an item in the range of significance of the function ‘Socrates is xwhere’,
and an appropriate answer to the question, What is Socrates?, is an item in the range
of significance of ‘Socrates is xwhat’; moreover, the resulting propositions are true
precisely for the correct answers to the respective questions. Hence, to the various
questions, Socrates is what? Socrates is of what quality? Socrates is of what quantity?
Socrates is where? Socrates is when? Socrates is doing what?, we may assign the
propositional functions, ‘Socrates is xwhat’, ‘Socrates is xquality’, ‘Socrates is xquantity’,
‘Socrates is xwhere’, ‘Socrates is xwhen’, ‘Socrates is xdoing’. When carried out for
85Hence we assume that the relations are what Goddard (1966, p. 155) called homogeneous: if R has ιj
as left range of significance and ιk as right range of significance then Rab is significant for any a ∈ ιj and
any b ∈ ιk.
86The classification is developed by Goddard (1966, pp. 157–162).
87The qualification “quite explicitly” is required, for the association is also made, though more implicitly,
by Leśniewski (1929, p. 14). Both Leśniewski (cf. ibid.) and Ryle (cf. Ryle, 1971a, pp. 8–9) had studied
Husserl’s Fourth Logical Investigation (esp. its § 10), where categories, or rather meaning categories, are
connected with the notions of sense and nonsense (see section 1.3 above), and so indirectly with the notion
of range of significance.
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all the categories this correspondence yields altogether ten propositional functions,
and so ten types. We noted in section 5.2.2 of chapter 1 that the correspondence
between questions and categories breaks down for the category of relatives; but that
fact should not prevent us from appreciating the underlying idea that the categories
are ranges of appropriate answers to questions: one could concoct a question such
as ‘Socrates is what relative to something else?’ as the question whose range of
appropriate answers constitute the category of relatives. And assuming this idea,
assuming that any category collects the range of appropriate answers to a certain
question, it follows that Aristotle’s categories are also the ranges of significance of
certain special propositional functions.
At this point Ryle criticizes Aristotle (cf. Ryle, 1938, pp. 195–196). It is not only
the ranges of significance of these special propositional functions that are categories:
any propositional function, or any “sentence frame,” gives rise to a category. Not only
propositional functions of the form ‘Socrates is xwhere’ and ‘Socrates is xdoing’ must
be taken into account, but also such propositional functions as ‘I am the man who x’
and ‘x implies that tomorrow is Tuesday’. In the range of significance of the first is
a phrase such as ‘visited The Hague yesterday’, which we may take to fall into the
Aristotelian category of doing; but in the range of significance of the second there is
a phrase such as ‘today’s being Saturday’, for which there is no place in Aristotle’s
category scheme, as it is not a thing said without combination (cf. our discussion
towards end of section 1 of chapter 1). This suggests that Ryle’s set of categories is
more numerous than that of Aristotle. According to Ryle, the number of categories
is in fact indefinite:
Scholasticism is the belief in some decalogue of categories, but I
know of no grounds for this belief.88
The truth is that there are not just two or just ten different logi-
cal métiers open to the terms or concepts we employ in ordinary
and technical discourse, there are indefinitely many such different
métiers and indefinitely many dimensions of these differences.89
There are indefinitely many types in each of the simple and ramified hierarchies; but
that is an organized indefiniteness, controlled by an inductive definition. The realm
of Rylean types, on the other hand, is open-ended in the sense that it cannot be
circumscribed by a definition. One may start, for instance, with Aristotle’s categories,
but find that one needs a métier for ‘today’s being Saturday’. Next one may find
88Ryle (1938, p. 200).
89Ryle (1954, p. 10)
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that the range of significance of the propositional function ‘x likes a Gershwin tune’
coincides neither with any of Aristotle’s métiers nor with that containing ‘today’s
being Saturday’, hence a new métier would have to be introduced. And thus it would
continue.
A question then arises of how this account fits with the idea that categories,
however one explains them, are concepts of the highest generality. Smart (1953)
asked whether Ryle’s notion of difference of type, “if pushed to the limit, may not
show every expression to be of a different logical category from every other,” that is,
whether every entity has its own category. For the realm of numbers Smart pointed
to propositional functions of the form mn−x =
k
l , which are undefined for n = x. On
Ryle’s definition of a category difference these propositional functions would show
that each number belongs to a separate category. One may object to this example
that it exploits the rather vague and wobbly character of the notion of significance.
We might feel that putting x = n yields nonsense of a very different order from what
results by putting x = Julius Caesar; hence it may not be so clear what the range of
significance of mn−x =
k
l includes and what it excludes. But there are other examples
that appear to show that categories on Ryle’s account can get quite specific, perhaps
too specific. There is a range of significance containing only literary works, namely
‘x is divided into 24 chapters’; the range of significance of ‘x has 24 floors’ includes
only buildings; and one can think of many other equally specific ranges of significance.
The question is whether we would want to call these categories, since they all can
be taken to fall under a higher concept. Both books and buildings fall under the
concept of a cultural object, say; and both fall in the range of significance of ‘x took
a long while to complete’. Would anyone who followed Fowler’s guidance not to use
the word ‘category’ unless he is prepared to state “(1) that he does not mean class, &
(2) that he knows the difference between the two”90 maintain that there is a category
of literary works or a category of buildings?
2.3.1. Westerhoff on categories. Anyone who defines categories as ranges of sig-
nificance but does not regard all ranges of significance as categories faces what West-
erhoff (2005, p. 35) calls the cut-off point problem: the problem of specifying what
characterizes those ranges of significance that deserve the title of category. Westerhoff
responds to this problem against the background of his own account of categories, an
outline of which may be inserted here.
In the opening of his book Westerhoff announces that he will deal only with the
“metaontological” issues of the nature and structure of the categories, and offer no
90See A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, lemma ‘category’.
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special theory of categories (p. 20); but his metaontological considerations are con-
ducted within a framework that takes states of affairs and sets as primitives, and the
constituents of states of affairs, whatever they be, as derived; and a relatively large
part of the book is devoted to developing this special ontological theory. Westerhoff’s
more general theory of categories is the following (cf. esp. § 48). There is a domain
of individuals (or, constituents of states of affairs). This domain is partitioned into
ranges of significance. Ranges of significance go together in groups to form wider
ranges of significance, namely the union of the group. These wider ranges of signif-
icance in their turn go together in groups to form even wider ranges of significance;
and so on upwards. Since the initial ranges are disjoint and new ranges are obtained
by taking unions, the resulting structure is that of a tree satisfying Sommers’s law
of categorial inclusion. The tree has only finitely long paths, and it may or may not
have a unique top node. The cut-off point problem can now be vividly formulated as
follows. Walking along a path in the tree that starts at a most specific range of sig-
nificance we shall after a certin number of steps reach a stage after which all nodes in
the path are categories—what is this critical stage? To say that categories are found
only at the end of the path, that is, at top nodes of the tree, solves the cut-off point
problem; but Westerhoff wishes to countenance the possibility that some categories
involve others—in extensional terms, that some categories are included in others.91
Westerhoff proposes to solve the cut-off point problem by saying that categories
are those ranges of significance from which all others can be “constructed” (ibid.
§ 41). As instances of construction he mentions the definition of rational numbers as
equivalence classes of ordered pairs of natural numbers, and the definition of events
as triples of individuals, properties, and time-instances (§ 49). Westerhoff does not,
however, offer anything like a general account of what a construction is; and what he
does say about the notion does not suffice to settle the following questions. (1) What
is the category of a construct? There needs to be some general account saying that
if a range of significance is constructed in such and such a way, then it belongs to
such and such a category. Westerhoff deals with this question only for the construct
of triples of individuals, properties, and time-instances, saying that it belongs to the
category of sets (p. 122–123); this is so, presumably, since triples themselves are sets.
If all constructs are set-theoretical, the precedent of this example would rule that
everything is a set, a tenet that trivializes the theory of categories. If, on the other
hand, some constructs are not set-theoretical, the example of events, the only example
provided, does not tell us how to assign categories to them. (2) How do we know that
91As is the case, for instance, in the theory of categories defended by Chisholm (1996).
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a construct is a range of significance? It is assumed that we have a tree of ranges of
significance, a tree in which all ranges of significance find their place. A construction
is the construction of a node in this tree, taking various higher nodes and yielding a
lower node. With no clear conception of what a construction is, neither can we be
convinced that a construct is a node in the tree, i.e. a range of significance. It is for
instance not clear in which sense a triple of individuals, properties, and time-events
is a range of significance. (3) Even if the two foregoing questions were successfully
met, and we had been shown that a construct is a range of significance and had been
offered some general account of which category a construct belongs to, there would
still be the question of whether the constructed range of significance coincided with the
target of the construction. There is a range of significance of events (p. 121); triples of
individuals, properties, and time-instances are meant to construct this range; but how
do we know that the construction succeeds, that the constructed range of significance
coincides with the range of events? Indeed, how do we know that the category of the
triples, namely the category of sets, includes the range of events? It is not evident
that it does. (4) There are also questions one could ask regarding the constructors,
in particular which ranges of significance they belong to. Westerhoff seems to assume
that there is a range of significance of sets, while set-formation is a constructor. He
also takes mereological fusion to be a constructor (p. 125); is there then, by analogy
with the case of sets, a corresponding category of mereological sums?
The idea that categories are the concepts from which all other concepts can be
constructed is in itself quite reasonable. This was perhaps what Kant had in mind
when he called his categories Stammbegriffe (KrV A81/B107; cf. p. 53 above). It was
presumably what Husserl had in mind when he characterized what he called cate-
gories as the primitive concepts of various ontologies.92 And those who are concerned
with “reducing” certain notions to other notions may reasonably call the notions not
reducible in their theory the categories of the theory. As the unanswered questions
in the previous paragraph suggests, however, it is difficult to combine this idea with
the the idea that categories are ranges of significance, and even more so if the ranges
of significance are to exhibit a rigid tree-structure. What lacks in Westerhoff’s the-
ory, in particular, is a more detailed account of the notion of construction. From
what he says about this notion it is not clear whether constructs can be assigned a
place at all in the tree-structure of ranges of significance; and provided that they can,
whether they then are assigned the right place. Until a more detailed account has
92See Husserl (1900, § 67), LU III § 12, Ideen §§ 10, 16. For more on Husserl’s categories, see section 6.2
below.
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been provided one cannot say that Westerhoff has succeeded in solving the cut-off
point problem.
3. Category mistakes
As already Ryle (1938) acknowledged in ending his paper with the question, “But
what are the tests of absurdity?” the definition of types as ranges of significance rests
quite heavily on the notion of significance. In this section it is argued that it rests
too heavily on that notion; one cannot build a rigorous theory of types simply on the
basis of intuitions of significance. It is further argued that the solution is not to scrap
the notion of the range of significance of a predicate altogether; that notion is still
needed, and attempts to do away with it are unsuccessful. We first consider “the field
of nonsense” and situate category mistakes within this field.
3.1. A taxonomy of nonsense. A radical sort of nonsense is what one may call
articulate noise, noise that is apt for being transcribed by means of an alphabet. This
is the stuff that so-called sound poetry is built of. ‘Fümms bö wö tää zää Uu/ pögiff
kwii Ee’, the first strophe of Kurt Schwitters’s famous Ursonate,93 is an instance of
articulate noise. Articulate noise is, I think, also what the ancients illustrated by the
string blituri.94 We call this articulate noise, and not mere noise, since for vocal sound
to be classified as nonsense it must bear traces of language, and, as already Aristotle
noted, articulation is a characteristic that sets language apart from growls, hisses,
bleats, etc.95 There are probably other factors besides articulation that must be in
place for noise to count as nonsense; in particular, the context in which something
we would call nonsense occurs must be such that one expects to find the expression
of sense. Nonsense is not the mere absence of sense, but its absence in contexts
where one expects to find sense. We should not count as nonsense the recitation of a
certain melody, even though what is then uttered is the gibberish dam–shubi–dam–
ooh–ooh. . .
Articulate noise should be distinguished from the sort of nonsense manifested in
Jabberwocky. ‘The slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe’ is not a phrase of
93This strophe, save a few vowels, in fact originates in one of Raoul Hausmann’s “poster poems.” Renditions
of the Ursonate as well as of Hausmann’s sound poetry can be found at
http://www.ubu.com/sound/ See Scholz (1989) for an instructive study of the genre.
94Ammonius (in Int 31.14) remarks that blituri is both meaningless and articulate. The illustration may
stem from the Stoics (DL VII.57). Other strings used for the same purpose were knax and skindapsos; see
Blank (1996, p. 148) and Meier-Oeser (1996).
95See in particular the distinction between psofos, phōnē, and dialektos at Historia Animalium IV.9
(535a29–536b24), on which see Ax (1978); and, furthermore, the connection between articulation and being
significant by convention alluded to at Int 16a26–29, on which see e.g. Ammonius in Int 29.31–31.33.
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English, since the words ‘slithy’, ‘toves’, and ‘wabe’ are not words of English but
Carroll’s own invention.96 Yet since they accord with English phonology they are
“potential” English words;97 whence one can meaningfully ask whether something is
a happy translation of these words, or of the whole of Carroll’s poem, into another
language, for the translations should be potential (but not actual) words of the target
language.98 By contrast, it is not clear what it would mean to translate the Ursonate
into English or any other language; and it is a fact that translators tend to leave
blituri, as well as other instances of articulate noise such as ‘Jubjub’ from the Jab-
berwocky, untranslated. Translatability could therefore be said to be a characteristic
that distinguishes Jabberwocky-style nonsense from articulate noise.
What no doubt contributes to the translatability of the nonsense words of Jabber-
wocky is their manifestation of a grammatical role. In general, grammatical roles are
gleaned not only from the morphology of the words, but also from the syntax of the
sentence in which they occur—which of course in turn may be deciphered on the basis
of the morphology of the words, so there is a two-way interaction here. ‘Toves’, for
instance, can be seen to have the role of grammatical subject, whence its translation
must have the form of a plural noun in the target language, and not that of a third
person singular verb. Grammatical roles are obvious in Carnap’s ‘Piroten karulieren
elatisch’ (Carnap, 1934, § 1), another instance of Jabberwocky-style nonsense: neither
word in this sentence is German, but from the morphology of the words and the syn-
tax of the sentence it is clear that ‘Piroten’ is a plural noun, that ‘karulieren’ is a
plural present verb, and that ‘elatisch’ is an adverb (though I cannot quite say why
this cannot be the object of the verb; perhaps it has to do with the lack of articles);
whence this sentence has quite appropriately been translated into English as ‘Pirots
carulize elatically’.
The source of the nonsensicality of articulate noise and Jabberwocky-style non-
sense is one or more words that themselves are nonsense. Carnap (1932, p. 220)
distinguishes nonsense having that source from nonsense whose source is syntax. A
sentence may contain only genuine words but nevertheless fail to make sense owing
96Carroll in his Mischmasch glossed ‘gyre’ as ‘to scratch like a dog’, but there is in fact an English word
‘gyre’, stemming from the Greek gyros, a ring or circle, whence Humpty Dumpty’s explanation ‘to go round
and round like a gyroscope’. ‘Gimble’ is explained by Humpty Dumpty as ‘to make holes like a gimblet’,
and so is close, if not identical, in meaning to the verb ‘gimlet’, “to pierce as or with a gimlet” (OED).
Thus Le Jaseroque renders these words as gyrer and vriller, and Scott’s Der Jammerwoch renders them
as wirren and wimmeln, all of which are actual words. Translations of Jabberwocky can be found at
http://www76.pair.com/keithlim/jabberwocky/translations/index.html.
97For this notion, and its relevance to Jabberwocky, see Lyons (1968, pp. 119–120).
98It would be misleading if the translated word was an actual word of the target language; for that reason
Scott’s ‘schlicht’ may not be the happiest translation of ‘slithy’.
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to how these words have been put together. Carnap distinguishes two cases of such
syntactic nonsense (ibid. p. 227), what we shall call word salad and category mistakes
respectively.99
An example of word salad is Carnap’s ‘Caesar is and’, Husserl’s ‘king but or sim-
ilar and’ (LU IV § 14),100 or indeed most strings of words arbitrarily strung together,
as ‘tree car however green however the the’.101 For a string to qualify as word salad the
elements it strings together should indeed be words. Hence a piece of articulate noise,
although it could very well be called a salad, is not word salad, since its elements are
not words. The notion of word salad is intuitively clear, but it is not straightforward
how one should characterize it. Drawing upon Ajdukiewicz’s definition of syntactic
connection, I suggest the following characterization.102 Word salad of a language L
are strings of words of L that do not admit of an analysis into function and argu-
ment or arguments. As we saw in section 1.1 above, function and argument are more
general notions than predicate and subject, so general in fact that any sentence, not
only those of subject–predicate form, can be analyzed into function and argument or
arguments. Hence there are no sentences that are not thus analyzable, as was noted
by Frege (1892a, pp. 204–205). Not being analyzable into function and argument is
therefore a necessary condition for a string of English words to be word salad. It is
not a sufficient condition for being a significant sentence of English, since category
mistakes are both thus analyzable and non-significant (or so I shall maintain); but
it does not disturb one’s ordinary sense of language to define a sentence of English
as a string of English words that can be analyzed into function and argument. Not
being thus analyzable is thus both a necessary and a sufficient condition on a string
of words of L for being a piece of word salad of L.
99The term ‘word salad’, or its German twin Wortsalat, appears to have originated in psychiatry; the OED
records an English use from 1904. For ‘category mistake’, see below.
100What Husserl called Unsinn is what we are calling word salad. He contrasted this with Widersinn,
countersense, the instances of which are a priori falsehoods such as ‘all triangles have four vertices’ and
‘some circles are square’ and descriptions known a priori not to have any reference, such as ‘square circle’
or ‘wooden iron’; see esp. LU IV § 12. As far as I know, it is only in the Formal and Transcendental Logic
(1929) that Husserl recognizes the phenomenon of category mistake; it is clear from LU IV § 10 (p. 327)
that Husserl regards category mistakes neither as nonsense nor as countersense.
101According to Magidor (2009b) it is a “dogma” that word salad of a kind with ‘Caesar is and’ (obtained
from a sentence by substituting one expression with another expression of a different grammatical category)
is meaningless. But her arguments are all destructive, of the type ‘such and such semantic theories fail to
provide a reason why word salad is meaningless’. Without a constructive account of what meaning these
instances of word salad could have, Magidor’s arguments, to the extent that they are successful, rather
show that there is something unsound about the semantic theories she considers (or perhaps that it is a
presupposition of these theories that word salad is meaningless).
102Cf. Ajdukiewicz (1935, p. 11).
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Analyzability into function and argument shows the string to enjoy what we may
call linguistic unity. Linguistic unity is the unity of a linguistic item that gives it
the character of a sentence.103 Having this character does not imply that the thing
is a significant sentence, as the case of category mistakes shows. A string may, in
fact, have this character yet fail to be a sentence, namely on account of its containing






There is no function in the objective sense signified by ‘outgribe’, but nevertheless it
seems alright to assign to this word the role of function, and to ‘mome raths’ the role
of argument, in this piece of nonsense. That articulate noise looks like salad is then
to be explained by the fact that it is not analyzable into function and argument; since
Jabberwocky-style is so analyzable, this is another point of difference between these
sorts of nonsense.
The term ‘category mistake’ was introduced by Ryle in his book The Concept of
Mind (1949).104 The idea is present in some earlier works of Ryle, but it is only in
that book that it is given the name ‘category mistake’.105 Ryle glosses the term as
the allocation of concepts to logical types to which they do not belong (ibid. p. 17),
but the idea is officially explained by means of a number of examples (ibid. p. 16). It
is clear from those examples, as well as from the use Ryle makes of the notion, that
a category mistake for him is an opinion arising from a misapprehension of categorial
distinctions, or in Ryle’s own words, “the practice of operating with an idea as if it
belonged to a certain category,” when in fact it belongs to another (Ryle, 1945b).
Thus, if I were to give an inventory of my wallet and I counted not only the coins
in it but also the obverses and the reverses, then I would be committing a category
mistake, for I would then be taking the piece of money to be of the same category
as the engravings. Likewise Ryle argues in his book that we commit a category
mistake if we think that by describing a certain behaviour as intelligent or a certain
action as volitional we are signaling the occurrence of such and such states of mind
assumed to be separate, or indeed of a kind different, from that behaviour or action.
In this dissertation the term ‘category mistake’ will have a more special meaning.
A category mistake for us is a sentence of subject–predicate form whose subject is
103Cf. the so-called problem of the unity of proposition; for a detailed discussion and a non-Fregean solution,
see Gaskin (2008).
104Perhaps owing to the wide appeal of this book, the term is, as one sees by searching for it on the
internet, now in wide use also outside philosophy.
105Ryle (1945a) employs instead ‘type-mistake’ and Ryle (1945b) ‘type-confusion’.
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not in the range of significance of the predicate, as in Carnap’s example ‘Caesar is
a prime number’ (Carnap, 1932, p. 227).106 This is a more special meaning of the
term ‘category mistake’, for if I commit myself to the truth of e.g. ‘Caesar is a prime
number’, then I commit a category mistake in Ryle’s sense, but as the example with
the coin shows, category mistakes in Ryle’s sense need not involve a category mistake
in the sense assumed here. We may restrict the scope of our category mistakes to
sentences with a singular subject, for we are interested in the notion only to the extent
that it provides a criterion for deciding whether a certain item belongs to a certain
range of significance; that is, we are interested in the notion only to the extent that
it helps us in deciding questions of the form ‘is “s is P ” significant?’, where s is a
singular subject.107
What we here call category mistakes are known in the literature under various
other appellations. Carnap (1928, § 30), in what appears to be the first definition
of the notion, calls them “confusions of spheres” (Sphärenvermengungen);108 Husserl
(1929, § 90) does not give these sentences a special name, but he does take them up
for discussion, describing them as “contensively senseless” (inhaltlich sinnlos);109 Ryle
himself used ‘type trespasses’ (Ryle, 1938, p. 200); Drange (1966), in the first mono-
graph on the topic, called them type crossings; Lappin (1981), in another monograph
on the topic, called them, following Thomason (1972), sortally incorrect sentences.
But ‘category mistake’ appears to be what philosophers nowadays would call such
sentences; they are so called by Magidor (2013), the only study of the topic in recent
106According to “the alternative view” of nonsense sketched by Diamond (1981), who also calls this the
Frege–Wittgenstein view of nonsense, there is no or very little difference between category mistakes and
Jabberwocky-style nonsense: for if a string of words has the unity of a sentence and is nevertheless nonsense,
then none of these words are significant in the context of that string. In what follows I adopt what Diamond
calls the natural view of nonsense, according to which a nonsignificant sentence may be composed of
significant parts.
107The question of how to extend the notion to other forms of sentence is considered by Drange (1966, pp.
93–107). In the setting of formal logic this is the question of how to assign the value ‘insignificant’ (besides
‘true’ and ‘false’) to well-formed formulas; for an extensive treatment of which see Goddard and Routley
(1973, Part II); a particular solution is given in Lappin (1981, p. 69), though note that the rule given
there for quantified formulas is not in accordance with the rule given for the boolean formulas (according
to Lappin’s rules, for A ∨ B to be insignificant it is sufficient that A or B is insignificant, while for
(∃x ∈ C)Ax to be insignificant it is necessary that A[c/x] is insignificant for all c ∈ C; for finite domains
these conditions contradict each other).
108It appears from a remark of Ewing (1937, p. 360) that the phenomenon of category mistakes was well-
known to Oxonians in the 1920’s: “the most usual example cited lately at Cambridge is ‘quadratic equations
go to race-meetings’, the example in my days at Oxford was ‘Virtue is a fire shovel’.” Ewing completed
his studies at Oxford in 1923 and went elsewhere afterwards (cf. e.g. http://archiveshub.ac.uk/data/
gb133-ace). Negations of category mistakes were given by Hegel (Wissenschaft der Logik Band II, p. 98)
and Bosanquet (1911, Bk. I p. 282) as examples of so-called infinite judgements; Hegel describes them as
true but widersinnig (is that an autological predicate?), Bosanquet describes them as unmeaning.
109For an instructive discussion, see De Palma (2008).
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years; and this is not a recent corruption, for the term ‘category mistake’ occurs in
this sense in Sommers (1963, p. 329), and can indeed be found as early as in Wang
(1954, p. 259).
3.2. Types and category mistakes. Within each sort of nonsense distin-
guished above one might discern various degrees of nonsensicality. A balanced piece
of articulate noise like ‘jolifanta bambla o falli bambla’ is somewhat less forbidding
than the consonant soup of ‘hjckrrh’. This line, the first line of Hugo Ball’s Karawane,
comes in fact rather close to Jabberwocky-style nonsense. The lesson would seem to
be that as articulate noise gets less and less forbidding, and approaches the phonology
of a familiar language, it may take on the character of Jabberwocky-style nonsense.
Differing degrees of nonsensicality recognized within the class of word salad are what
Chomsky (1964) and Katz (1964) called “degrees of grammaticalness.” Carnap’s ex-
ample ‘Caesar is and’ is less of a jumble than the melange of ‘tree car however green
however the the’, hence it has a higher degree of grammaticalness than the latter. A
yet higher degree of grammaticalness is enjoyed by ‘Socrates is identical’ (TLP 5.473)
or ‘Draco frightens’, strings that become sentences simply by appending a phrase
to them; while innocent grammatical errors such as ‘Caesar swim’ and ‘man crosses
river’ has a still higher degree.
That also category mistakes admit of degrees of nonsensicality is of more relevance
for our purposes. There are clear examples of category mistakes such as ‘the number 5
is malodorous’, ‘my headache is blue’ and ‘the cat Jemima is divided into 24 chapters’.
But it is not clear what one should say about, for instance, ‘my brother is pregnant’
or ‘this sonnet is divided into 24 chapters’. It seems that one cannot settle whether
these are category mistakes without having made a theoretical decision regarding the
ranges of significance of ‘pregnant’ and ‘divided into 24 chapters’. The existence of
such indefinite cases of category mistakes does not entail that the concept is vacuous.
The existence of clear cases such as ‘the number 5 is malodorous’ is sufficient to show
its reality. That a category mistake can be made sense of by a metaphorical reading
proves nothing to the contrary, precisely because the required reading is metaphorical
and not literal.110 What the existence of indefinite cases does entail is that one cannot
employ a naive conception of category mistakes for the definition of a type as the
range of significance of a predicate of English. An indefinite case is precisely the case
of a predicate whose range of significance is not a well-defined range. This problem
is recognized by Westerhoff (2005, p. 204), but he deals with it simply by making the
110See Lappin (1981, ch. 8) and Magidor (2013, pp. 66–74) for some remarks on the relevance of category
mistakes to the theory of metaphor.
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assumption to the contrary, namely that we do in fact know for any sentence whether
it is a category mistake or not. A similar assumption is made by Lappin (1981, p. 94).
He argues that an ideal speaker of the language—the existence of which, according to
Lappin, in any case is assumed in the theory of syntax—is able to decide all borderline
cases. But the indefiniteness of a predicate’s range of significance does not disappear
simply by assuming, as Westerhoff does, that it does not exist. And the claim that
the borderlines may be definite to an ideal speaker is of little help to the ordinary
man who aims at recovering the type theory implicit in English.
The conclusion must be that a theory of types cannot depend exclusively on
the notion of a category mistake. We see then the use for constraints such as the
law of categorial inclusion: they might guide the type theorist where the notion of
a category mistake leaves him in the dark. A theory of types in the tradition of
Ryle and Sommers is thus best regarded not as the uncovering of the type theory
implicit in English, as a systematization of the knowledge that supports judgements
of category mistakenness; rather it must be seen as a refinement of this knowledge, as
a regimentation of the notion of a range of significance that we possess as part of our
understanding of the language. The type theory must accord with that understanding
as far as it goes and must supplement it in cases outside its reach. If on the basis of
that understanding one judges ‘the number 5 is malodorous’ to be a category mistake,
then the type theory should allot numbers and malodorous things to different types.
If on the same basis we are not able to determine whether ‘my brother is pregnant’
is a category mistake, then the theory, when fully developed, should determine it for
us.
3.2.1. Frege and Quine on the universal range of significance. A type theory in
this sense is thus a development of type distinctions already found in natural language.
There is a venerable tradition, comprising both Frege and Quine, of dealing with
such type distinctions among predicates by, in effect, erasing them altogether. Frege
insisted that each predicate—as is clear from Gg II § 57 he has in mind predicates
of exact sciences—must be defined for all objects (FB pp. 19–20). For example the
predicate ‘prime’ should be defined not only for the integers, but for the Sun and for
all other heavenly bodies, indeed for all objects whatsoever. Frege’s stated reason for
requiring this is that otherwise “it would be impossible to lay down logical laws about
them,” i.e. about the predicates (loc. cit.). The point, I take it, is that if F is not
defined for a, then neither is ¬F defined for a, whence neither can we say that the law
of non-contradiction holds for F , as for instance ¬(Fa ∧ ¬Fa) will then not be true.
This argument rests on what I think is an unfounded assumption, namely that a logical
law should have no presuppositions. For according to a defender of type distinctions
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among predicates the correct statement of the law of non-contradiction includes the
statement of the presupposition that F is a predicate and that a is in the range of
significance of F . With this presupposition added the law of non-contradiction will
hold even if predicates are not assumed to have the universal range of significance. It
is this presupposition, therefore, that has to be the point of Frege’s attack. It will,
however, be difficult for him to attack it, for one can insist that even Frege makes
a presupposition of this kind: in his statement of the law of non-contradiction it is
presupposed that F is a predicate and that F is defined for a, namely that a is an
object. One can insist, that is to say, that the presupposition that a defender of type
distinctions believes should accompany the statement of logical laws is in fact made
also by Frege in his statement of logical laws; one may suggest, for instance, that this
presupposition is part of the notational conventions of Frege’s ideography.
The requirement on a predicate of being defined for all objects is for Frege closely
related, if not identical, to the requirement that a predicate should have what he calls
sharp boundaries (scharfe Grenzen). In the second volume of the Grundgesetze this
requirement is called the “principle of completeness” of definitions (Gg II §§ 56–65):
the definition of a predicate (or relation, or a function of any kind) should cover
all cases. In that discussion Frege claims that this requirement is just what is laid
down in the law of the excluded middle (Gg II § 56): “a given object ∆ either falls
under the concept Φ or it does not fall under it: tertium non datur.” A defender of
type distinctions may agree, but remark that there are two ways in which an object
could fail to fall under a concept: (1) the predicate applied to the object yields a
false proposition, or (2) it fails to yield a proposition at all, that is, the sentence is a
category mistake. The defender of type distinctions could, in other words, insist that
the proper formulation of Frege’s principle of completeness is given by the statement
of the law of the excluded middle with the presupposition added that ∆ lies in the
range of significance of Φ. He would accordingly say that for a predicate to have sharp
boundaries it is only required that it be definitely determined for which arguments
the predicate is true, for which it is false, and for which it is undefined. Thus the
predicate ‘prime’ has sharp boundaries even though it is not defined for the Sun.
Frege’s main concern in the cited passage (Gg II §§ 56–65) is to argue against the
legitimacy of what he calls piecemeal defining (stückweises Definieren). We should not
define addition first for the natural numbers, then for the integers, then for the rational
numbers, then for the real numbers, then for the complex numbers, then for etc., but
at once for all objects in general. It is clear that to someone who accepts Frege’s
principle of completeness piecemeal definition is faulty; but Frege appears also to want
the purported fault of piecemeal defining to support the principle of completeness.
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Someone arguing against Frege’s principle of completeness should therefore try to
show that piecemeal defining is quite alright. It is quite alright. Frege is correct to
note, what perhaps few had noted before him, that in piecemeal definition each piece
in effect defines a novel operation, and so to avoid confusion these should each be
given a different designation (Gg II § 57). But anyone who is not already committed
to the law of completeness would certainly say that Frege is mistaken in holding that
the procedure of piecemeal defining is faulty. What is required in the definition of a
function or predicate is that it has a definite domain; but that domain need not be
the universal domain. That is what the defender of type distinctions would say and
that, I think, is what a mathematician reflecting on the methodology of his science
would say. For there are important generalizations in mathematics that could not
be made if one followed Frege’s strictures. In algebraic number theory the notion
of a prime number is defined for rings in general, not only for the integers.111 The
definition generalizes the notion of being prime in the integers, so that characteristics
that hold of these also hold of prime numbers in the more general rings. This general
notion is, however, one which depends on the underlying ring, hence a number that
is prime in one ring may not be prime in another ring; the number 2, for instance,
is prime in the integers, but it is not prime in the so-called Gaussian integers, i.e. in
the ring of numbers of the form a + bi for integers a, b.112 Hence there is no way of
defining the unary predicate ‘prime’ for all numbers such that what one then obtains
is the “correct” generalization of what the predicate means for the integers (though
one could perhaps define a relation whose first relatum is the ring in question).113
The deeper reason for Frege’s requirement that a predicate be defined for all
objects is, however, not to be found in his conception of the logical laws nor in his ideas
about mathematical methodology, but in the architecture of his ideography, namely
that it encapsulates a simple theory of types with a single domain of individuals.
We saw in section 1.1 that each symbol of this ideography—excepting the judgement
stroke—is assigned a type. The unification that this involved—that e.g. negation is
just a unary function of objects and universal quantification just a unary function of
unary functions of objects—was clearly important to Frege. But on Frege’s typing
scheme there is only one type of unary predicates of objects. Hence any predicate of
the ideography, if it is to count as a predicate of that ideography at all, must be defined
111The definition is: α ∈ J is prime iff (α - µ and α - ν) ⇒ α - µν for all µ, ν ∈ J . The generalization
of Euclid’s definition of prime number (Elements VII def. 11) is taken to define another notion: α ∈ J is
irreducible iff any µ ∈ J such that µ - α is either = α or a unit in J . The point to be made here goes
through also for the concept of irreducibility.
112This follows from the identity (1 + i)(1− i) = 2.
113On the notion of “correct” or fruitful generalization in mathematics, see Tappenden (2008).
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for all objects. Thus the principle of completeness of definition follows naturally from
the simple type structure assumed by Frege’s ideography. In Gg § 29 Frege lays it
down that the name of a function of objects has a signification (Bedeutung) if and
only if the proper name arising from it by filling its argument places with a proper
name has a signification whenever this proper name itself has a signification: F has a
signification if and only if Fa has a signification whenever a has a signification. Since
all signs of the ideography must have a signification—“Rechtmäßig gebildete Namen
müssen immer etwas bedeuten” (Gg § 28; cf. TLP 5.4733)—this dictate is therefore
just the requirement that a predicate be defined for all objects.
In practice the principle of completeness means that most, and perhaps all, func-
tions will be defined for a range of what Quine (1960, p. 229)—apparently following a
usage established in electrical engineering—called “don’t-cares,” namely objects lying
outside what one naturally would count as the range of significance of the function.
Frege and, as far as I know, everyone who has followed Frege’s or Quine’s lead in
these matters say very little about which values the function should be assigned for
these don’t-care arguments. This silence, as well as Quine’s epithet, could lead one
to think that no care is required in this assignment. As Brady and Routley (1973)
point out, that would be a mistaken opinion. A first problem has to do with defined,
or composite predicates; for if F is composite, then the truth value assigned to Fa
has to accord with the definition of F . To take a simple case, if F is ¬G, then Fa
has to be given the opposite value of Ga, for otherwise we get a contradiction. A
second problem is that there might be cases that we should, for philosophical reasons,
need to care about. Namely, if F is some philosophically interesting predicate, say
a mental predicate, and it is disputed whether Fa is true, false, or neither, then it
cannot be a matter of arbitrary choice which value we assign to Fa. A third prob-
lem, not mentioned by Brady and Routley, is the following. Someone committed to
Frege’s principle of completeness has to say that category mistakes are either true or
false. There is a tradition going back at least to Ewing (1937), and defended among
others by Prior (1954), Quine (1960, p. 229), Drange (1966), Lambert (1968), and
most recently by Magidor (2013), that simple category mistakes, i.e. such as do not
involve negation, are false. Perhaps they are false in a special way,114 but at least
they are false. This view of simple category mistakes can, however, not be combined
with the requirement that a function be defined for all objects. For let s stand for
the Sun and m for the Moon, and suppose that we have defined s+m = a, whatever
a may be. Then the sentence s + m = a is a true simple category mistake. That is,
114Pap (1960, p. 53) suggests that they are synthetic a priori falsehoods.
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the requirement that addition, or any other function, should be defined for all objects
forces one to accept that there are true simple category mistakes: if f(a) is assigned
the value b, then f(a) = b is true.
It is thus not a trivial matter to develop a coherent and consistent position that
assumes all predicates to have the universal range of significance. Some care is needed
in assigning truth-values to category mistakes; and if the scope of the position is ex-
tended to include the requirement that functions in general should have the universal
domain of definition, then it may be difficult to explain why category mistakes have
the truth-values they do—for why are some categorially mistaken sentences of the
form x + y = z false and others true? It may nevertheless be a logically possible
position. However, the artificiality attaching to the procedure of assigning values to a
function for don’t-care arguments suggests rather than contests the existence of non-
trivial ranges of significance. And as Sundholm (1999, p. 22) remarks, the recognition
of don’t-care arguments of a function is in effect the recognition of a non-trivial range
of significance, namely as the range of arguments that we do care about.
The recent work of Magidor (2013) illustrates how difficult it is to avoid the
notion of range of significance. Magidor does not make any explicit statement about
ranges of significance in her book, but the claim that all predicates have the universal
range of significance is implicit in its main theses, namely that category mistakes are
meaningful, that they have a truth-value, and that their deviance is to be explained
as an instance of presupposition failure.115 The range of significance of a predicate
is just the range of objects of which the predicate is true or false. Hence, if all
category mistakes have a truth-value, as Magidor holds, then all predicates must
have the universal range of significance. Yet it seems to me that non-trivial ranges of
significance feature quite prominently in the positive part of Magidor’s theory, that
accounting for the deviance of category mistakes. According to Magidor, there is for
any predicate P a predicate P ∗ such that an utterance of a sentence of the form ‘s is
P ’ presupposes that s is P ∗ (Magidor, 2013, ch. 5); the sentence ‘s is P ’ is a category
mistake if this presupposition fails. Magidor offers no general account of the relation
of the predicate P to the predicate P ∗, but in the examples she gives P ∗ is always the
range of significance of P .116 Thus she relates ‘coloured’ to ‘green’, ‘natural number’
115Ewing (1937) seems to me to defend precisely the same theses: he is explicit that category mistakes are
meaningful and that they have a truth-value (ibid. pp. 360ff.); and he compares (ibid. p. 361) the queerness
of category mistakes to that of the sentence ‘I did not commit more than six murders last week’, whose
queerness I think a philosopher today would account for as stemming from presupposition failure (namely
failure of the presupposition that I did commit a murder). See also the following footnote 116.
116 In that case, Magidor’s account is anticipated by Pap (1960). Pap says for instance that (ibid. p. 48)
“the statement ‘a is red’ may be said to presuppose in the same sense [sc. in the sense in which ‘the King of
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to ‘prime’, and ‘something that can be pregnant’ to ‘pregnant’ (ibid. pp. 140–146).
That P ∗ is the range of significance of P is indeed entailed by Magidor’s account of
category mistakes, for it is precisely when a is not in the range of significance of P
that ‘a is P ’ is a category mistake. It appears that ranges of significance have entered
through the backdoor into Magidor’s theory.
4. Type predications
Our discussion of category mistakes leads in this section to the topic of type
predications: judgements in which an entity is assigned to a type. Some philosophers
have found such judgements problematic. Frege’s problem of the concept horse, for
instance, is in its purest form a problem of making sense of type predications; and
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus held that what one attempts to say in a type predication
can only be shown. The examination of type predications occasions our introduction
of Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory, which will play an important role in the rest
of this dissertation. Subsection 4.1 deals with the predication of a type in the sense
of Ryle and Sommers, subsection 4.2 with the predication of a simple type.
4.1. Ryle–Sommers type predications. Magidor’s arguments for the thesis
that category mistakes have a truth-value are indirect. She finds problems both with
the contrary thesis as such (Magidor, 2013, pp. 83–91) and with defences of it given
in the literature (ibid. pp. 91–109). Quine’s main argument for the same thesis is
an appeal to the “simplicity of theory” that results from accepting it (Quine, 1960,
p. 229). The considerations at the end of the previous section show that it may not
at all be a simple matter to assign truth-values to category mistakes; and indirect
arguments of the sort offered by Magidor carries little conviction so long as they
are not accompanied by any indications of which truth-values at least some category
mistakes do in fact have.117 This is to my mind a case where we cannot rest content
with abstract arguments. We need to be shown for certain concrete cases of category
mistakes why they are true or false. In the absence of such concrete proofs I am
inclined to regard the general considerations of Magidor and others meant to show
that category mistakes have a truth-value as warranting an inference by modus tollens
rather than one by modus ponens. The strongest argument for the thesis that category
Switzerland is a pipe smoker’ presupposes that there is a king of Switzerland] that a is visible or spatially
extended” (cf. ibid. p. 54). Like Magidor, Pap holds that category mistakes are false.
117A similar objection can be made against Magidor’s arguments that category mistakes are meaningful
(cf. the title of Magidor 2009a, reproduced as ch. 3 in Magidor 2013): these are all indirect and carries
little conviction so long as they are not accompanied by any indication of what category mistakes in fact
mean.
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mistakes have a truth-value is therefore not any of these general considerations, but
rather the more mundane piece of reasoning presented by Prior (1954, p. 159). He
constructs a syllogism from the conclusion of which it may be inferred that ‘Virtue is
not square’ is false, as follows.118
What is square has some shape
Virtue has no shape
∴ Virtue is not square
Since the premisses are true, so is the conclusion; hence by the T-schema and the
definition of ‘is false’ as ‘is not true’ we have
‘Virtue is square’ is false
This argument does not rely on any peculiarities of virtue or squareness, and may be
adapted to other category mistakes.
What may be dubbed Prior’s paradigm is a syllogism in Camestres with a singular
minor term, followed by one application of the T-schema:
Every P is Q
s is not Q
∴ s is not P
∴ ‘s is P ’ is false
The paradigm is applied by Drange (1966, p. 24) to show the falsity of three quite
randomly chosen category mistakes: ‘the theory of relativity is blue’, ‘smells are loud’,
and ‘moral perfection is a prime number’. Here, then, is a direct argument of the kind
required to the conclusion that certain category mistakes are false. The argument is
faulty, however.
Prior points out the difference between a proof that virtue is not square and a
proof that the Sun is not square: while the latter rests on the fact that the Sun has
a non-square shape, the former rests on the fact that virtue has no shape at all; it is
thus the difference between having another shape and having no shape at all.119 Prior
thereby himself provides the clue to a diagnosis of his argument, as nicely spelled
out by Goddard (1970). We must distinguish two sorts of negation. There is firstly
choice negation (cf. p. 110 above), which places the subject in the complement of P
118A piece of reasoning of this form is implicit also in Ewing (1937, p. 360). Prior’s as well as two other
syllogisms are extensively discussed by Drange (1966, pp. 19–36). The sentence ‘Virtue is not square’ is
taken from Bosanquet (1911, Bk. 1 p. 282), who cites it in his discussion of so-called infinite judgements
(cf. footnote 108 above).
119There is also a difference in the mood of the syllogism; here it is Cesare with a singular minor premiss:
What is circular is not square.
The Sun is circular.
∴ The Sun is not square
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but inside its range of significance, |P |; as above we denote this by ¬P . There is
secondly what we may call categorial negation, which places the subject in {|P |, i.e.
in the amorphous lump of individuals outside the range of significance of P ; let us
denote this by ⇁P . Categorial negation is not the same as exclusion negation (cf.
p. 110): while exclusion negation places the subject in {P , categorial negation places
it in {|P |. Categorial negation may therefore be glossed as ‘is not the sort of thing
that can be’: to assert that s is ⇁P is to assert that s is not the sort of thing that
can be P .120
The validity of Prior’s syllogism presupposes that the same negation is employed
in the minor premiss and in the conclusion. For, if ‘every P is Q’ is significant, then
we must have, as we in fact do have in Prior’s syllogism, that |P | = |Q|. Hence, from
the premisses that every P is Q while s is ¬Q we can therefore only infer that s is
¬P ; and from the premisses that every P is Q while s is ⇁Q we can only infer that s
is ⇁P . The diagnosis of Prior’s argument is then that the inference from the validity
of the syllogism to the conclusion that a certain category mistake is false presupposes
that categorial negation is employed in the minor premiss while choice negation is
employed in the conclusion. The argument to the conclusion that ‘virtue is square’
is false is therefore faulty. In order to see that this is the correct diagnosis, suppose
first that choice negation is employed in the minor premiss of Prior’s syllogism. Then
virtue is assumed to fall in the range of significance of ‘shape’; but that assumption
is just as much in need of argument as is the thesis that virtue falls in the range of
significance of ‘square’. In this case the argument to the conclusion that ‘virtue is
square’ is false therefore begs the question. Suppose next that categorial negation is
employed in the conclusion. The conclusion then says that ‘virtue’ falls outside the
range of significance of ‘square’; but from that assertion we cannot infer that ‘virtue
is square’ is false. Rather, we can infer that it is neither true nor false, for the range
of significance of a predicate is the range of subjects for which it is true or false. In
this case Prior’s syllogism therefore establishes that ‘virtue is square’ does not have
a truth-value, the opposite of what it was meant to establish. So the argument fails
to establish that ‘virtue is square’ is false.
120In the significance logic of Goddard and Routley (1973) categorial negation, viewed as a sentential—





In significance logic this connective would be glossed as ‘it is not significant that’. It is what Goddard and
Routley would call a non-standard negation (cf. ibid. pp. 277–282).
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More goes on in Prior’s syllogism than just the employment of non-standard sorts
of negation. For its major premiss is not any old a-predication, but a predication that
lays down the range of significance of the major term P ; and its minor premiss is not
any old singular e-predication, but one that places the minor term s outside this range
of significance. The middle term of Prior’s syllogism is therefore a term whose range
of truth is equal to its range of significance. This is what in section 2.2.1 above we
called, following Sommers, a category term; we shall also call it a type predicate.121
Predicating a type predicate of an object is, at least on the Ryle–Sommers account
of types, to assign it to a range of significance, hence to say that such and such
predicates can be significantly predicated of it. And type predicates are employed in
laying down a type hierarchy, for they serve as names of the ground types. A type
predication is a predication of the form ‘s is τ ’ where τ is a type predicate. Prior’s
syllogism is thus a syllogism of type predications, and our diagnosis of it suggests that
type predications may have “a different logic” from ordinary predications. At least
there is the difference that to negate an ordinary predication is usually to employ
choice negation, while to negate a type predication, as is done in the minor premiss
of Prior’s syllogism, must be done by employing categorial negation.
Prompted by observations along these lines, Goddard (1966) sketches a logical
system that incorporates type predications. To a many-sorted predicate logic let
us add a symbol ιk for each sort, or ground type. These type symbols have the
syntax of unary predicate symbols with the fundamental difference from the latter
that t ∈ ιk is well-formed for any individual term, while Pt is well-formed only if P
and t have matching types. To negate a type predication one must employ categorial
negation ⇁t ∈ ιk. This predication is true if and only if t is not of type ιk. If Pt
is well-formed, then t falls in the range of significance of P , whence ⇁Pt is false
whenever it is well-formed; restricted to ordinary predications Pt, categorial negation
is thus just the falsity connective. If type predications are to form more than a mere
appendix to many-sorted logic, there needs to be interaction between the two forms
of predication, i.e. between t ∈ ιk and Pt. As there is no relation in this system
that has the whole universe of individuals as its left or right range of significance, the
only way such interaction can be effected is through connectives and quantifiers. It
is quite straightforward to add connectives to this system connecting categorial and
ordinary predications; but we shall immediately run into problems when considering
quantifiers in whose scope we should want to place both forms of predication: for
that would have to be quantification over the whole domain of individuals, and such
121‘Category predicate’ is less happy, for it looks like a pleonasm.
135
quantifiers cannot meaningfully apply to predicates restricted to a sort. There can,
for instance, be no way of forming a formula such as ∀x(x ∈ ιk ⊃ ¬Px) where x is
to range over all individuals, for then Px would not be well-formed. Hence, for there
to be any interesting interaction between the two forms of predication in the current
system, we need to follow Goddard in loosening the formation rules of its predicate
logical segment: we need to admit Pt as well-formed even when P and t do not have
matching types.
To incorporate type predications into a standard system of many-sorted predicate
logic we shall thus have to accept that there are well-formed formulas that are not
significant. This, however, goes against a fundamental presupposition of predicate
logic and takes us into the realm of so-called significance logic, as developed by God-
dard and Routley (1973).122 Erecting a system of significance logic is by no means a
trivial matter, and faces both conceptual and technical problems. (1) Since formulas
can be well-formed yet non-significant, the predicate and individual variables must
be regarded as schematic letters, and quantification must therefore be substitutional.
(2) Since a formula may be well-formed but unmeaning, consequence requires that also
singular terms may be well-formed but unmeaning, a decision that has further reper-
cussions for the treatment of quantification (cf. Goddard and Routley, 1973, ch. 3).
(3) And, to take one last complicating factor, since it is not sentences in the abstract
that are non-significant, but only sentences as used on a certain occasion—‘Friday
is in bed’ would be significant in the context of Robinson Crusoe—it is necessary to
take context into account.123 All such issues need to be clarified before one can begin
to consider the role of type predications in significance logic. Instead of going into all
of these preliminaries, let us consider a system in which the distinction between type
predications and ordinary predications is made form the start, namely Martin-Löf’s
constructive type theory.
4.1.1. Sets in constructive type theory. The two notions of type that have mainly
occupied us in this chapter both have their pendants in constructive type theory.
What are called sets in constructive type theory may be taken to correspond to
Ryle–Sommers types, while what is called types there may be taken to correspond
simple types.124 The role played by the one individual domain in simple type theory is
122The book develops ideas found in earlier papers of its authors. A projected second volume was, as far
as I can see, never published.
123Contexts are included in what Goddard and Routley call context logic; here it is non-trivial even to
state what the well-formed formulas are (one distinguishes semi-wff, partial wff, wfc, wffcl, and wffsl), but
its basic form of judgement is: expression e in context c yields the statement α. For more details, see
Goddard and Routley (1973, ch. 2).
124This use of the terms ‘set’ and ‘type’ follows Martin-Löf, and is found in Nordström et al. (1990), Ranta
(1995), and Nordström et al. (2000). In homotopy type theory these terms have a different use. What we
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in constructive type theory taken over by sets; these are thus the ground types. The
higher types of constructive type theory are generated by a rule which generalizes
the rule by which higher types in simple type theory are generated. We shall look
at this rule in more detail below (section 4.2.4); here our concern is with the theory
of sets, the theory presented in Martin-Löf (1984). A set is in constructive type
theory defined by laying down what its elements of canonical form are and when two
elements of canonical form are equal. Instead of ‘element of canonical form’ we often
say ‘canonical element’. An element of a set A is a method that when executed yields
a canonical element of A. Elements of a set A are equal if they evaluate to equal
canonical elements of A.
To define a set one must therefore say how its elements are formed ; that is typ-
ically achieved by means of an inductive definition. This definition does, however,
not lay down all forms whatsoever that an element of the set may have, but only
the canonical forms. The set N of natural numbers, for instance, is defined in the
following way:
0 : N 0 = 0 : N
n : N
s(n) : N
n = m : N
s(n) = s(m) : N
These rules lay down the canonical form of natural numbers, and so do not by them-
selves sanction a judgement such as 2 + 2 : N , since 2 + 2 is neither of the form
0 nor of the form s(n). On the basis of the definition of addition and that of 2 in
terms of 0 and s, however, we can carry out a reduction of 2 + 2 to the canonical
form s(s(s(s(0)))). This is of course just what it means to compute 2 + 2: when a
schoolboy is asked to compute 2 + 2 what he is asked to do is to reduce this number
to canonical form (which for him happens to be 4 and not s(s(s(s(0))))). Since this
reduction depends only on the meaning of the symbols out of which 2+2 is composed,
the number 2 + 2 may itself be regarded as a method, namely a method that when
executed yields the number s(s(s(s(0)))) of canonical form.125 That 2 + 2 is an N is
thus to say that it is a method, in accordance with the general account of what an
element of a set is. That 2 + 2 and 3 + 1 are the same N is to say that they evaluate
to the same canonical form. In addition to the basic sets N and Nk, the canonical
call sets are there called types (cf. The Univalent Foundations Program, 2013, ch. 1); while what is there
called a set is a type in their sense of a special kind (ibid. p. 107).
125In fact, as is clear from the third rule above, already s(3) is canonical provided 3 : N . Hence, the
evaluation halts already when s(3) is reached. I here use the example s(s(s(s(0)))) as it is more intuitive.
A formulation of constructive type theory in which the evaluation halts only with s(s(s(s(0)))) is found
in Granström (2011, chs. 3–5). In computer science jargon the mode of evaluation to canonical form in
standard formulations of constructive type theory is “lazy” (Martin-Löf, 1984, p. 9), while in Granström’s
formulation it is “eager.”
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sets of k members for each natural number k, the theory of sets in constructive type
theory defines operators for forming new sets from old. These include an operator Π
for forming the cartesian product of a family of sets over a set and an operator Σ for
forming the disjoint union of a family of sets, and many others besides. In each case,
what the canonical elements of a set thus formed are, as well as what equal canonical
elements of the set thus formed are, is laid down in a so-called introduction rule. The
introduction rule for a set former is paired with an elimination rule as well as an
equality rule; the general form of the two latter rules need not be explained here.126
The notion of set thus explained is quite different from each of the conceptions of
set that we may call the combinatorial conception, the dichotomy conception, and the
iterative conception, respectively.127 Although these conceptions of set are all closely
tied to each other, it is possible, and may be useful, to distinguish them. By the com-
binatorial conception of set I have in mind what underlies the definition of set found
in for instance Dedekind (1888, art. 2), Husserl (1891, p. 74), and Cantor (1895, p.
481). According to this conception a set collects together a certain plurality of objects
already “given,” and does so without adding anything apart from the mere collection
of them.128 Dedekind suggests that the plurality of individuals thus collected is given
in a list, but that, of course, is possible only when the resulting set is finite. Since
infinite sets are needed in mathematics, the combinatorial conception is therefore of-
ten replaced by the dichotomy conception. Whence Dedekind (loc. cit.), after having
explained the notion of set according to the combinatorial conception, says that a set
S is “completely determined when it is determined for each thing whether it is an
element of S or not.” This assumes the dichotomy conception of sets, according to
which a certain condition exists that defines the set and thereby divides the universe
of individuals in two: those individuals satisfying the condition, hence belonging to
the set, and those individuals not satisfying the condition, hence not belonging to
the set.129 If no restrictions are laid down on what this condition may be, then, as
126For general remarks on these rules, see Martin-Löf (1984, pp. 24–25) and Nordström et al. (1990, p. 35).
127For a comparison of set in the sense of constructive type theory with other notions of set, see also the
interesting discussion of Granström (2011, pp. 53–63).
128Dedekind (1888, art. 2): “Es kommt sehr häufig vor, daß verschiedene Dinge a, b, c . . . aus irgendeiner
Veranlassung unter einem gemeinsamen Gesichtspunkte aufgefaßt, im Geiste zusammengestellt werden,
und man sagt dann, daß sie ein System S bilden; man nennt die Dinge a, b, c . . . die Elemente des
Systems S, sie sind enthalten in S; umgekehrt besteht S aus diesen Elementen.”
Husserl (1891, p. 74): “Ein Inbegriff entsteht, indem ein einheitliches Interesse und in und mit ihm zugleich
ein einheitliches Bemerken verschiedene Inhalte für sich heraushebt und umfaßt.”
Cantor (1895, p. 481): “Unter einer ‘Menge’ verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung M von bestimmten
wohlunterschiedenen Objecten m unserer Anschauung oder unseres Denken (welche die ‘Elemente’ von M
gennant werden) zu einem Ganzen.”
129The name ‘dichotomy concept’ stems from Wang (1974, p. 187); see also Gödel (1947, pp. 518–519).
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is well known, contradiction ensues. In particular, if we accept the formation of sets
of sets and allow the membership relation to occur in the defining condition without
any restrictions, then we can form the condition
(D) x ∈ r ⇔ x /∈ x
which would define a set r, for which we should have
(R) r ∈ r ⇔ r /∈ r
If, however, we require that a set be formed only “after” all its elements have been
formed, then we cannot instantiate r in (D) to get (R), hence we should avoid at
least this particular antinomy. The iterative conception of set is often motivated by
precisely this observation.130 It thus emphasizes the component of the combinatorial
conception that a set should be formed from individuals already given or formed.
The iterative conception places no restrictions on how sets may be formed from ones
already formed, hence at any stage we may form all sets whose elements may be sets
formed so far as well as other individuals that are not sets. In practice this yields the
cumulative hierarchy as first defined by Zermelo (1930, p. 36) by iterating the power
set operation along the ordinals, taking unions at the limit stages, and beginning from
some domain, possibly empty, of non-sets.
Neither of these conceptions of set agree with that of constructive type theory.
The basic reason for this is the emphasis in each of these conceptions on the priority
of the elements of a set to the set itself. According to the combinatorial conception
a set is defined by collecting together, and regarding as one, certain objects given
in a list or the like. According to the dichotomy conception we have before us the
universe of individuals, which we bisect by means of a condition, thereby defining a
set. That a set is posterior in some sense to its elements is the motivating idea of
the iterative conception of set. So in each case the set is posterior to its elements.
These elements, however, are individuals of a certain kind or sort: they are numbers,
or polynomials, or triangles, or thoughts, or trees, or tables, or what have you; they
may even be sets themselves. But in any event they are all something, for there is an
answer to the question of what they are. Each element of a set may be an individual
of a different kind—the notion of set is formal in the sense that its elements may be
as heterogenous as you wish—but it is still an individual of some kind or sort, still an
individual that belongs to a certain domain. It is this notion of domain of individual,
or kind or sort of individual, rather than the notion of a collection of any individuals
whatsoever, that the notion of set in constructive type theory is meant to capture.
130So, for instance, in Boolos (1971) and Shoenfield (1977).
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That this notion of set is more fundamental than the notion of iterative set, i.e. a
set on the iterative conception, is vividly illustrated by Zermelo’s discussion (ibid.).
For him a set is a member of a domain of iterative sets (Mengenbereich), and the
cumulative hierarchy affords a way of stratifying this domain. Here it is the notion of
a domain of sets, rather than the sets themselves, that corresponds to the notion of set
in constructive type theory. In his characterization of domains of sets Zermelo makes
crucial use of ordinals, and these belong to a domain that does not coincide with any
domain of sets. Thus, in addition to domains of iterative sets Zermelo assumes the
notion of a domain of ordinals. In constructive type theory Zermelo’s domains of
ordinals correspond to so-called well-ordering sets (cf. Martin-Löf, 1984, pp. 79–86);
it is also possible to define there a set corresponding to a domain of iterative sets (cf.
Aczel, 1978, pp. 61–62).
It is a basic tenet of constructive type theory that judgements must be distin-
guished from propositions. Judgements feature in inferences, and a judgement is what
one demonstrates in a mathematical proof. A proposition, on the other hand, is what
is asserted as true in a judgement. It is, moreover, on propositions and propositional
functions, but not on judgements, that the logical connectives operate.131 This is
thus the distinction Frege drew in the Begriffsschrift between judgement and judge-
able content, but which tends to be ignored, or at least not properly recognized, by
most present-day philosophical logicians.132 The notion of judgement is more funda-
mental than that of proposition, and a presentation of constructive type theory must
begin by presenting the form of judgements it assumes. For our present purposes
three forms of judgement are relevant (more forms of judgement will be presented
later):
A : set a : A A true
The first two forms of judgements have already been explained above when it was
explained (1) that a set A is defined by laying down how its canonical elements are
formed and how equal canonical elements are formed; (2) that an element a of a set
A is a method that when executed yields a canonical element of A. Another basic
tenet of constructive type theory is the identification of the type of propositions with
the type of sets,133
prop = set
131For this point, see esp. Martin-Löf (1996).
132See the works cited in footnote 2 above.
133This is a development of the so-called Curry-Howard correspondence (Howard, 1980).
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Hence ‘A : prop’ is another way of writing the judgement ‘A : set’. A proposition is
identified with the set of its canonical proofs, or proof objects. Accordingly, a proof
of a proposition is a method for obtaining a canonical proof. A proposition is true
if it is inhabited, i.e. if it has a proof. These ideas are reflected in the third form
of judgement ‘A true’ above, a form of judgement that is written ` A in Frege’s




In passing from a : A to ‘A true’ some information is left out: in asserting ‘A true’
we assert that we have a proof of A, but we do not make this proof manifest, as we
do in asserting a : A. Another way of writing the judgement ‘A true’ is ‘A exists’.
Viewing sets in constructive type theory as Ryle–Sommers types, the judgement
a : A
should be viewed as a type predication. Type predications are thus among the basic
forms of judgement in constructive type theory. The same holds for ordinary predica-
tions. For, given a set A, propositional functions may be defined over it, i.e. functions
P whose value Pa for any argument a in A is a proposition. The judgement
Pa true
to the effect that the propositional function, or predicate, P holds of an a in the set A
is thus an ordinary predication. Hence the difference between type predications and
ordinary predications corresponds to the difference of the forms of judgement a : A
and ‘Pa true’.
From the explanation of the form of judgement ‘A true’ it is clear that any judge-
ment of this form is preceded by a judgement of the form a : A. In particular, an
ordinary predication ‘Pa true’ is preceded by a type predication p : Pa in which a
proof object p of the proposition Pa is made manifest. Thus already the meaning
explanation of ordinary predications shows that they are epistemically posterior to
type predications. For present purposes another asymmetry between ordinary predi-
cations and type predications is of more interest: the ordinary predication ‘Pa true’,
in which P is a propositional function over the set A, presupposes the type predica-
tion a : A. Indeed, we cannot make the judgement ‘Pa : prop’ unless we know that
a belongs to the range of significance of P . In order to appreciate this asymmetry
between ‘Pa true’ and a : A it is instructive to consider a propositional function that
is true for every element of A. Given any set A and elements a, b in A constructive
type theory allows the formation of a proposition I(A, a, b), which is true if a and b
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are equal elements of A, that is, if they evaluate to equal canonical elements. This
proposition I(A, a, b) must be distinguished from the more fundamental judgement
a = b : A (cf. Martin-Löf, 1984, pp. 59–64). An I-set, as I shall call it, has the
following introduction rule
a : A
r(A, a) : I(A, a, a)
Thus, the proposition I(A, a, a) is inhabited, hence true, for any element of A. Given
a set A we may therefore define a propositional function over A
Px ≡ I(A, x, x)





These two inferences are justified in fundamentally different ways, however, and that
difference reflects the difference between the type predication a : A and the ordinary
predication ‘Pa true’. The inference (1) is valid in virtue of the definition of P and the
introduction rule for I-sets. This inference thus draws its justification from how P has
been defined. The inference (2), by contrast, is valid for any propositional function P
defined over A. It is justified as follows. Assume that the premiss ‘Pa true’ is known.
Then the presuppositions of the premiss must be known; but the judgement a : A is
one of these presuppositions; whence a : A is known. The only fact used about P in
this justification is that A is its domain of definition. The judgement ‘Pa true’ then
has a : A as a presupposition. Since we must know that this presupposition is fulfilled
before making the judgement ‘Pa : prop’, a fortiori before making the judgement
‘Pa true’, the conclusion of (2) is therefore just the repetition of a judgement that
will already have been made, assuming that we know the premiss of the inference. The
lesson is that, even though the type predication a : A and the ordinary predication
‘Pa true’, with P defined as above, are equiassertable, the former is a presupposition
of the latter. In constructive type theory the order of conceptual priority between a
propositional function and its range of significance is therefore the reverse of what
it is in Ryle–Sommers type theory. In the latter a propositional function is given in
the abstract, so to say, and its range of significance is determined on the basis of
judgements of significance, perhaps with the help of certain formal constraints such
as the law of categorial inclusion. In constructive type theory, by contrast, one must,
in defining a propositional function, first specify its range of significance.
While the type predication a : A is a basic form of judgement in constructive
type theory, there is no corresponding negative judgement to the effect that a is not
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an element of the set A. This can be seen as following from what Martin-Löf has
called the doctrine of types, namely the doctrine that an object is always an object
of a certain type.134 One does not conceive of a universe of bare objects that only
subsequently is divided into types according to the nature of the object. Rather, an
object is introduced with its type, and therefore cannot be thought apart from it.
Hence we may regard the type of an object as its nature, or essence, and there is no
separating the object from its essence to ask whether it perhaps has another essence,
i.e. whether it perhaps belongs to another type. Since there are no negative type
predications, neither are there predications to the effect that two types are unequal,
for that would require a witness of their inequality; a fortiori there are no predications
that two types are disjoint. Since Prior’s syllogism trades in the negations of type
predications, there is no way of formalizing it in constructive type theory. In general
it is required for the formalization of a syllogism in constructive type theory that the
three terms A, B, and C be propositional functions defined over the same domain D,
in particular that A, B and C have the same range of significance.135 Constructive
type theory is thus a system in which type predications can be made, but according
to which category mistakes are not well-formed, whence non-significant.
4.2. Simple type predications. Category mistakes motivated our treatment of
predications of types in the sense of Ryle and Sommers; our treatment of predications
of simple types is motivated by Frege’s problem of the concept horse.
4.2.1. The problem of the concept horse. There are various ways of formulating
Frege’s problem of the concept horse.136 According to one formulation, the problem
is that of accounting in general for propositions in which a phrase of the form ‘the
function f ’ serves as subject. Since, according to some of the things Frege says (esp.
GLA §§ 51, 66), ‘the function f ’ is a proper name, it cannot be used to signify
a function, for what signifies a function must be unsaturated, just as the function
itself is unsaturated; but a proper name is by definition an expression that is not
134Cf. Martin-Löf (1975, p. 76).
135The mood of Barbara is formalized as follows
f : (∀y : (Σx : D)A(x))B(p(y))
g : (∀y : (Σx : D)B(x))C(p(y))
∴ λy.ap(g, 〈p(y), ap(f, y)〉) : (∀y : (Σx : D)A(x))C(p(y))
Here the domain D is made explicit. It is reasonable to assume that D is non-empty. This assumption
does, however, not validate the inference from f : (∀y : (Σx : D)A(x))B(p(y)) to the judgement that
(Σx : D)A(x) is non-empty (“existential import”), since A might not hold of any D, in which case f is a
function with an empty domain.
136As emphasized by Proops (2013).
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unsaturated.137 Whence it appears that we cannot make a function f the topic of
a proposition to say of it that it has such and such properties. That would namely
require use of an expression such as ‘the function f ’ as subject; with ‘the function
f ’ as subject, however, we shall not succeed in talking about a function, but shall
find ourselves instead talking about what must be an object. Whence anything we
might wish to say about the function f that would require making it the topic of the
proposition we cannot in fact say. Whence, perhaps, Frege’s famous words that “my
expression taken quite literally miss my thought” (BG p. 204).
The problem of the concept horse according to this formulation is thus the prob-
lem of making a function the topic of a proposition; or in other words, the problem of
expressing a thought the only way of expressing which would be by means of a sen-
tence whose subject is a phrase of the form ‘the function f ’. Against this formulation
of the problem one may appeal to what is known in the literature as Frege’s Context
Principle: “never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context
of a proposition” (GLA p. x). For it may be that when considering a subject phrase
of the form ‘the function f ’ not in isolation, but in its sentential context, we should
find no “awkwardness of language” (sprachliche Härte, BG p. 196) that stands in the
way of what we wish to say.
One may also appeal to the distinction between the surface grammatical form
of a sentence and its ideographical form. That these come apart is evident in the
case of quantified propositions, a point of which Frege must have been well aware.
In the surface grammatical form of a quantified proposition a predicate is said of a
quantified subject; so this is parallel to the surface grammatical form of the singular
proposition. In the ideographical rendering of a quantified proposition, however, a
second-level function ‘every’ is applied to a first-level function, and that is not parallel
to the ideographical rendering of a singular proposition. Thus, on the surface level of
‘every horse is mortal’ the predicate ‘is mortal’ is said of the quantified subject ‘every
horse’; but on the ideographical level the second-level function ‘every’ is applied to the
first-level function ‘if x is a horse, then x is mortal’. Surface grammar and ideography
come apart also in the case of propositions of the form now under discussion, namely
propositions whose subject appears to be of the form ‘the function f ’. The quite
ordinary mathematical sentence ‘the sine function is periodic’ is a case in point. In
formalizing this sentence in ideographical notation one feels no inclination to render
137Cf. footnote 10 above and the text footnoted there. For the relevant definition of proper name, see SB
p. 27.
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‘the sine function’ as a Fregean proper name. The formalization would rather be
(∃r ∈ R)(∀x ∈ R) sin(x+ r) = sin(x),
where ‘sin’ is a functional expression and not a proper name. There is an analysis of
this formula into the function
Φ(f) ≡ (∃r ∈ R)(∀x ∈ R)f(x+ r) = f(x)
applied to the argument sin. That analysis corresponds well to the grammatical anal-
ysis of the sentence ‘the sine function is periodic’ into the subject ‘the sine function’
and the predicate ‘is periodic’. But the function Φ is a second-level function and sin
still a function of objects.
Another case in point is ‘Euler’s totient function is multiplicative’ or ‘the Ack-
ermann function is not primitive recursive’ of in fact most sentences of mathematics
whose subject has the form ‘the function f ’. In each case the function that is men-
tioned in the subject phrase of the natural language formulation of the theorem occurs
in the ideography together with an argument, hence it does not occur as an object.
The real problem of the concept horse is therefore not to account for phrases of the
form ‘the function f ’ as they occur in subject position in mathematical prose, for such
phrases in general “disappear on analysis.” The real problem of the concept horse is
rather to account for propositions where ‘is a function’ is the predicate: to account for
type predications, that is.138 If anything else is suggested by Frege’s writings—which
it presumably is by the Grundlagen der Arithmetik and Über Begriff und Gegenstand,
a paper responding to a criticism of the Grundlagen—then that rather points to a
tension in Frege’s thinking. For there is no reason why he should not have accepted
our analysis of ‘the sine function is periodic’ and sentences of a similar surface form.
As there are infinitely many types of function in the simple type hierarchy, so
there are also infinitely many type predicates (it is worth repeating a point that is
often sinned against in the literature, namely that ‘is a function’ is not a type predicate
according to Frege, since there are infinitely many sorts of function, each as distinct
from any other as unary functions of objects are from objects; cf. BG pp. 26–27 and
GG p. 37). But let us concentrate here on the type of unary functions of objects;
138A similar observation is made by Carnap (1934, §§ 76–77) when he distinguishes two modes of employ-
ment of what he calls universal words: in the first mode of employment the universal word serves merely
to show the sort of a variable or other sign, and so can be done away with provided the sign wears its type
on its sleeve, and that is merely a matter of convention; in the second mode of employment the universal
word occurs as a non-qualifying part of the proposition and cannot be thus done away with; Carnap notes
that a type predication is the simplest case of this second mode of employment and proceeds to account
for such predications (we shall discuss his account in section 4.2.3 below).
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the considerations made should generalize to all other types. The problem of the
concept horse is thus that of explaining how one can say of a thing that it is a unary
function of objects. If a solution to this problem requires that a predication of the
sort ‘f is a function’ be rendered in Frege’s ideography, then I think no solution can
be found. One suggestion is to define a first-order predicate that is true precisely of
the courses-of-values of functions of objects and let this predicate be a proxy for the
predicate ‘is a first-order function’.139 Another suggestion is to define ‘is a function’
as a second-order predicate that is true of all unary functions of objects. An example
of such a predicate is
Φ(f) ≡ ∀x∃y(f(x) = y),
where the quantifiers range over all individuals.140 Both of these suggestions supply a
predicate of the ideography that may be read as ‘is a function’. But both suggestions
are problematic. The first is problematic for the reason that much of Frege’s doctrine
of courses-of-values is problematic, namely in that it opens the door to the Zermelo–
Russell paradox, requiring as it would appear to do an injective function from concepts
into objects.141 There is a more fundamental problem that confronts both suggestions.
To understand the predicates here being defined—the first-order proxy predicate ‘is
a course-of-values of a first-order function’ or the second-order predicate true of all
first-order functions—one needs to understand the ideography. To understand the
ideography, however, one needs to understand what a function is, and therefore also
to understand type predications of the form ‘f is a function’. The definition of the
proxy predicate ‘is a course-of-values of a first-order function’ lays down that it is a
function; so this definition presupposes a grasp of the type predicate ‘is a function’.
Likewise, the definition of the second-level function true of all first-order functions lays
down that it is a second-level function, and therefore presupposes a grasp of the type
139For discussion of this suggestion in the case where the predicate is ‘is a concept’, see Parsons (1986,
pp. 452–455) and Proops (2013, pp. 77–84). One may recognize the suggestion at BG p. 197, but at the
place in question Frege refers not to GG § 3, where the notion of course-of-values is introduced, but to
GLA p. x, which is just a comment on the third of Frege’s three Grundsätze in that work, namely “Der
Unterschied zwischen Begriff und Gegenstand ist im Auge zu behalten.” I am not certain whether the proxy
predicate ‘is a first-order function’ is definable in Frege’s ideography. According to Frege’s definition of his
application function, ξ_ζ, the value of ∆_Γ is to be the course-of-values –ε(ε 6= ε) for all ∆ when Γ is not
a course-of-values (Gg § 34); but it will not do to define ‘is a first-order function’ as ∀a(a_ξ 6= –ε(ε 6= ε)),
for this will yield the value False also for the course-of-values of the function whose value is –ε(ε 6= ε) for
any object. The deeper problem here would seem to be that we lack clear application criteria for the notion
of being a course-of-values. Notice, however, that the proxy predicate ‘is a concept’ is easily definable in
Frege’s ideography, namely as ∀a(a_ξ = −(a_ξ)), where ‘−’ is Frege’s horizontal stroke (Gg § 4).
140This proposal is developed by Dummett (1973, pp. 211–217). Frege appears to defend it in a letter to
Russell of 29/06/1902: “Der Begriff der Function muss ja ein Begriff zweiter Stufe sein, während er in der
Sprache immer als ein Begriff erster Stufe erscheint.”
141As is emphasized by Parsons (1986, pp. 454–455).
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predicate ‘is a second-level function’, which in its turn would seem to presuppose
a grasp of the type predicate ‘is a function’. The definition of each of these two
predicates thus presupposes that we already grasp the type predicate the definition
is meant to account for. An objection closely related to this one is the following. For
each type τ there is a function of type (τ)o that is true of every object of type τ ; but
that function must not be confused with the type τ itself. The function of individuals
λx.x = x, for instance, cannot be identified with the type ι of individuals. This is an
instance of the more general point that a type cannot be identified with an element
of some type. But that, in effect, is what we must do if we are to define the type
predicate ‘is a function’ in Frege’s ideography.
4.2.2. Tractarian silence. Hence, there can be no predicate of Frege’s ideography
that faithfully renders the predicate ‘is a function’. In face of this fact one position
to take is that of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.142 Wittgenstein held that some-
thing’s falling under what he called a formal concept cannot be asserted by means
of propositions, but is rather shown in propositions (TLP 4.122, 4.124, 4.126).143 As
examples of formal concepts Wittgenstein mentions object, complex, fact, function,
and number (TLP 4.1272). These examples together with the various properties of
formal concepts that we shall now discuss make it natural to identify formal concepts
as the types or categories of the Tractarian system. To say that an object falls under
a concept is in Frege’s ideography to say that a certain function yields the value true
when applied to that object; in Russell’s ideography it is to say that a certain propo-
sitional function φx yields a true proposition when that object is assigned as value
to the variable x. Thus we may say that a genuine concept, such as the concept of
man, is represented by a certain function, the propositional function ‘x is a man’, say.
Wittgenstein denies that formal concepts are genuine concepts represented by func-
tions; instead they are pseudo-concepts (Scheinbegriffe), and represented by variables
(TLP 4.126–4.1272).144 In particular, there is no propositional function representing
the formal concept of an object, a concept rather represented by a variable, like the
‘x’ in ‘x is a man’. An entity’s falling under a formal concept is therefore not as-
serted by the combination of a propositional function and the entity in question, but
is shown by the fact that the entity is a possible value of a variable of a given sort;
142Several remarks made in this section and the next echo ones made by Klein (2004).
143Wittgenstein distinguishes what he calls formal concepts from what he calls formal properties and
relations. The latter are said to be the marks (Merkmale) of the former (TLP 4.126), but it is a moot
point what the difference is between the two notions. I shall not distinguish the two.
144The notion of variable assumed in the Tractatus (TLP 3.311–3.317, 4.1271–4.1273) is obscure, if not
confused. I shall not attempt to clarify it here, but take for granted the understanding of variables
articulated for instance by Church (1956, pp. 9–15).
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or equivalently, that a variable of a given sort is what one must replace the symbol of
the entity by in order to obtain a propositional function from a proposition in which
that name occurs.145
Regarding the problem of the concept horse Wittgenstein could therefore have
said that the predicate ‘is a function’ is a pseudo-predicate. What we wish to say by
means of it cannot be said; something’s being a function is rather shown in a symbol.
The type of a symbol is a characteristic feature (charakteristischer Zug) common to
all symbols of that type (TLP 4.126). This is not to say that a function symbol is just
whatever can be substituted by or for an f or a g or primed versions of these, for a
symbol’s being of a certain type is not merely a question of typography. Rather, the
type of a symbol is shown in the use that is made of the symbol in the ideography, in
its “logico-syntactic employment” (TLP 3.326–3.327). In general, then, the Tractarian
approach to type predications is to say that they are nonsensical (TLP 4.124), in effect
that there are no such predications. What one attempts to say in a type predication
is rather something that is shown in the symbolism itself, something that comes in of
the logico-syntactic employment of the symbols.
Although the Tractarian view of type predications is a possible reaction to Frege’s
concept horse problem, it seems not to have been conceived as such by Wittgenstein.
His ground for holding the thesis that type predications are nonsenical rather has
to do with the so-called picture theory of meaning (TLP 4.01, etc.).146 To say that
something falls under a formal concept would namely amount to saying something
about the logical form of the propositions in which it occurs, and that, according to
Wittgenstein, is not possible. For a picture to be a picture of a piece of reality—be it
a true or a false picture—the picture and the piece of reality need to have something
in common. What a picture shares with what it depicts Wittgenstein calls a form of
representation (Form der Abbildung) (TLP 2.16–2.17). A picture can, however, not
depict its own form of representation, for that would mean transgressing what makes it
a picture in the first place (2.172–2.174). Logical form is, according to Wittgenstein, a
form of representation. Logical form is in fact the most general form of representation
that there is, for it is present in any picture. It is a minimal condition on a picture
that it shares the logical form of what it depicts; by contrast, the picture need not
share, for instance, the spatial form of what it depicts (2.18–2.182). A proposition
(Satz ) is a picture, and shares the logical form of what it depicts (e.g. 4.03 or 3 with
3.1). But since logical form is a form of representation, a proposition cannot depict
its logical form, for again, that would conflict with the conditions for the possibility
145Husserl called this the process of formalization; more on that in section 6.2 below.
146For a sympathetic discussion of the picture theory of meaning, see Stenius (1960, esp. ch. VII).
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of the proposition’s being a picture in the first place (4.12–4.121). Since a proposition
p that purports to say that an entity e falls under a certain formal concept purports
to say something about the logical form of the propositions in which a symbol of the
entity e occurs, and since one such symbol would occur in the very proposition p,
there can in fact be no such proposition.
That there is a close relationship between formal concepts and what Wittgenstein
calls logical form is not stated by him in so many words. That he held there to be
a close relationship, however, seems clear when we consider the theses describing the
notion of a formal concept in their context. With numbers 4.12x these theses must be
regarded as developments of thesis 4.12, which is precisely the thesis that applies TLP
2.172 to propositions, saying that a proposition cannot depict its own logical form.
Thesis 4.121 adds that a proposition shows its logical form, while formal concepts
are introduced in TLP 4.122 with the proviso that an object’s falling under a formal
concept cannot be said by, but is only shown in, propositions.
4.2.3. The Russell–Carnap reduction. A different reaction to the problem of in-
corporating type predications into an ideography is to say with Russell (1919b, p.
267) that “the theory of types is really a theory of symbols, not of things.” According
to Russell (1924, p. 332) all symbols are of the same logical type: they are all “classes
of series of noises or shapes,” by which he means classes of equiform utterances or
inscriptions (cf. Russell, 1944, p. 692). This is presumably not the only way in which
symbols can be treated as being of a single type—what is required is only that they
be a sort of general object whose instances are utterances or inscriptions—but for
concreteness let us concentrate on this account. What we say in a type predication
such as ‘the sine function is a function of real numbers’ is therefore that the class of
symbols equiform with ‘sin’ belongs to the class of function-symbols, and this is just
an ordinary predication Pt. Thus it appears that we can do away with type predi-
cations altogether, as they are reducible to ordinary predications over the domain of
equiformity classes of inscriptions or utterances.
Russell seems to have been led to a view like this through consideration of how
to present the type theory without violating the doctrine of types, “a point which for-
merly troubled me a good deal” (Russell, 1944, p. 692). An especially clear illustration
of the difficulty this raises is offered by PM ∗9.14:
∗9.14 If “φx” is significant, then if x is of the same type as a, “φa”
is significant, and vice versa.
This “primitive proposition,” as it is called in Principia, lays down an important tenet
of the doctrine of types, namely that types are ranges of significance of propositional
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functions. But for it to have the import it is meant to have the variables x and a
must cross all types, and that, according to the doctrine of types, is not possible, as
the range of a variable is restricted to a single type. Hence PM ∗9.14, in laying down
an important part of the doctrine of types, violates that very doctrine, whence the
whole thing looks like a self-contradiction. It was as a way out of this predicament
that Russell came to view the theory of types as a theory of symbols, for on that view
the variables x and a would range over symbols, all of which are of one type, and
thus the theory could be presented without self-contradiction. The reduction of type
predications to ordinary predications over symbols follows as a corollary.
In the Logical Syntax of Language (1934) Carnap deals with type predications
in quite the same way, though I think motivated by considerations rather different
from Russell’s. Carnap views type predications as belonging to what he calls the logic
of science (Wissenschaftslogik). The logic of science is, according to Carnap, what
philosophy becomes when it has been purged of all unscientific aspects: all questions
of philosophy are logical questions concerning sciences (ibid. § 72). Type predications
will therefore belong to the logic of science, since they classify the objects studied in
the various sciences. The logic of science is, according to Carnap, “the syntax of the
language of science” (ibid. § 73). Syntax here means “nothing but the combinatorics,
or if one prefers, the geometry of finite discrete sequential structures of a certain
kind” (ibid. § 2). The syntax of the language of science is therefore the study of
the structure of science and scientific propositions considered as a certain sort of
mathematical objects. Carnap describes syntax as the purely formal study of these
things, by which he means that it does not take meaning into account, but considers
only the sorts and sequences of certain figures, certain “discrete sequential structures”
(ibid. § 1). This use of the word ‘formal’, as indicating a concern only with the visible
surface of a sign, is quite novel in the history of logic,147 and not in line with how the
word is used elsewhere in this dissertation.
As a part of the syntax of the language of science type predications concern
symbols. A type predication thus has the form: such and such a symbol belongs to
such and such a class of symbols; for instance, “ ‘5’ is a numeral,” “ ‘is a horse’ is
a property-word” (ibid. § 77). Carnap remarks (loc. cit.) that, so conceived, type
predications, as well as closely related predications such as ‘no property is an object’,
can be made without violating the doctrine of types. But it is not this observation
that motivates Carnap’s conception of the logic of science as the study of syntax,
and consequently his treatment of type predicates as ranging over symbols. The
147I am uncertain where it originates; it corresponds well to the second sense of ‘formal’ marked out by
Frege (1886).
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motivation is rather Carnap’s belief in the virtues of syntax in his sense. Syntax
allows for precisely formulated and definitely answerable questions, and helps one
avoid the grip of pseudo-problems. The identification of the logic of science, hence
also of philosophy, with the syntax of the language of science is therefore of benefit
to the former. The identification is of benefit to the doctrine of type predications in
particular, for according to Carnap type predications form a major source of pseudo-
problems. Problems concerning the nature of numbers, the nature of time and space,
of the physical and the mental, and the nature of universals are all pseudo-problems
raised by an improper understanding of type predications. They are resolved only
by dealing with type predications in Carnap’s way, namely as being solely concerned
with the visible surface of signs (ibid. § 80).
We must now ask whether this Russell–Carnap reduction of type predications
to ordinary predications is a satisfactory treatment of the former. To my mind it is
not. One could firstly question whether it is in fact true that type theory is a theory
of symbols in Russell’s sense. For granted that all symbols are of the same type—
and that must be granted if the reduction is to have any effect—then it would seem
that the theory of types is precisely not a theory of symbols, since there are no type
distinctions among symbols, while a theory of types must distinguish between types.
The theory of symbols cannot comprise a theory of types, but at most a theory of the
single type of symbols. It will not do to counter that types enter when we consider
the meaning of these symbols: for then one grants that the actual theory of types
is not a theory of symbols, but a theory of the meanings of symbols. A second and
more fundamental objection to the reduction is that it simply does not remove the
need for type predications. This is evident from how we presented the reduction
above: type predications are reducible to ordinary predications over the domain of
equiformity classes of inscriptions or utterances. In this very formulation we commit
ourselves to the distinction between symbols and predicates over symbols, and that
is a distinction of type. If we do not opt for Tractarian silence, we shall therefore see
the need, when carrying out the Russell–Carnap reduction, to say that such and such
is a predicate over symbols, that is, we shall see the need to make type predications.
Hence the Russell–Carnap reduction does not in fact dispose of type predications,
as they are required in the statement of the reduction. One could counter that here
there is certainly a confusion of object language and metalanguage: we have removed
type predications from the object language, and that is all that is required. In order
to reply to this we must first consider the relation of type theory to the idea of an
object language.
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As is the case with any scientific investigation, the study of type theory as an
object language in the sense of a mathematical object of the type of symbols neces-
sarily takes place in a language. Following Curry (1963, pp. 28–29) we may call that
language the U language, where ‘U’ does not stand for ‘universal’, but indicates that
the U language is the language being used.148 An ideography in the tradition of Frege
and Russell should be seen, not as an object of mathematical study, but as a way
of making precise a fragment of the U language, namely the language being used in
mathematics (and perhaps other sciences, as Frege suggested, Bs pp. xii–xiii; but let
us concentrate on mathematics here). The U language is to a greater or lesser extent
imprecise; in most areas of language use this imprecision is perhaps only a benefit,
but for a logical analysis of arithmetic Frege realized that it was an obstacle that can
be overcome only by the construction of an ideography (Bs p. x). Frege’s ideography
was thus not introduced as an object for mathematical study, but as an addition to
the language in which mathematics is studied,149 as a means of making this language
more precise. As such it may be compared to the introduction of technical terminology
with explicit meaning explanations that we find in all sciences. Like the U language
itself, an ideography should be regarded as open: it can always be extended with
new primitives if that is required and justified. An ideography in Frege’s spirit can
therefore not be identified with an inductively defined set of strings. Given a definite
portion of the ideography we can of course choose to consider that as a mathematical
object, and study its various properties along the lines of model theory and proof
theory. We do, however, not thereby transcend the U language, for this objectified
ideography will still have to be studied in the U language. By its definition there is
no way out of the U language.
In the works that have occupied us above type theory is generally assumed to be
an addition to the U language, and not an object of mathematical study on a par
with, say, groups or manifolds. That is the case with Frege, with Principia, with
Ryle, Sommers, Goddard, and with constructive type theory. Type theory is here
regarded as an addition to the U language along the lines of Frege’s ideography and
not as a mathematical object. The addition to the U language of a type theory is
here thus a way of making precise the various type distinctions that are made in the
U language. This conception of type theory is more fundamental than the conception
of it as an object language, for in presenting type theory as an object language we
have to make use of typical distinctions in the U language. Namely, we have to make
use of the distinction between between the type of symbols and the type of predicates
148The term was first introduced in Curry (1950).
149For this point, cf. Sundholm (2001, 2002).
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over symbols, and that distinction is not captured by the object language. Although
we may be able to “model” some definitely circumscribed part of the U language in a
type-free theory, we cannot infer that there are no type distinctions in the U language.
The reply to the contention recorded above that nothing more is required than
an account of type predications in the object language is therefore that more is in fact
required.150 What we want is to make explicit the type distinctions made in the U
language, and our arguments show that this is not achieved with the Russell–Carnap
reduction. It is a further question whether type predications in the U language in
fact can be made precise in an ideography. Wittgenstein’s point in the Tractatus is
precisely that they cannot: in an ideography formal concepts are represented by vari-
ables and not by propositional functions (TLP 4.1272). Indeed, there could perhaps
be inherent conceptual or technical difficulties in representing type predications in an
ideography. But there is an ideography in the tradition of Frege in which type predi-
cations can be made, and which thus would seem to show that the contrary is the case,
viz. constructive type theory.151 We have already seen how predications of the form
a : A, where A is a set, are explained in constructive type theory (section 4.1.1); we
shall now look at how predications of the form a : α, where α is a type are explained.
4.2.4. Types in constructive type theory. As was noted at the beginning of sec-
tion 4.1.1 above, what are called types in constructive type theory may quite well
be compared to simple types, in contrast to what are there called sets, which may
be compared to Ryle–Sommers types. If α is a type of constructive type theory and
a is an object of α, then the judgement a : α, i.e. a type predication, can be made
in the theory, and not merely in the metalanguage. There is thus in this theory not
only the form of judgement a : A, where A is a set, but also the more general form of
judgement that something is an element of a type (that it is more general will emerge
presently). The explanation of the simple type predication a : α is given together
with the explanation of what a type is; that explanation is given together with the
explanation of what the rules of type formation are;152 but first some preliminaries.
(i) A type α of constructive type theory is explained by saying what its elements are
and what equal elements of the type are. This explanation is in general effected by
explaining a pair of judgments
150I take Geach (1976, pp. 58–61) to be saying much the same thing. For another, more Tractarian,
response to the Russell–Carnap reduction, see Stenius (1960, pp. 182–188).
151On the place of constructive type theory in the tradition after Frege, see e.g. Sundholm (2012b).
152The development of the rules of type formation postdate the lectures published in Martin-Löf (1984),
and so are not included in that book. The rules are presented and discussed in Martin-Löf (1994, pp.
91–92) and in Martin-Löf (2013). A presentation of the whole theory that takes types into account is found
in Nordström et al. (2000).
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a : α (a is an element of type α)
a = a′ : α (a and a′ are equal elements of type α)
By explaining the first judgement, one explains what an element of α is, and by ex-
plaining the second judgement, one explains what equal elements of α are. (ii) As
we shall see in more detail below, not only type predications, but also predications
with an even more general predicate can be made within constructive type theory; in
particular, one can also make the judgement α : type in the theory, and this is not a
type predication, since type is not itself a type. (iii) An important feature of construc-
tive type theory that distinguishes it from Frege’s ideography is the incorporation of
hypothetical judgements. In particular there is a hypothetical form of judgement
α : type [x : β],
read “α is a type provided x is a β.” Let us write α〈b/x〉 for the result of substituting
b for x in α. This hypothetical form of judgement is explained by saying that
α〈b/x〉 is a type provided b : β, and
α〈b/x〉 and α〈b′/x〉 are equal types provided b = b′ : β
If these judgements are valid, then we may think of α as a family of types over β.
Hypothetical judgements of the form
(Hypo) a : α [x : β],
read “a is an α provided x is a β,” are explained similarly, namely by saying that
a〈b/x〉 : α〈b/x〉 provided b : β
a〈b/x〉 = a〈b′/x〉 : α〈b/x〉 provided b = b′ : β.




β : type α : type [x : β]
(x : β)α : type
We justify a rule of type formation by justifying its conclusion on the assumption that
we know the premisses of the rule. A judgement of the form α : type is justified by
showing that α is indeed a type, i.e. by saying what an object of type α is and what
equal objects of type α are. Let us justify each of the three rules of type formation in
turn. The first rule set : type says that there is a ground type set of sets. To justify
this rule we need to say what a set is and when two sets are equal. It was explained
in section 4.1.1 above what a set is. Two sets are equal if a canonical element of the
one is a canonical element of the other, and vice versa.
The second rule says that any set A is itself a ground type. Instead of the one type
of individuals of most formulations of type theory, there is here therefore one type of
154
individuals for each set. We justify the second rule by recalling the explanation of
what an element of a set is and what equal elements of a set are. An element of a set
is a method that when executed yields a canonical element of the set; elements are
equal if they evaluate to the same canonical element. Recall that prop = set. Hence




According to the first rule there is a type of propositions; what a proposition is and
when propositions are equal is given by the explanation of what a set is and when sets
are equal. The second rule now says that any proposition A is also a ground type.
The third rule of type formation allows the formation of so-called dependent
function types: if β is a type, and α is a family of types over β, then we may form the
type (x : β)α. If α〈b/x〉 = α〈b′/x〉 for any b and b′ in β, then we put (β)α = (x : β)α.
This identification is in accordance with our default notation for function types (β)α.
A function type (β)α of the simple type hierarchy may thus be identified with a type
(x : β)α in the dependent type hierarchy provided α is a constant family over β. From
this we see that the dependent type hierarchy is a generalization of the simple type
hierarchy.
To justify the third rule of type formation we must explain the following pair
of judgements, relying on the assumption that we know the premisses of the rule,
namely that we know β : type and α : type [x : β].
(1) f : (x : β)α
(2) f = g : (x : β)α
Judgement (1) means that
(1∗) f(b) : α〈b/x〉 whenever b : β,
and that
(1∗∗) f(b) = f(b′) : α〈b/x〉 whenever b = b′ : β.
Here f(b) is the application of the function f to the element b, where the notion of
application is primitive. We shall say more about this primitive notion of application
in the next section 4.2.5; it is not to be identified with substitution. We then know
what the judgements (1∗) and (1∗∗) mean, since we know β : type and α : type [x : β].
Judgement (2) means that
f(b) = g(b) : α〈b/x〉 whenever b : β.
Again we know what this judgement means because of our knowledge of the premisses
of the rule. In rule form we can gather the explanations of judgements (1) and (2)
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into the following two rules
f : (x : β)α b : β
f(b) : α〈b/x〉
f = g : (x : β)α b = b′ : β
f(b) = g(b′) : α〈b/x〉
These meaning explanations may have seemed tedious, but they are our answer
to the challenge that type predications cannot be made. By explaining the form of
judgement
f : (x : β)α
we explain what it means to assert that f is a unary function of a certain type,
precisely what the problem of the concept horse requires us to explain. There is no
proposition Pf where P is a predicate ‘is a function’; in other words, there is no
propositional function ‘x is a function’. But there is a judgement f : (β)α assigning
f to a type of functions. Frege did distinguish judgements and propositions in this
sense. But he recognized only one form of judgement ` A; he did not recognize type
predications as a form of judgement. To recognize and explain type predications is,
however, just what is needed in order to account for the problem of the concept horse.
Following Martin-Löf, let us call what stands to the left of the colon in a judgement
of constructive type theory the subject of the judgement, and what stands to the right
its predicate.153 As appears from the foregoing discussion the predicate of a judgement
need not be a type. Firstly, in the first rule of type formation the predicate is type,
and type is not itself a type. Secondly, the predicate of a hypothetical judgement is
not a type. Thus
type [x : β]
α [x : β]
are both genuine predicates (provided β is a type), namely of the judgements
α : type [x : β]
a : α [x : β]
but they are not types, for they are not constructed by means of the type formation
rules. Hence we must distinguish between predications of the form a : α where α is
a type, and predications of the form a : C , where C is any predicate. Martin-Löf
suggests to call a category anything that can be the predicate of a judgement of con-
structive type theory. If we recall section 1.2 of chapter 1 above, we see that this is
in line with one meaning of the Greek word katēgoria as employed by Aristotle; but
that it is not quite in line with Aristotle’s designation of what we call his categories,
for these Aristotle called, not katēgoriai, but rather genē tōn katēgoriōn, classes of
153For this and for the interpretation of categories in constructive type theory reported below, see for
instance Martin-Löf (2013, Lecture 1).
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predicates; so a system of Aristotelian categories is not primarily a system of pred-
icates, but a system of classes of predicates. Given the type-theoretical framework
Martin-Löf’s designation is, however, a natural one, since the notion of a category is
now the most general notion of a concept: certainly more general than the notion of
a set, but also more general than the notion of a type. We have namely that any set
is a type and any type is a category, while not all categories are types and not all
types are sets.
4.2.5. Notions of function. Elements of dependent function types (x : β)α con-
form to one notion of function; we shall call elements of function types mappings.154
Another notion of function is that of a dependent object ; a dependent object is an
object of the category α [x : β]. What it means to be an element of the category
α [x : β] is explained by explaining the two forms of judgement
(3) a : α [x : β]
(4) a = a′ : α [x : β]
The form of judgement (3) is the form of judgement (Hypo) explained on page 154
above. Judgement (4) is explained by saying that
a〈b/x〉 = a′〈b/x〉 : α〈b/x〉 provided b : β
Thus we explain both what a mapping is and what a dependent object is by saying
how it is applied to elements in its domain. We explained the judgement f : (x : β)α
in part by laying it down that the following rule is valid
f : (x : β)α b : β
f(b) : α〈b/x〉
A mapping f of type (x : β)α is thus something that when applied to any element
b of β yields an element f(b) of type α〈b/x〉. The notion of application proper to
mappings is a primitive notion. It is part of the explanation of elements of function
types that they are such things that can be applied to certain things to yield values
(recall our discussion of Fregean functions in section 1.1). From the explanation of
the judgement a : α [x : β] it follows that this rule is valid:
a : α [x : β] b : β
a〈b/x〉 : α〈b/x〉
A dependent object a is thus something that when an element b of β is substituted
for x in it, we get an element a〈b/x〉 of type α〈b/x〉. Substitution is also a primitive
notion, but it does not coincide with the notion of application proper to mappings.
154The distinction between three notions of function drawn in what follows stems from Martin-Löf; for an
account in print, cf. Sundholm (2012a, pp. 953–954).
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Substitution is in a sense more general than application, since it is explained for
all objects—or expressions, if one prefers—of the theory, including types themselves.
Substitution is usually dealt with in the metalanguage of a theory, but it has been
shown that it can be made a part of constructive type theory itself.155 With sub-
stitution included in the theory an expression such as a〈b/x〉 will be a proper part
of the theory and not a shorthand notation in the metalanguage for “the result of
substituting b for x in a.”
Given a dependent object a, we may form a mapping (x)a by abstraction:
(Abstr)
a : α [x : β]
(x)a : (x : β)α
Let us consider two examples. (i) Addition of natural numbers is defined in con-
structive type theory by means of the the recursion operator R introduced in the
elimination rule for N .156 Hence we may define a dependent object 2n as follows
2n ≡ n+ n : N [n : N ]
From the dependent object 2n, of the category N [n : N ], we may form the mapping
(n)2n of type (N)N by abstraction. (ii) There is a binary operator + on set by means
of which the disjoint union of two sets are formed. Hence we may define a dependent
object 2X as follows
2X ≡ X +X : set [X : set]
From the dependent object 2X, of the category set [X : set], we may form the mapping
(X)2X of the type (set)set by abstraction. To obtain a mapping from the dependent
object
X + Y : set [X : set, Y : set]
two rounds of abstraction are needed. First we form the dependent object
(Y )X + Y : (set)set [X : set]
and then we form the mapping
(X)(Y )X + Y : (set)(set)set.
This mapping is of course equal to the mapping + itself.157
Neither a mapping nor a dependent object is an individual, i.e. an element of
a set. Both of these notions of function must therefore be distinguished from the
155For the technical details of this, see Tasistro (1993).
156Cf. Martin-Löf (1984, pp. 71–74).
157This follows by the rule of η-conversion:
(x)(f(x)) = f
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notion of function as an iterative set of a certain kind, namely a set of ordered pairs
f ⊆ X × Y such that for all x ∈ X there is at most one y ∈ Y with 〈x, y〉 ∈ f ; and
from the notion of function as a Fregean course-of-values. Within their respective
frameworks both sets of ordered pairs and Fregean courses-of-values are individuals.
Here is therefore a third notion of function. In constructive type theory a function of
this kind is an element of the set Π(A,B). Such a Π-set, as I shall call it, is formed
by the following rule
A : set B : (A)set
Π(A,B) : set
Hence, given a set A and a mapping B from A into set, we can form the set Π(A,B).
The introduction rule for Π-sets is the following
A : set B : (A)set f : (x : A)B(x)
λ(f) : Π(A,B)
Let us go through this rule in detail. We are given a set A and a mapping B from
the set A into set. This means that
B(x) : set [x : A]
In other words, the result of applying B to x is a set B(x) whenever x is an element
of A. From the rules of type formation it follows that
(x : A)B(x) : type
We are, finally, given an element f of this type (x : A)B(x). The introduction rule for
Π-sets allows us to form the individual λ(f), a canonical element of the set Π(A,B).
We may think of it as an individual coding the mapping f . Objects that evaluate to
the form λ(f) for some mapping f are thus the pendants in constructive type theory
of functions in the sense of set theory and of Fregean courses-of-values. We must now
ask how such an object is applied to an argument.
In the definition of a function as a set of ordered pairs of a certain kind it is not
said what it means to apply such a set to an argument. It is therefore misleading
then to write f(x) without any further explanation. This is a piece of notation that
must be explained. In axiomatic set theory that explanation is given by means of a
contextual definition of the term f(x). If ϕ is a formula satisfying
T ` (∀x ∈ a)(∃!y ∈ b)ϕ(x, y)
where x does not occur free in f . The mapping to the left of the equality sign here is obtained as
follows. One starts with a mapping f of type (x : α)β. Then f(x) : β [x : α]. Hence, by abstraction,
(x)(f(x)) : (x : α)β. The rule of η-conversion states that this mapping (x)(f(x)) is equal to f .
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for certain sets a and b, then one defines
(f(x) = y) ≡ (x ∈ a) ∧ (y ∈ b) ∧ ϕ(x, y)
It is thus the equation f(x) = y that is defined, and not the term f(x) itself. An
expression of the form ψ(f(x)) is then understood to be of the form ∃y(f(x) = y ∧
ψ(y)). This treatment of the term ‘f(x)’ may well suffice for the purely mathematical
purposes of axiomatic set theory, but it is questionable whether it suffices as a piece
of conceptual analysis. For if this manner of dealing with functional expressions in
any way reflects our own dealings with such expressions, it should be the case that
we do not understand expressions like 2 + 2 outside the context of an equation; but
no such case has been made, nor, I think, can one be made. If I say that 2 + 2 is
an even number what I mean to say is that 2 + 2 is an even number and not that
there is some number n such that 2 + 2 = n and n is an even number. Neither is
it convincing to claim that the proposed analysis somehow improves on our ordinary
understanding of functional expressions, which if left unfettered may lead us into
philosophical problems like those pertaining to the golden mountain or the king of
France. For those problems arise from the fact that a meaningful expression has no
reference; but the expression ‘f(x)’ is meaningful only if f(x) exists. So there appears
to be no reason other than technical convenience for analyzing functional expressions
away in the manner of set theory.
A better alternative, therefore, is to make use of an application operator ap(f, x)
and define f(x) ≡ ap(f, x). A regress argument shows that this operator cannot
itself be construed as a set of ordered pairs, or indeed as an individual of any kind
whatsoever.158 For if ap is an individual then we shall have the problem of accounting
for the term ‘ap(f, x)’, which cannot be accounted for solely on the basis of how ap is
explained, namely as an individual of a certain kind. The application operator ap can
therefore not be an individual. Hence, Frege’s application operator ξ_ζ is a binary
function in his sense, in particular it is not itself an object in Frege’s sense (Gg § 34).
In constructive type theory ap is a mapping, i.e. an element of a dependent function
type. Given an element c of the set Π(A,B) and an element a of the set A, we justify
the judgement ap(c, a) : B(a) as follows. When we evaluate c to canonical form we
get something of the form λ(f), where f is a mapping of type (x : A)B(x). We define
158The argument closely resembles Bradley’s regress argument. It is found e.g. in Dummett (1973, pp.
251–252), and in a somewhat different form in Frege’s BG pp. 204–205.
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ap(c, a) to be f(a). Hence the following two rules are valid:159
c : Π(A,B) a : A
ap(c, a) : B(a)
f : (x : A)B(x) a : A
ap(λ(f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
It should now be clear that the notion of mapping is more fundamental than the
notion of an element of a Π-set. Firstly, in laying down what a canonical element of a
Π-set is we appeal to a certain mapping: the canonical element λ(f) is formed from
the mapping f given in the premiss of the introduction rule. Secondly, in order to
say how an element of a Π-set is applied to an individual we must appeal both to the
ap-mapping and to the mapping f from which the canonical element λ(f) is formed.
Since ap is a mapping, its application to the arguments c and a is primitive, and not
to be explained by means of any further notions.
Being a mapping, ap belongs to a dependent function type. It may be instructive
to see which type this is. The ap-mapping takes an element of Π(A,B) and an element
a of A and yields an element of the set B(a). The set A, the mapping B of type (A)set,
and the set Π(A,B) must therefore all be included in the typing of ap. Using the
letters X and Y in place of A and B one sees that
ap : (X : set)(Y : (X)set)(Π(X,Y ))(x : X)B(x)
The mapping ap is thus in fact a quarternary function taking a set X, a mapping Y
in (X)set, an element of Π(X,Y ), and an element x of X, and yielding an element
of B(x). Note the use of the dependent function type here: the type of each of the
three last arguments of ap depends on at least one previous argument. Hence, if the
first argument of ap is some set A, then the type of the second argument must be
(A)set; if the second argument is some mapping B of type (A)set, then the type of the
third argument must be Π(A,B); the type of the fourth argument must be A. Similar
considerations apply to the λ-operator, used for constructing the canonical elements
of Π-sets. It is in fact a ternary function, taking a set A, a mapping B of type (A)set,
and an element f of type (x : A)B(x), and yielding an element λ(A,B, f) of type
Π(A,B). It is therefore typed as follows
λ : (X : set)(Y : (X)set)((x : X)Y (x))Π(X,Y )
For convenience we shall omit the two first arguments both of λ and of ap.
The λ-operator takes a mapping f and yields an individual λ(f). It may therefore
be regarded as a nominalization operator, taking a higher-order entity and yielding a
first-order entity. From the typing of λ one sees that it is applicable to the mapping
159These are the rules of Π-elimination and Π-equality presented by Martin-Löf (1984, p. 28–29). A more
general form of these rules are found in (ibid., Preface) and Nordström et al. (1990, pp. 51–52).
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f only if the domain of f is a set, that is, only if f is of type (x : A)B(x), where A
is a set. It is natural to ask whether there can be nominalization also if the domain
of f is not a set, if it for instance is set itself. There cannot be; at least there cannot
be any set of the form “Π(set, B)” explained along the lines of Π-sets. For assume
that there were such a set. The canonical forms of its elements would be λ(f), where
f would be a mapping of the type (X : set)B(X), where B is a mapping of type
(set)set. The domain of the mapping f would thus be set. Hence if Π(set, B) itself
were a set, it would be included in the domain of f . But then an arbitrary canonical
element λ(f) of Π(set, B) would be the nominalization of a mapping f whose domain
would include Π(set, B) itself. Hence the set Π(set, B) would have to be explained
in terms of itself. For in defining a set we must lay down how its canonical elements
are formed, and canonical elements of Π(set, B) would be formed from mappings f
whose domain would include the set Π(set, B). We should therefore not be able to
give a non-circular definition of Π(set, B). Hence it cannot be admitted as a set in
constructive type theory.
5. Sortals, identity, and generality
For something to serve as a basic domain in logic it has not only to be a range
of significance: it must also be a domain of quantification. Quantification, however,
requires individuation. In this section we first consider concepts that serve individua-
tion; thereafter we consider the notion of a domain of generality, of which the notion
of a domain of quantification is a special case.
5.1. Sortals. The distinction drawn in constructive type theory between a set
and a propositional function defined over that set corresponds closely to the distinc-
tion drawn by Strawson (1959, p. 168) in an ontological turn of phrase between sortal
and characterizing universals, and by Geach (1962, p. 39) in a more linguistic turn
of phrase between substantival and adjectival general terms. In later literature what
Strawson calls sortal universals and Geach substantival general terms have also been
called sortal concepts, sortal predicates, etc., or simply sortals;160 for the most part
of what follows we shall employ the latter term. A sortal universal, or substantival
general term, A comes equipped with what Geach calls a criterion of identity,161 “that
160The adjective ‘sortal’ was coined by Locke, Essay III.iii.15 on the pattern of how ‘general’ is formed
from ‘genus’ (Locke used ‘sort’ as an English equivalent of both ‘genus’ (III.iii.15) and ‘species’ (III.iii.12)).
The earliest use of the noun ‘sortal’ I have seen is in Wallace (1965, p. 10).
161This phrase occurs in Austin’s translation of Frege’s Grundlagen, namely of Frege’s ‘Kennzeichen für die
Gleichheit’ (GLA § 62). It is unclear to me whether Frege with this phrase intended what later philosophers
have intended with the term ‘criterion of identity’ (note, for instance, the difference between the criterion
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in accordance with which we judge as to identity” (Geach, 1962, p. 39), or in Straw-
son’s terminology “a principle for distinguishing and counting individual particulars”
(Strawson, 1959, p. 168). A characterizing universal, or adjectival general term, by
contrast, presupposes such a criterion, since its role is to supply a “principle of group-
ing” particulars already distinguished. Thus, ‘apple’ is a sortal universal, say, since
it provides a principle for distinguishing and counting those individual particulars we
call apples, while ‘red’ is a characterizing universal, supplying for instance a principle
for grouping apples into red and non-red apples.
A set A in constructive type theory comes equipped with a criterion identity:
that is what one lays down in explaining what equal canonical elements of A are.
The definition of a propositional function over a set presupposes the definition of that
set, hence in particular it presupposes its criterion of identity. Sets thus have the
role of sortals while propositional functions over sets have the role of characterizing
universals. There is a further point of similarity between sortals and sets. As empha-
sized by Wiggins (1967, 2001) a sortal provides an answer to the question of what
an individual is. Confronted with an individual and the question, What is it?, any
appropriate answer is a sortal. Likewise it is a characteristic of sets in constructive
type theory, in contrast to for instance iterative sets, that they provide such answers,
being domains of individuals.
Dummett (1973) pairs the notion of criterion of identity with the notion of crite-
rion of application, that which determines when it is correct to apply a predicate to
an individual. In constructive type theory the criterion of application associated with
a set is contained in the explanation of how the canonical elements of that set are
formed. Recall the four introduction rules for the set N of natural numbers, stated




The other two give its criterion of identity:
0 = 0 : N
n = m : N
s(n) = s(m) : N
As these rules illustrate, the criterion of application of a set A is conceptually prior
to its criterion of identity: in stating that a is the same A as b I presuppose that a
is an A and that b is an A. Dummett (1973, p. 75) holds that some adjectival terms
are not associated with any criterion of identity, though they are associated with a
criterion of application. The adjectival term ‘red’, for instance, provides no criterion
for being awarded a cum laude and a ‘Kennzeichen’ of having been awarded it—‘criterion’ apparently has
this ambiguity, as noted by Geach 1973, p. 288).
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of identity, but when we say that something is red we seem to rely on a criterion
of application. Adjectival terms in general would therefore seem to bring out the
conceptual priority of criteria of application over criteria of identity, since they are
associated with criteria of application but not with criteria of identity.
It is doubtful, however, whether this analysis of adjectival terms is correct. Let
us recall the distinction between type predications and ordinary predications: a type
predication is one to the effect that something is an object of a certain type, while an
ordinary predication is one to the effect that a certain object whose type has already
been laid down has a certain property, that two objects whose types already have
been laid down stand in a certain relation, etc. From the example of the set N we
see that something’s satisfying the criteria of application or identity of a sortal is
expressed in a type predication, a : A or a = b : A. That an individual satisfies an
adjectival term, that for instance a number is even or an apple is red, is, by contrast,
expressed in an ordinary predication ‘Pa true’. The sense in which the apple can
be said to satisfy a purported criterion of application associated with the adjective
‘red’ is thus quite different from the sense in which it is said to satisfy the criterion of
application associated with the sortal ‘apple’: the one case is expressed by means of
a type predication and the other by means of an ordinary predication. It may help to
consider a predicate P defined over A and true for every element of A. Even though
the judgement ‘Pa true’ as well as the judgement a : A in some sense expresses the
A-hood of a, only the latter is a judgement to the effect that a satisfies the criterion
of application associated with A. The former judgement ‘Pa true’ presupposes that
a satisfies this criterion of application, and a fortiori is not a judgement to the effect
that it does satisfy it. It is thus only on the strength of an equivocation of type
predications and ordinary predications that we may talk about criteria of application
associated with adjectives.
Dummett offers an account of categories in terms of the notion of criterion of
identity.162 The account, presented at (Dummett, 1973, pp. 75–76), starts from the
assumption that two sortals may be associated with the same criterion of identity.
If A and B are two sortals associated with the same criterion of identity, then it is
further assumed that there is a sortal C such that both anything which is an A is a
C and anything which is a B is a C. Writing A ∼ B to denote that A and B are
associated with the same criterion of identity and making intuitive use of the ⊂-sign,
this assumption can be expressed as follows:
162Similar accounts of categories are given by Hale and Wright (2001, p. 389) and by Linnebo (2005, p.
215).
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If A ∼ B, then there is a C such that A ⊂ C and B ⊂ C.
Dummett finally assumes that among all sortals associated with the same criterion of
identity there is a most general sortal, namely a sortal C such that if A is associated
with the same criterion of identity as C, then anything which is an A is a C. This
assumption can be expressed as follows:
For any A there is a C such that A ∼ C, and B ⊂ C whenever B ∼ C.
Dummett identifies a category with such a C, what is sometimes called an “ultimate
sortal.”163 Categories are thus identified with the most general sortals, sortals that
are not subordinate to any other sortals.
From Dummett’s account of categories it seems as if the criterion of identity of a
sortal A is conceptually prior to the category C under which A falls: for the category
C is defined as the most general sortal with the same criterion of identity as A. The
actual order of conceptual priority is, however, the reverse. The criterion of identity
associated with A is, namely, the same as that associated with C; but the criterion of
identity associated with C presupposes the criterion of application associated with C.
The criterion of identity associated with A, being the same as that associated with C,
therefore also presupposes the criterion of application associated with C. Hence, both
the criterion of application and the criterion of identity associated with a category,
whence also the category itself, is conceptually prior to the sortals subordinate to it.
The picture can therefore not be as suggested by Dummett’s definition, namely that
we obtain a category by considering more and more general sortals. The picture must
rather be that we start with a category and obtain more and more specific sortals
by adding characteristics, thereby altering the criterion of application while keeping
the criterion of identity constant. We must thus regard the category as supplying
the criterion of identity of these sortals. The resulting structure is presumably a tree
structure with categories at top nodes; it is therefore similar to the structure of a tree
of genera and species with categories at top nodes. The adding of characteristics to a
sortal in order to obtain a more specific sortal corresponds in the traditional theory
of genus and species to the adding of a differentia to a genus.
Both sortals and Ryle–Sommers types correspond to sets in constructive type
theory: sortals by being associated with criteria of application and identity, and by
providing answers to the question of what an individual is; Ryle–Sommers types
by being the ranges of significance of predicates of individuals. That sortals and
Ryle–Sommers types thus in a way complement each other appears, however, to
have passed without much notice in the literature. In the works of Ryle, Sommers,
163For instance by Stevenson (1975, p. 195), Griffin (1977, e.g. p. 77), and Westerhoff (2005, p. 59–63).
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Goddard, and others on the notion of range of significance it has not been asked
whether such ranges are associated with criteria of identity and application. And for
instance in the logic of sortals developed by Stevenson (1975) the notion of range of
significance is altogether ignored. Stevenson’s logical system contains sortal terms
in addition to ordinary predicates, but these predicates are not restricted in their
range of significance to sortals, but defined over the whole universe of individuals. In
constructive type theory, by contrast, sets are associated with criteria of application
and identity, and they serve as the ranges of significance of predicates. The notion
of set in constructive type theory therefore absorbs both the notion of sortal and the
notion of type as a range of significance.
5.1.1. Identity. The doctrine of restricted identity may be described roughly as
the doctrine that identity is restricted to a sortal. Some such doctrine seems a nat-
ural consequence of the doctrine that sortals are associated with criteria of identity:
if the criterion identity associated with S differs from that associated S′ one would
feel inclined to say that what identity means in S is different from what identity
means in S′. This intuition cannot be satisfactorily dealt with in simple type theory.
A restricted identity relation will need to be ternary, x =S y, with a third argu-
ment for the sortal S, and that is straightforward enough. The type of this ternary
identity relation in the simple type hierarchy, however, will be ((ι)o)(ι)(ι)o, taking
a propositional function S and two individuals, and yielding a proposition; and that
is problematic. For a =S b will then be a proposition no matter which individuals
a and b are. In particular, relying on simple type theory one is forced to say that
a =S b is a proposition even if either a or b is not an S.164 But if either a or b is not
an S, then the criterion of identity associated with S does not apply, hence it would
seem that the relation x =S y is undefined for the pair of a and b: which criterion
of identity would one be relying on in judging either that a =S b is false or that it
is true? Not the criterion associated with S, for that does not apply to a, say; and,
by the meaning of x =S y, not the criterion associated with some other sortal S′. If
in this case no criterion is needed, then one might wonder why a criterion is needed
when judging whether a =S b where a is an S and b is an S. We seem forced to say
that a =S b is meaningless if either a or b is not an S. This means that identity is
of dependent type, since the type of the x- and the y-argument in x =S y depends
on which S is chosen. In order to make sense of the doctrine of restricted identity we
therefore need a dependent type hierarchy.
164From the the relevant clause in the definition of satisfaction in Stevenson’s system it appears that the
formula x =S y is false if x or y are not assigned elements of S (cf. Stevenson, 1975, p. 198).
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The doctrine is made good sense of by the notion of propositional identity in
constructive type theory, that is, the notion of identity encapsulated by I-sets (cf.
p. 142 above). The ternary identity relation I is a mapping of the dependent function
type (X : set)(X)(X)prop. Identity is thus a mapping that yields the proposition
I(A, a, b) for any set A and elements a and b of A. The binary relation of identity
on a set A, the relation (x)(y)I(A, x, y), is of type (A)(A)prop, hence it is undefined
for individuals not in the set A. Constructive type theory thus supports what Griffin
(1977, p. 97), taking a clue from Dummett (1973, p. 550), calls the function thesis:
identity is a function from sortals to relations. Dummett (loc. cit.) adds to this
that the sense of the identity relation associated with a given sortal is uniformly
related to this sortal. Such is precisely the case in constructive type theory, where
the introduction rule of the set I(A, a, a) is uniform in A and a, as follows:
A : set a : A
r(A, a) : I(A, a, a)
Identity is thus absolute: there is only one identity relation, namely the mapping I.
The doctrine of restricted identity must therefore be distinguished from the doctrine of
relative identity, known from the philosophical literature.165 According to the doctrine
of relative identity there may be two identity relations defined over one and the same
sortal: the individuals a and b, falling under the same sortal, may be identical A’s but
non-identical B’s. This doctrine is therefore not consistent with the function thesis,166
hence, neither is it consistent with the notion of identity encapsulated by the I-sets
of constructive type theory.
5.2. Quantification and generality. A domain of quantification is the domain
over which a quantifier ranges, and which must be appealed to in giving the truth-
conditions of propositions in which the quantifier occurs. The domain of quantification
is often indicated in English by a noun phrase following the determiner ‘every’, ‘any’,
‘some’, ‘a’, etc., as in ‘every bottle is empty’ or ‘some books were stolen’. Even when
this is not the case, as in ‘I have tried everything’ or ‘everyone is on board’, where
the determiner ‘every’ has been glued to the dummy nouns ‘thing’ and ‘one’, the
165Geach defends both restricted and relative identity (cf. his 1962, pp. 38–40, 157, 1972, pp. 238–249, and
1973); Wiggins (2001) defends restricted identity, but rejects relative identity (cf. esp. pp. 21–76); while
Griffin (1977) holds the more idiosyncratic position that rejects restricted identity but defends relative
identity.
166Pace Griffin (1977, p. 98), who claims that “the function thesis plainly derives its plausibility from (R),”
i.e. from the doctrine of relative identity.
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context usually supplies a domain.167 In ordinary predicate logic a quantifier has the
form ∀x or ∃x for some variable x. Here the domain of quantification is therefore not
made explicit; that a quantifier of predicate logic nevertheless is associated with a
domain is a basic assumption of model theory, where the domain of quantification is
just the domain of the model (or one of its domains if the language is many-sorted).
Constructive type theory differs from ordinary predicate logic by including reference
to the domain of quantification in the syntactic form of the quantifier: the universal
quantifier is there written (∀x : A), where A is a set.
According to the analysis of the syntax of quantified propositions provided by
Frege in the Grundgesetze and followed by most logicians since,168 such a proposition
is obtained by applying a quantifier to a propositional function: given a propositional
function Px we may form the quantified proposition ∀xPx. From this we see that
the domain of the quantifier in ∀xPx cannot exceed the range of significance of the
propositional function Px. For, by definition it is only for elements a in the range of
significance |P | of Px that Pa is a proposition; hence it is only the elements in |P |
that one may draw upon in explaining the truth-conditions of ∀xPx. On the other
hand, since the range of significance |P | consists of the range of values for which Px is
either true or false, it is clear that they must all be appealed to in explaining the truth-
conditions of ∀xPx. Hence the quantifier in ∀xPx must be taken to range over all
the values in the range of significance of Px. We conclude—as already Russell (1908,
p. 234) did on the basis of a similar argument—that the domain of quantification of
a quantified proposition coincides with a range of significance.
This connection between domains of quantification and ranges of significance
appears to be ignored in most of the literature on the question of absolute generality,169
the question of whether it is possible to quantify over “absolutely everything.” An
answer to this question depends on an answer to the question of whether there is
a universal range of significance: only if there is a universal range of significance is
there a universal domain of quantification. In the literature discussing the question
of absolute generality it appears to be generally assumed that there are propositional
functions with the universal range of significance. In particular, it appears to be
assumed by all parties of the debate that x = x is such a function. To be more
precise, it appears to be assumed by all parties of the debate that if the notion of
167The context plays a role also in utterances of ‘every bottle is empty’, for the noun ‘bottle’ does not by
itself determine a domain of quantification; see Stanley and Gendler Szabó (2000) for a discussion of this
phenomenon of so-called “quantifier domain restriction.”
168Geach (1962, pp. 178–180) is perhaps an exception.
169For instance Williamson (2003), Glanzberg (2004), and the anthology of Rayo and Uzquiano (2006).
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“absolutely everything” makes sense, then there is a propositional function x = x
ranging over that domain; the main point of contention is then whether the notion
of “absolutely everything” does in fact make sense, and if so, whether it supplies a
domain of quantification. That assumption, however, requires argument, and our
previous discussion of ranges of significance and of identity shows that convincing
arguments are hard to find. Our considerations in sections 2–4 regarding the ranges
of significance of propositional functions apply of course as well to the propositional
function x = x. In the case of identity the considerations of the previous section 5.1.1
apply in addition. If one accepts the division of individuals into sortals and views
these as associated with criteria of identity, then one seems committed to a doctrine
of restricted identity. But according to such a doctrine the range of significance of
the propositional function x =S y must be the sortal S and not the whole universe.
Thus, any domain of quantification is a range of significance; is any range of
significance a domain of quantification? Recall the rule of formation of Π-sets:
A : set B : (A)set
Π(A,B) : set
Since prop = set this rule can also be written
A : set B : (A)prop
Π(A,B) : prop
To assert that the proposition Π(A,B) thus formed is true is to assert that it is
inhabited. We may assert that provided we have found a member c of Π(A,B). This
object c has the property that given any element a of the set A, ap(c, a) is an element,
i.e. a proof object, of the proposition B(a). Following the so-called Brouwer–Heyting–
Kolmogorov interpretation of the logical constants, c may therefore be regarded as a
proof object of the proposition (∀x : A)B.170 Hence we may define
(∀x : A)B = Π(A,B) : prop
As Π(A,B) can be formed for any set A and any propositional function B : (A)prop, it
follows that any set is a domain of quantification, namely the domain being quantified
over in the proposition (∀x : A)B. Let us reserve the term ‘quantification’ for this
notion of generality, that is, the notion of generality thus captured by Π-sets. We
shall soon see that constructive type theory also knows other notions of generality.
170A standard formulation of the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation is found in Troelstra and
van Dalen (1988, pp. 9–10); see Sundholm (1983) for its philosophy and history.
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Let A be a set. Then (x : A)I(A, x, x) is a dependent function type. By the
introduction rule for I-sets,
A : set a : A
r(A, a) : I(A, a, a)
there is a mapping (x)r(A, x) of type (x : A)I(A, x, x) taking an element a of A and
yielding a proof object r(A, a) of I(A, a, a). The introduction rule for Π-sets then
gives us
λ((x)r(A, x)) : (∀x : A)I(A, x, x)
By omitting the proof object λ((x)r(A, x)) we obtain the judgement that every ele-
ment of A is equal to itself:
(∀x : A)I(A, x, x) true
Here A is a given set. The law of identity states, however, not that every element of
some particular set is equal to itself, but that any element of any set whatsoever is
equal to itself. The law thus involves generality over sets.
We saw above that there is no set of the of the form Π(set, B). Hence there is no
proposition of the form (∀x : set)B, where B is a propositional function over set. In
particular there is no proposition of the form “(∀X : set)(∀x : X)I(X,x, x),” which
would express the law of identity. But consider the following judgement
(X)(x)r(X,x) : (X : set)(x : X)I(X,x, x)
It can be derived in a chain of reasoning similar to the one just carried out where
we let X be an arbitrary set on which we abstract in a final step.171 The mapping
(X)(x)r(X,x) thus asserted to exist takes a set X and an element x of X, and yields
an element, i.e. a proof, r(X,x) of the proposition I(X,x, x). The judgement therefore
asserts that the proposition I(X,x, x) is inhabited for any set X and element x of X;
that is, it asserts the law of identity. By demonstrating that the type
(X : set)(x : X)I(X,x, x)
171Here is a formalized version of the reasoning:
X : set [X : set] x : X [x : X]
r(X,x) : I(X,x, x) [X : set, x : X]
(x)r(X,x) : (x : X)I(X,x, x) [X : set]
(X)(x)r(X,x) : (X : set)(x : X)I(X,x, x)
The first inference uses I-introduction, and the next two uses (Abstr), given on page 158 above.
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is inhabited, we have thus been able to demonstrate a judgement in which there is
generality over set. Let us call a type of the form
(x1 : α1) . . . (xn : αn)B(x1, . . . , xn)
where B(x1, . . . , xn) is a proposition provided x1 : α1, . . . , xn : αn, a generality
type.172 The types α1, . . . , αn will be called the domains of the generality type. A
judgement of the form
b : (x1 : α1) . . . (xn : αn)B(x1, . . . , xn)
will be called a type general judgement. Here bmay be regarded as a verification object
of the generality type (x1 : α1) . . . (xn : αn)B(x1, . . . , xn). It takes any elements
a1, . . . , an of α1, . . . , αn respectively and yields a proof object b(a1, . . . , an) of the
proposition B(a1, . . . , an). We call b a verification object and reserve the term ‘proof
object’ for individuals, namely for the verification objects of propositions.
We can now answer our question. A propositional function is an element of a
type (α)prop where α can be any type. Hence, any type may serve as a range of
significance. A range of significance is of course the range of significance of some
propositional function. Hence, any range of significance is a type. Moreover, any
type is the domain of some generality type; hence any range of significance is the
domain of a generality type. However, not every range of significance is a domain of
quantification; the type set, for instance, is not. In fact, the type α is a domain of
quantification if and only if α is a set. Hence, although every range of significance
is the domain of a generality type, not every range of significance is a domain of
quantification.
This, then, answers our question; but the answer raises a new question. The
introduction rule for Π-sets allows us to form an object λ(f) : Π(A,B) from the
mapping f : (x : A)B(x). Hence, the rule allows us to pass from the generality type
(x : A)B(x) to the quantified proposition λ(f) : Π(A,B), and from the verification
object f , which is not an individual, to the proof object λ(f), which is an individual.
Since the type general judgement f : (x : A)B(x), occurring as a premiss of the rule,
172Generality types stand to universally quantified propositions roughly as what Sundholm (1997, p. 206–
208) calls closed consequences stand to implications. A closed consequence is a type
(A1) . . . (An)B
where A1, . . . , An, B all are propositions. The corresponding implication is
A1 ⊃ (. . . ⊃ (An ⊃ B ) . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
The verification object of a closed consequence is a mapping, while the verification object of an implication
is an individual, namely an element of a Π-set.
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is already a judgement of generality, the question arises what the point is of a rule
for forming Π-sets and an operator λ for nominalizing verification objects f of type
(x : A)B(x). Is it not sufficient to have a rule for forming generality types (x : α)B(x)
and a rule of abstraction for forming verification objects of type general judgements?
It is not sufficient if we are to incorporate predicate logic into constructive type
theory. For that requires identifying the operators of predicate logic—the connec-
tives and the quantifiers—with elements in the dependent type hierarchy. Only by
identifying these operators with elements of the hierarchy can we honour the basic
tenet of type theory that all symbols of the language be assigned a type. But there
is no element in the dependent type hierarchy corresponding to the construction of
the generality type (x : α)B from a type α and a propositional function B over α.
When we pass from a propositional function over a type to a generality type we do
not apply an operator to the former so as to obtain the latter. The formation of a
generality type is rather an instance of dependent function type formation, which is
a primitive of the theory, just as the application of a mapping to an argument is a
primitive. By contrast, there is an element of the dependent type hierarchy by which
a quantified proposition is formed from a set and a propositional function over that
set: that is the mapping Π. It, and therefore the quantifier ∀, is a mapping of type
(X : set)(Y : (X)prop)prop. Only quantified propositions, thus, and not generality
types are formed by means of an operator of the type hierarchy. We must therefore
recognize both notions of generality: quantified propositions and generality types.
The type set, hence also prop, may be the domain of a generality type, but not
of a quantified proposition. Generality types therefore provide for a notion of higher-
order generality. It differs from higher-order quantification in predicate logic. The
result of applying a higher-order quantifier to a propositional function is a new propo-
sition, to which, therefore, the propositional connectives are applicable. A generality
type is, however, not a proposition, but a dependent function type. The notion of
generality provided for by generality types also differs from what is sometimes called
schematic generality.173 This is the kind of generality involved in the assertion of
axiom schemes, such as induction in arithmetic or replacement in set theory. A gen-
erality type, namely, involves binding, which schematic generality does not. This
comes out clearly when we consider negation and denial. One cannot deny a judge-
ment of schematic generality by another another judgement of schematic generality.
173That difference is utilized in Sundholm (2013) in order to transform the so-called Kripke schema into a
principle.
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One can, for instance, not deny the axiom of replacement
∀a[(∀x ∈ a)∃!y ϕ(x, y) ⊃ ∃b (∀x ∈ a)(∃y ∈ b)ϕ(x, y)]
where the variables range of iterative sets, by asserting the following schema:
¬∀a[(∀x ∈ a)∃!y ϕ(x, y) ⊃ ∃b (∀x ∈ a)(∃y ∈ b)ϕ(x, y)]
A generality type, by contrast, may occur within the scope of a negation. Let us see
how. The negation ¬A of a proposition A can be defined as A ⊃ ⊥, where ⊥ is a false
propositional constant. In constructive type theory the set N0 is such a constant,
hence we may define
⊥ = N0 : set
This set has no introduction rule, hence it is empty, and therefore false as a proposi-
tion. The implication A ⊃ B is treated in constructive type theory as a special case
of a Π-set. Assume that C : (A)set is a mapping satisfying C(x) = B for every x in
A. Then a proof object of Π(A,C) is an object d with the property that ap(d, a) is an
element of C(a) = B provided a is an element of A. Hence, in accordance with the
Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation of the logical constants, we may define
A ⊃ B = Π(A,C) : prop. A proof object of A ⊃ B is thus a lambda term λ(f) derived
from a mapping f : (A)B.
By setting B = ⊥ in the above we see that ¬A = Π(A,C), where C is a proposi-
tional function over A such that C(a) = ⊥ for every a in A. A proof object of ¬A is
therefore a lambda term λ(f) derived from a mapping f : (A)⊥. To assert that such
a mapping exists, that is, to make the judgement
f : (A)⊥
is to deny that A is true, for that is to assert that any proof object of A can be
mapped to a proof object of ⊥, while there are no proof objects of ⊥. In general, if
α is a type, then f : (α)⊥ in effect asserts that α is empty. Hence we may think of
(α)⊥
as the negation of the type α. If α here is a generality type, (α)⊥ is its negation. Let
us consider an example, namely the negation of the generality type
(X : set)(x : X)(y : X)I(X,x, y)
A verification object of this type would be a mapping taking any set X and any two
elements x and y of X to a proof object of the proposition I(X,x, y), the proposition
that x and y are equal. Assume the generality type to be inhabited; that is, assume
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the judgement
(J) z : (X : set)(x : X)(y : X)I(X,x, y)
Thus we are assuming that for any set X all pairs of elements x, y of that set are
equal. If we apply the z provided by this assumption (J) to the set N and its elements
0 and s(0) we obtain a proof object z(N, 0, s(0)) of I(N, 0, s(0)). Now, a judgement
of the form
c : ¬I(N, 0, s(0))
can be demonstrated if one assumes the existence of what is called a universe in con-
structive type theory.174 Applying this proof object c of ¬I(N, 0, s(0)) to z(N, 0, s(0))
of I(N, 0, s(0)) we obtain an element ap(c, z(N, 0, s(0))) of ⊥. Thus we have demon-
strated the hypothetical judgement
ap
(
c, z(N, 0, s(0))
)
: ⊥ [z : (X : set)(x : X)(y : X)I(X,x, y)]
By the rule (Abstr) of abstraction, given on page 158 above, we can infer
(z)ap
(




(X : set)(x : X)(y : X)I(X,x, y)
)
⊥
The formalized version of this demonstration may be relegated to a footnote.175 The
judgement demonstrated asserts that a certain mapping exists from the generality
type (X : set)(x : X)(y : X)I(X,x, y) into the set ⊥. Hence it sanctions a judgement
that can be expressed in scare quotes as follows:
“¬(∀X : set)(∀x : X)(∀y : X)I(X,x, y) true”
6. Formal and material categories
A recurring theme of this chapter has been the distinction between ground types
and higher types. In this final section we consider a related distinction, namely that
between what I shall call, employing Husserlian terminology, formal and material
174On universes, see Martin-Löf (1984, pp. 87–91); the demonstration of c : ¬I(N, 0, s(0)) is given ibid. p.
91. That the assumption of one universe is necessary for this demonstration was proved by Smith (1988).
175We recall that z officially is a unary mapping, yielding a new unary mapping when applied to a set
X, etc. As in the main text, we let c be a proof object of ¬I(N, 0, s(0)). We abbreviate the judgement
z : (X : set)(x : X)(y : X)I(X,x, y) by J. The demonstration is then as follows.
J [ J ] N : set
z(N) : (x : N)(y : N)I(N, x, y) [ J ] 0 : N
z(N)(0) : (y : N)I(N, 0, y) [ J ] s(0) : N
















categories. Formal categories may be thought of as topic-neutral, while material
categories are topical. In the words of Ryle (1954, p. 116), who coined the term
‘topic-neutral’, material categories provide “the fat and the lean,” whereas formal
categories provide the “joints and tendons” of thought. The distinction will here be
discussed in the context of the works of Frege, Husserl, and Carnap.
6.1. Frege’s three realms. Frege in his Der Gedanke (1918) distinguished be-
tween three realms (Reiche) or worlds: the outer world (Außenwelt), the inner world
(Innenwelt), and the third realm (drittes Reich).176 The first is the realm of things
that we access through perception, containing for instance stones, trees, and houses.
The second is the realm of what Frege calls ideas (Vorstellungen), which include both
intentional experiences, such as perceptions, imaginations, and remembrances; and
non-intentional experiences, such as sensations and moods. To the third realm be-
long what Frege calls thoughts. Thoughts differ from things in the first realm in that
we can have no perceptual awareness of them; and from things in the second realm in
not being dependent on any subject for their existence: in Frege’s words, thoughts do
not need a “carrier” (Ged p. 69). Frege had made a similar trifold division already in
the Grundlagen, namely between the spatial or physical; the subjective, or the world
of ideas; and what is objective yet not perceived by the senses. Frege appears to
argue that numbers, since they belong to neither of the first two, must belong to the
third of these realms (GLA §§ 21–27). As objects of a similar status he also mentions
the axis of the earth, the centre of mass of the solar system, and the equator. To the
third realm one should perhaps also count “logical objects” such as the truth-values
and courses-of-values,177 and the primitive functions of the ideography.178 In fact, at
Gg p. xviii Frege allocates concepts in general to what he there calls the domain of
the objective but non-real (ein Gebiet des Objectiven, Nichtwirklichen), which may
be another variant of the third realm.
The division into three realms deserves the title of a categorial division, for it
purports to be a most general division of entities in a general sense of ‘entity’. The
question therefore arises how this division relates to Frege’s simple type hierarchy.179
On the basis of Frege’s writings one can only speculate on an answer; but three
176On the history of the notion of Drittes Reich, see Gabriel (1992). Many of the references to Frege’s
works in what follows I have found in Künne (2010, pp. 486–506, 514–541).
177For the characterization of these as logical objects, see WB p. 121. Numbers are characterized as logical
objects at Gg II § 74.
178The negation function and the identity relation are both said to “belong to logic” at UGG2 p. 428.
179The Nachlass piece known as Aufzeichnungen für Ludwig Darmstaedter (NS pp. 271–277), dated 1919,
shows that Frege also at the time when Der Gedanke was published accepted the distinction between first-
and second-order functions.
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readings suggest themselves. According to the first the three realms divide the domain
of Fregean objects, while functions do not belong to any realm. Instead of one ground
type there would thus be three, corresponding to the three realms. Employing 1, 2,
and 3 as names for the first, second, and third realm respectively the resulting type
structure could be defined as follows: 1, 2, and 3 are types; if τ1, . . . τn are types, then
(τ1 . . . τn)1, (τ1 . . . τn)2, and (τ1 . . . τn)3 are types, namely the types of n-ary functions
from τ1, . . . , τn into 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The three realms effect a partition of
the ground type of objects also on the second and third reading; but unlike the first
reading these readings assign functions to realms. According to the second reading
functions belong to the third realm. The third realm is thus taken to encompass
all types of functions as well as a certain section of the type of objects. The third
ground type is therefore no longer to be equated with the third realm but only with
the objects of the third realm, 3o say. According to the third reading the realm of a
function is the same as the realm of its arguments. This reading therefore requires
that all n-ary functions for n > 1 be homogenous, namely that all the arguments of a
function belong to the same realm. In the literature Künne (2010, p. 505) defends a
version of the first reading, Burge (1992) assumes the second reading, while Dummett
(1982, pp. 120–123) defends a version of the third reading.
All the three readings hold that the ground type of objects is partitioned into three
ground types. This conflicts with the doctrine of the Grundgesetze, where functions
are required to be defined for all objects, for instance addition to be defined for the
Sun (FB p. 20; cf. section 3.2 above). But there are indications that the Frege of the
Grundlagen accepted such a partition. He says for instance that “spatial predicates
are not applicable to ideas” (GLA § 61, cf. § 48); thus, not that spatial predicates are
false of ideas, but that they are not applicable to them. This can only be the case
if ideas and spatial predicates are not of matching types. Frege moreover appears to
regard ‘blue idea’, ‘salty concept’ and ‘chewy judgement’ as category mistakes (§§ 24,
3). This must be explained by the fact that with these expressions one purports to
apply a first realm predicate to a second or third realm object. In the Grundgesetze
(p. xxi), by contrast, Frege remarks that to say of an idea that it is green is false, hence
not nonsensical. We have seen that this is a common account of category mistakes in
later writers, and the one Frege is forced to with his acceptance of a universal domain
of individuals.
In light of these tensions and in light of the motley assortment of entities the third
realm must be taken to include when one juxtaposes the Grundlagen, the Grundge-
setze, and Der Gedanke it seems preferable to regard the various trifold divisions of
these works as distinct, serving distinct theoretical frameworks. It may for instance
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be argued that the third realm of Der Gedanke is the realm of senses. Indeed, in the
contemporaneous Die Verneinung (1919) Frege speaks of “the realm of thoughts and
parts of thoughts” (Vern p. 155). Thus he seems to assume that parts of thoughts just
as thoughts themselves are denizens of the third realm; and these are all and only the
senses of expressions. But if the third realm is the realm of senses, then it does not
include logical objects, since logical objects are not Fregean senses; for the same rea-
son the realm of senses does then not include numbers. In an unpublished piece from
1919 Frege indeed explicitly denies that objects and functions are parts of thoughts
(NS p. 274),180 whence he implicitly denies that objects and functions inhabit the
realm of thoughts and parts of thoughts. The realm of senses cannot therefore be the
realm of the objective but non-real in the Grundlagen and the Grundgestze.
It is indeed doubtful whether everything Frege regards as objective but non-real
in the Grundlagen can reasonably be said to belong to one and the same realm: does
the equator and the number 14, for instance, belong to the same realm? They are
both non-real and objective, but their commonalities would seem to stop there. It
can moreover be questioned whether senses and objects that are not senses, such as
numbers, can be taken to belong to the same realm. It seems odd, for instance, that
the sense of a number expression should belong to the same realm as the number
designated by that expression, for the two are “constituted” in quite different ways,
the one as the object of an act, the other as what provides the direction of that act.
For Frege, however, this may not have seemed odd, for he appears to have viewed
thoughts not as providing the direction of acts, but rather as being the objects of
acts of thinking. To think, according to Frege, is to grasp a thought (Ged p. 62);
and one grasps a thought in an act directed towards that thought (Ged p. 75).181
In such an act a non-sensible capacity, which by operating upon material provided
to it by the senses discloses the first realm, operates without such material, thereby
disclosing the third realm.182 With each realm we may therefore associate a mode of
access to that realm. The first realm is indeed characterized by Frege as the realm
of things that can be perceived by the senses (Ged p. 66) or as the world of sensibly
perceptible things (Ged p. 75). Frege does not seem to have a term for the perception
180Aufzeichnungen (NS p. 274): “Doch sind Gegenstand und Begriff nicht Bestandteile dieses Gendankens.
Die Bestandteile des Gedankens weisen aber in eigentümlicher Weise auf Gegenstand und Begriff hin.”
181“Obgleich zum Bewußtseinsinhalte des Denkenden der Gedanke nicht gehört, muß doch in dem Bewußt-
sein etwas auf den Gedanken hinzielen.” Cf. the commentary of Künne (2010, pp. 514–518) ad loc.
182The capacity in question may be what Frege calls ‘reason’ in GLA §§ 26, 105. Frege’s account of percep-
tion fits the “content-apprehension model” that Husserl assumed for all acts in the Logical Investigations
(cf. Klev, 2013). In Kant’s terminology thoughts would be noumena, “Dinge, die bloß Gegenstände des
Vestandes sind” (KrV A249).
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of one’s ideas, what Locke called reflection,183 but that he recognizes such perception
must be implicit in his speaking of perception by the senses, viz. presumably as a
contrast to inner perception: otherwise the phrase ‘perception by the senses’ would
be a pleonasm, and ‘perception’ would suffice.184 The third realm is accessed by the
act by virtue of which we grasp thoughts.
6.2. Husserl on regions and formal categories. Frege’s pair of notions of
type and realm bears resemblance to Husserl’s pair of notions of formal and mate-
rial category. A formal category may be described as topic-neutral, while material
categories, or regions, may be described as providing the most general topics with
respect to which formal categories are neutral. Such a characterization also fits the
type-theoretical notions of function and ground type respectively. For, although each
function is defined over a single type, and in that sense is not topic-neutral, the no-
tion of function itself is topic-neutral in the sense that given any two types α and β
there is a type (α)β of functions from α to β. The ground types in a type hierarchy
provide topics in the sense that all other types are types of functions of functions
of. . . individuals of some ground type; that is, all other types are ultimately grounded
in one or more ground types. Objects in the simple type hierarchy are thus either
individuals or derived from individuals by means of the “formal category” of ‘function
of’. We have already seen (in section 1.3 above) that Husserl does not adopt a type
hierarchy; but he does think that within each region various entities may be derived
by means of formal categories from the individuals of that region (Ideen I § 10). As
examples of formal categories Husserl lists property, relation, state of affairs, set, num-
ber, part and whole, and others (loc. cit.). These apply in every region and give rise
to the “higher types” of entities of a region, for instance properties of physical things
and states of affairs involving physical things. These higher type entities are equally
part of the region (cf. the third reading on page 176 above, according to which the
realm of a function is the same as the realm of its arguments); a region thus consists
of individuals and categorial derivations of those individuals.
It is a fundamental philosophical problem, according to Husserl, both to find
out what regions there are (Ideen I § 17) and to understand the nature of a given
region and the interdependence of various regions on each other (ibid. § 152). In
order properly to understand the region of consciousness one needs to carry out the
so-called phenomenological reduction; only after that has been done does one have
183Essay II.i.4. Reflection is for Locke contrasted with sensation, by means of which we access the first
realm.
184This point is due to Künne (2010, pp. 488–489).
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before oneself this region in its purity (ibid. § 33). Other regions, which not being
consciousness are regions of transcendent beings (ibid. §§ 41–46), raise the problem
of constitution, namely the problem of describing precisely how objects of that region
present themselves to consciousness, how they are constituted in consciousness (ibid.
§§ 149–153; Ideen II passim). Such is for instance the case with the region of nature,
or physical thing (Ideen II §§ 12–18). Husserl is not quite definitive on what regions
there are other than nature and consciousness, but he clearly does assume that there
are other and that it is a task of phenomenology to find them and to describe them.
Other regions Husserl mentions in the three books known as the Ideas185 include the
region of the body, the region of living beings (animals), the region of persons, and
the region of society and culture (“die Geistige Welt”).186 Husserl’s set of regions
thus offers a refinement of Frege’s first two realms. Fregean senses would for Husserl
either belong to the region of consciousness, this being the region of so-called noemata
(Ideen I § 88), which at least some readers have regarded as the Husserlian pendant to
Fregean senses;187 or to the formal category of meanings, which is the domain of pure
logic, including pure grammar (cf. section 1.3 above). Numbers, as well as sets, do in
any event constitute formal categories according to Husserl. In general it appears that
Frege’s third realm in the Husserlian scheme should be distributed over the region of
consciousness and various formal categories.
In the first chapter of the Ideas Husserl gives a definition of the notion of a re-
gion.188 Put concisely, a region is a highest genus under which essentially independent
entities fall. This definition relies on Husserl’s doctrine of so-called essences (Wesen),
which we may think of as a sort of objectified concepts (Ideen I §§ 1–7). Essences
stand in relations of genus and species (ibid. § 12). Moreover, some essences are
dependent and others are independent, namely if and only if a particular standing
under that essence is dependent or independent, respectively (ibid. § 15; LU III); an
individual is a particular standing under an independent essence. Regions are highest
185Cf. the remark on these works on p. xiv above.
186In lecture notes from 1917/18 Husserl speaks of a region of valued being (“Wertsein”) that should be
coordinated with the “value-free” regions of nature, consciousness, etc. (Husserl, 1996, p. 297). It seems
to me to fit better with Husserl’s doctrine, both that of regions and that of axiology, that “axiological
categories” should stand, not coordinated to regions, but rather as the formal categories stand to regions:
they are applicable in all regions, transforming whatever they apply to into valued objects of various sorts.
187The locus classicus for this interpretation is Føllesdal (1969). The noema involves several components
that we would presumably not find in Fregean senses, in particular “thetic character” and saturation (Ideen
I §§ 132–133); the pendant of Fregean senses is thus rather what Husserl calls noematic sense (ibid. §§ 129–
130). Husserl was anxious to distinguish the pure region of consciousness from the domain of study of
psychology, so this reading of Fregean senses need not be a piece of psychologism. Woodruff Smith (1995,
p. 331) expressly links Frege’s third realm and Husserl’s noemata.
188For an instructive discussion of this definition, see Stone (2000, pp. 97–131).
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independent essences (Ideen I § 16). Husserl in fact distinguishes the notion of a
region and the notion of a material category. A region gives rise to what Husserl calls
a regional ontology, an a priori science of the region in question. A material category
is a primitive concept of a regional ontology (loc. cit.). Husserl seems also to have
assumed that any highest genus which is not itself a region is a dependent part of a
region. Spatial form (Raumgestalt), for instance, is a dependent genus; and it, as well
as any higher genus it may fall under, is a dependent part of the region of nature,
since any physical thing has a spatial form.
Husserl’s definition of regions does not play any significant role in how he actually
deals with this notion. Instead of discussing that definition in detail, it is therefore
more instructive to consider some of the characteristics Husserl in his employment
of the notion takes regions to have. We shall see that characteristics that we have
considered earlier in this dissertation, such as being the range of significance of a
propositional function, being the range of a quantifier, and being associated with
criteria of application and identity are not among these. A first characteristic Husserl
takes regions to have is related to the idea that regions are highest genera. A region
is namely said to prescribe a rule for how we may vary an individual of that region
in imagination so that it still remains an individual, in other words, so that we still
have a unitary course of experience of an individual (Ideen I §§ 142, 149, 150; Ideen
III § 7). Less general concepts, for instance the concept of a diamond, may also
be regarded as prescribing a rule for the course of experience, for instance that the
thing posited as a diamond does not bounce back in our hands in the manner of a
bouncy ball when we let it fall to the ground. But we can still imagine a continuous
transformation of the diamond into a bouncy ball without our experience falling
apart into a series of disconnected appearances; in fact we can imagine the diamond
continuously transformed into any other physical thing, namely so long as we remain
inside the region of nature. Husserl’s discussion of imaginative variation in the cited
paragraphs rely on the region in question being that of nature, but he appears to have
thought that the discussion would generalize to other regions.
A second characteristic of regions concerns “access,” a topic we have already
discussed in connection with Frege’s realms. For each region there is an original
mode of awareness of entities of that region (Ideen I § 138). In the case of nature
that is ordinary perception (e.g. loc. cit.). This is an original mode of awareness in
contrast for instance to remembrances and imaginings of things in nature (ibid. § 99),
in which the object is not present there before us. In the case of consciousness the
original mode of awareness is reflection (ibid. §§ 77–78); this, however, is not naive
reflection, but rather what one may call phenomenological reflection, involving the
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phenomenological reduction, for only when this is carried out can pure consciousness
be disclosed (ibid. § 50). One becomes aware of the body in what Husserl calls bodily
apprehension (Ideen II § 36; Ideen III § 2). The individuals in the region of the
body are localized sensations, namely sensations localized in the body. In order to
apprehend these sensations a special form of apprehension is required, since usually
the sensations are apprehended as things in the outer world. I touch this table; I
then speak of the sensations in my fingers on the basis of bodily sensations, but of
the surface of the table on the basis of a perceptive apprehension. It is in the former
sort of apprehension, which according to Husserl also applies for the other senses,
that I am aware of the body as a region. We are aware of animals and persons
by forms of empathy (Einfühlung) (e.g. Ideen I § 151). Thus we speak of “seeing”
sorrow or joy in our fellow human beings, and to some extent also in other living
beings. It appears that for Husserl also the region of culture is accessed through a
form of empathy. The formal categories crosscut the regions, hence the proper mode
of awareness of formal categories do not conflict with the proper modes of awareness
of regions. Rather, Husserl held that any intuition can be categorially formed so
that we can see not only the individuals of a region, but also its higher type entities,
notably states of affairs. This is Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition, developed
in LU VI §§ 40–66. ‘Intuition’ here designates an act in which the object is given with
a certain amount of liveliness and saturation, and contrasts with what Husserl calls
signitive acts; any act of original awareness of a region is an intuition (e.g. LU VI
§§ 14, 25–27). Categorial forms of intuition are therefore the intuitional counterparts
to forms of meaning in Husserl’s sense (cf. section 1.3 above); and categorially formed
intuitions are the counterparts to complex meanings (ibid. §§ 62–63).
A third characteristic of regions concern their relation to sciences. A region gives
rise to several “ontologies,” that is, to a priori sciences of concepts that compose the
region (Ideen I §§ 9, 16). In the case of nature, there is for instance geometry as the
ontology of space, and there should likewise be ontologies of time and of matter, since
space, time, and matter are all involved in the constitution of physical objects. As
a matter of fact, most ontologies have not been developed in any systematic fashion,
but such developments are in principle possible. Any empirical science studies objects
of some domain, and that domain stands under a region. An empirical science ac-
cordingly assumes the results of the ontologies associated with their respective region
(ibid. §§ 8,9); thus, natural science assumes the results of geometry, or more generally
the results of the ontologies of nature. Formal ontology and formal logic, the a priori
sciences of the formal categories, are assumed by all sciences, whatever their domain,
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for formal categories apply in all regions. This concludes our discussion of the three
characteristics of regions.
The topic-neutrality characteristic of formal categories may be regarded as a
certain notion of generality: formal categories apply across all regions. The regions
themselves enjoy another sort of generality, namely that pertaining to highest genera.
Husserl does not draw attention to these distinct notions of generality, but he does
make a related distinction between what he calls formalization and generalization
(Ideen I § 13; LU III § 24). Formalization, which Husserl also calls pure categorial
abstraction (LU VI § 60), is what we carry out when passing from an entity to its
formal category purely as a form or schema. In order to achieve this we replace the
“material elements” of the entity by “empty forms” (Leerformen). This is, for instance,
the operation we carry out when passing from a presentation of geometry in which
the primitive terms have their intuitive, geometrical meaning to a presentation in the
style of Hilbert (1899), in which the primitive terms are replaced by variables and
the theory becomes “schematic.”189 The reverse operation, in which the empty forms
are “filled,” Husserl calls de-formalization (Entformalisierung) or substantivazation
(Versachlichung). In generalization we pass from the essence of an entity to a genus
of it; continued generalization leads ultimately to a highest genus, which is a region
in case the entity in question is independent. The reverse operation of generalization
is specialization.
Since the formal categories crosscut the regions, both generalization and formal-
ization make sense for any entity; in other words, any entity has both a formal and
a material category. This reflects the fact that any entity is made up of both formal
and material elements. Since no distinction between form and matter is made in
function–argument syntax, neither does it come equipped at the outset with a set of
formal and material categories. As has already been suggested above, there are nev-
ertheless natural candidates for serving these roles in the simple type hierarchy: the
notions of individual and function may serve as formal categories, while the ground
types may serve as material categories. With the distinction between formal and
material categories in place we can also make sense of the notions of formalization
and generalization. Formalization in the simple type hierarchy is applicable to any
entity and yields either of the two formal categories. Generalization applies only to
189Cf. the following remark of Hilbert from lecture notes dated 1894 (Hallett and Majer, 2004, p. 104):
Unsere Theorie liefert nur das Schema der Begriffe, die durch die unabänderliche
Gesetze der Logik mit einander verknüpft sind. Es bleibt dem menschlichen Ver-
stande überlassen, wie er dieses Schema auf die Erscheinung anwendet, wie er es
mit Stoff anfüllt.
Hilbert makes a similar remark in a letter to Frege (WB p. 69).
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individuals, or rather, to sorts of individuals; or at least it will apply to sorts when
one has superimposed a genus/species hierarchy on each ground type, for instance
in the manner envisaged by Dummett (cf. p. 164ff. above). A ground type is then a
highest genus, or an ultimate sortal, that divides into more and more specific sortals.
Generalization means moving upward in this hierarchy, and specialization downwards.
According to a traditional interpretation Aristotle’s categories are highest genera
(cf. chapter 1 section 2). Kant’s categories, by contrast, are described as forms of
thought (cf. chapter 1 section 5.1) Here we could thus speak of material and formal
categories respectively. It would be mistaken, however, to think that Husserl with his
distinction of material and formal categories synthesizes the doctrines of Aristotle and
Kant. Firstly, none of Aristotle’s categories could be regarded as Husserlian material
categories. In the greater scheme of things Aristotle’s primary substances correspond
to Husserlian individuals;190 hence the Aristotelian category of substance splits into
all the various Husserlian regions, since these are precisely the highest genera under
which individuals fall. The Aristotelian category of quality would presumably split
into various material categories associated with the regions of nature and conscious-
ness. Number is in the Aristotelian category of quantity, but for Husserl it is a formal
category. Secondly, the role categories play in Kant’s philosophy differs from the role
formal categories play in Husserl’s philosophy.191 For Kant the categories are concepts
of “pure synthesis” (KrV A78/B104). For Husserl, as well, the formal categories are
concepts of synthesis. The synthesis corresponding to Husserl’s formal categories,
however, has a much narrower scope than the synthesis corresponding to Kant’s cat-
egories. The latter is involved in any act; in order, for instance, to perceive objects at
all the mind must synthesize a “manifold of intuition,” namely by bringing it under the
categories. According to Kant, the unity of an object does not lie in the object itself,
to be extracted from it by perception, but is an achievement of the understanding, by
virtue of which the object has unity in the first place.192 The synthesis corresponding
to Husserl’s formal categories, by contrast, is involved only in acts whose objects are
higher-level, such as sets and states of affairs. The mind is in general not active in
bringing about the unity of objects. The colour and the spatial form of this table,
for instance, are not connected by the mind, but are given to it already connected.
Likewise, the many “snapshots” I make of the table as I regard it from different sides
190Stone (2000, p. 129) accepts this identification.
191On this point, see De Palma (2010).
192E.g. KrV B134–135: “Verbindung liegt aber nicht in den Gegenständen, und kann von ihnen nicht etwa
durch Wahrnehmung entlehnt und in den Verstand dadurch allererst aufgenommen werden, sondern ist
allein eine Verrichtung des Verstandes, der selbst nichts weiter ist, als das Vermögen, a priori zu verbinden,
und das Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen unter Einheit der Apperzeption zu bringen.” Cf. B129–130.
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are not synthesized in the way higher-level objects are synthesized from other objects.
We may think of the latter as an active form of synthesis, while the former is passive
(LU VI § 47; Ideen II § 9). Kant does not have this distinction between active and
passive synthesis.193 He therefore regards all experience as categorially formed; for
Husserl, by contrast, only the experience of higher-level objects is categorially formed.
6.3. Formal and material categories in Carnap’s Aufbau. We suggested
that in the simple type hierarchy the ground types are material categories and the
notions of individual and function are formal categories. In Der logische Aufbau der
Welt (1928) Carnap suggests a different view: material categories form strata in a
simple type hierarchy. Thus, the ground type or types, as well as perhaps some
functions of ground type, and functions thereof, etc. constitute one material category.
Moving higher up in the hierarchy we find another material category; and so on. The
aim of this section is to get a more precise picture of this idea.
The type hierarchy Carnap assumes has the structure he defines in his Abriß der
Logistik (1929).194 There is one ground type; if α1, . . . , αn are types, then (α1, . . . , αn)
is a type, namely the type of n-ary relations whose i-th argument is of type αi. The
programme of the Aufbau is to show that all entities whatsoever, all entities in the
“world” referred to in the title of the book, are elements of a certain simple type hi-
erarchy of this structure (e.g. §§ 1, 26). The ground type of the hierarchy consists of
what Carnap calls basic experiences (Elementarerlebnisse), namely a subject’s expe-
riences “in their totality and complete unity” (§ 67).195 In addition Carnap assumes as
given one non-logical constant relation over the type of elementary experiences. This
is the relation holding between basic experiences x and y if the reproduction of x in
recollection is similar to y (§ 78). On this basis, Carnap argues, one should be able
to define classes and relations playing the role of “rational reconstructions” (§§ 100,
143) of all other denizens of the world, that is, one should be able to construct the
world.196
The world is for Carnap divided into various kinds of objects (Gegenstandsarten)
(§§ 17–25). The kinds that play a role in Carnap’s construction are, in Husserlian
terminology, the regions of consciousness, nature, other subjects, and culture. These
regions stand in a strict order of epistemic priority: consciousness is epistemically
193Husserl criticized Kant for this already in (Husserl, 1891, p. 41).
194Cf. footnote 21 above with the text footnoted there.
195That they are the experiences of a subject, also called by Carnap the Ausgangssubjekt (§ 66), is seen only
after the constitution of the world has been completed; in themselves the basic experiences are subjectless
(§ 65).
196The construction becomes a logical construction only with “the elimination of the primitive relation”
(§§ 153–155).
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prior to nature; nature is epistemically prior to other subjects; the region of other
subjects is epistemically prior to culture (§ 58). Carnap requires that his construction
of the world conform to this epistemic order (loc. cit.). That is the reason why he
chooses a section of the region of consciousness as the ground type of the construction
(§ 60). The construction might succeed as well with a ground type of nature, but such
a construction would not respect the order of epistemic priority among the regions
(§ 59). That the construction as a whole conforms to this order is, however, not
secured simply by the choice of ground type; in addition at least the following two
requirements must be met.
(i) It need not, and usually will not, be the case that all elements of a type are
used in the construction of the world. Let us write u(α), the use of α, for those
elements of type α employed in the construction. The first requirement says that all
elements of u(α) belong to the same region. This is a requirement of purity: no type
should be separated by two regions.
(ii) Given requirement (i), the epistemic priority among the four regions induces
a partial order on types: β ≤ α if and only if no element of u(α) is epistemically prior
to an element of u(β). For instance, if u(β) falls in the region of nature and u(α)
in the region of other subjects, then we have β ≤ α. If u(α) falls in the region of
consciousness, however, then we have β 6≤ α. Let us call the trace of a type the set
of all types involved in its construction from the ground type. With ι as name of the
ground type, the trace tr(α) of a type α can be defined inductively as follows:
tr(ι) := ∅
tr((α1, . . . , αn)) :=
⋃
{{α1, . . . , αn}, tr(α1), . . . , tr(αn)}





= {((ι), ι), (ι), ι}
The second requirement says that we should have β ≤ α for all types β in tr(α).
Thus, if β ∈ tr(α), then the objects in u(β) are not epistemically prior to the objects
in u(α).
Carnap does not spell out these requirements in his book. He expressly states
that the converse of (i) is false: not all objects of the same kind belong to one and
the same type (§ 29). One may perhaps assume that he would have done the same
about (i) itself if he thought it to be false as well; and he does say that elements of the
region of culture are always of a type different from elements of consciousness (§§ 56,
151). Requirement (ii) would seem to be a minimal condition on the construction if





?level k + l +m+ n —
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Culturelevel k + l +m —
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Figure 2. Carnap’s construction of the world?
of the idea that in the construction of an element a we shall not need to refer to an
element to which a, in view of its region, is epistemically prior.
That Carnap entertained a picture of the construction of the world in which the
two requirements are met is suggested by what he says about levels of constitution
(§ 41). Constitution is another word for definition (§ 38),197 and the level of constitu-
tion of an entity is the level in the type hierarchy at which a rational reconstruction of
the entity is defined. Carnap had defined the notion of level in a simple type hierarchy
in the Abriß (p. 32).198 The level ` of the ground type is 0; the level of a higher type
(α1, . . . , αn) is defined by
`
(
(α1, . . . , αn)
)
:= max{`(α1), . . . , `(αn)}+ 1
In the picture Carnap appears to entertain the regions respect levels: it holds that
if `(β) < `(α), then β ≤ α.
We thus have a situation as in Figure 2. The first few levels make up the region
of consciousness. The levels after consciousness make up the region of nature, the
197It has been argued by Mayer (1991, pp. 292–295) and Rosado Haddock (2008, pp. 42–48) that Carnap
takes over Husserl’s notion of constitution. But to define a rational reconstruction of an object (Carnapian
constitution) is quite different from describing how the object presents itself to consciousness (Husserlian
constitution). Carnap is in fact explicit that constitution need only preserve the logical, and not the
cognitive, value of propositions regarding the object (Aufbau § 50).
198Carnap’s notion of level does not coincide with Frege’s notion of level (Gg §§ 21–24), which applies
to an n-ary function only if all its arguments are of the same level (otherwise the function is said to be
ungleichstufig). Neither does it coincide with the notion of order in the Principia (PM pp. 52–55), which is
designed for the ramified hierarchy (Church’s definition of this notion of order is given on page 101 above).
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following levels make up the region of other subjects, and finally comes the levels
of culture. Whereas each region thus takes up only finitely many levels, the type
hierarchy continues into infinity; at levels above those making up the region of culture
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Kemp, A. (1987). The Tekhnē Grammatikē of Dionysius Thrax: English translation
with introduction and notes. In Taylor, D. J., editor, The History of Linguistics in
the Classical Period, pages 169–190. John Benjamins, Amsterdam.
Klein, C. (2004). Carnap on categorial concepts. In Awodey, S. and Klein, C., editors,
Carnap Brought Home: The View of Jena, pages 295–316. Open Court, Chicago.
Klev, A. (2011). Dedekind and Hilbert on the foundations of the deductive sciences.
Review of Symbolic Logic, 4:645–681.
198
Klev, A. (2013). Form of apprehension and the content-apprehension model in
Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 16:49–
69.
Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. (1962). The Development of Logic. Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
Knudsen, C. (1982). Intentions and impositions. In Kretzmann, N., Kenny, A., and
Pinborg, J., editors, The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pages
479–495. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Kretzmann, N. (1966). William of Sherwood’s Introduction to Logic. Translated with
an introduction and notes. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Kretzmann, N. (1968). William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words.
Translated with an introduction and notes. University of Minnesota Press.
Kretzmann, N. (1974). Aristotle on spoken sounds significant by convention. In
Corcoran, J., editor, Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations, pages 3–21.
Reidel, Dordrecht.
Kretzmann, N. (1982). Syncategoremata, exponibilia, sophismata. In Kretzmann,
N., Kenny, A., and Pinborg, J., editors, The Cambridge History of Later Medieval
Philosophy, pages 211–245. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Künne, W. (2010). Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges. Vittorio Klostermann,
Frankfurt am Main.
Lallot, J. (1989). La Grammaire de Denys le Thrace. Traduite et annotée. Éditions
du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris.
Lambek, J. (1958). The mathematics of sentence structure. The American Mathe-
matical Monthly, 65:154–170.
Lambert, K. (1968). On the no type theory of significance. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 46:79–86.
Lappin, S. (1981). Sorts, Ontology, and Metaphor. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
Law, V. and Sluiter, I. (1995). Introduction. In Law, V. and Sluiter, I., editors,
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Zoals de titel van dit proefschrift aanduidt vormt het begrip logische syntaxis de
leidraad voor dit onderzoek over categorieën. Het wordt betoogd dat zowel Aristoteles’
als Kants categorieën gelieerd zijn aan de traditionele logische syntaxis, die ‘S is P ’
als grondvorm aanneemt; en dat typentheorie gelieerd is aan de functie–argument
syntaxis, die f(a) als grondvorm aanneemt. Het proefschrift is opgedeeld in twee
hoofdstukken, het eerste verbonden door de traditionele logische syntaxis, het tweede
door de functie–argument syntaxis.
In het eerste hoofdstuk worden een aantal traditionele categorieënleren bestu-
deerd, met name de leer van Aristoteles, die van Kant en de grammaticale leer van
woordsoorten. Aristoteles’ categorieënleer vormt de kern van onze beschouwing. Zo-
wel de leer van Kant als de grammaticale leer van woordsoorten worden vanuit deze
kern benaderd.
In de eerste afdeling van het eerste hoofdstuk vragen wij naar de aard van de
entiteiten die onder Aristoteles’ categorieën vallen. Volgens onze interpretatie zijn
dat termen in de zin van de syllogistiek. Uitgangspunt van de tweede afdeling is de
overgeleverde interpretatie van Aristoteles’ categorieën als de hoogste genera. Het
begrip genus maakt deel uit van de vier of vijf zogeheten predikabilieën, wiens leer
hier ook wordt besproken. In tegenstelling tot de traditie beweren wij dat Aristote-
les’ categorieën geen hoogste genera zijn, maar dat zij veeleer als louter klassen van
termen moeten worden beschouwd. De vraag of de entiteiten die onder Aristoteles’
categorieën vallen linguïstische of ontische wezens zijn wordt in afdeling drie benaderd
door een debat over dezelfde vraag uit de late Oudheid. In een verwant hedendaags
debat beweren enkele vooraanstaande Aristoteles-geleerden dat er een verschil bestaat
tussen de lijst van categorieën in hoofdstuk 4 van het boek Categorieën en die van
hoofdstuk I.9 van de Topica: de eerste is ontisch van karakter, de tweede linguïstisch.
Wij geven ons bezwaar tegen deze lezing. In de vierde afdeling wordt de leer van de
woordsoorten historisch voorgesteld en de samenhang (of de afwezigheid daarvan) tus-
sen woordsoorten aan de ene kant en zowel Stoische als Aristotelische categorieën aan
de andere kant besproken. In de traditionele grammatica en logica wordt het verschil
gemaakt tussen de zogeheten categorematische en syncategorematische woordsoorten.
De verscheidene karakteristieken van de syncategorematica worden in dezelfde afde-
ling uiteengezet en vormen in de volgende afdeling het uitgangspunt van onze lezing
van Kants categorieën. Hun relatie tot de Aristotelische categorieën is namelijk verge-
lijkbaar met die tussen de syncategorematica en de categorematica. Kants beroemde
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kritiek op Aristoteles’ categorieënlijst luidt dat die zonder enige principes waren “bij-
eengeraapt.” Aan het eind van afdeling vijf bespreken wij een aantal pogingen van
Aristoteles-commentatoren om een dergelijk principe te vinden.
In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt de typentheorie in haar diverse verschijningen be-
studeerd: de simpele en vertakte typenhïerarchie, typen als significantiebereiken van
propositionele functies, en typen in de zin van Martin-Löfs constructieve typentheorie.
In de eerste afdeling wordt de simpele typenhïerarchie uiteengezet, zowel haar
logisch-ontologische uitwerking, die naar Frege teruggaat, als haar grammaticale uit-
werking, die naar Ajdukiewicz teruggaat. Hier wordt ook de relatie tussen de simpele
typenhïerarchie en het zogeheten ontologische vierkant besproken. In afdeling twee
stellen wij aan de hand van voorbeelden de vertakte typenhïerarchie voor en voeren
wij vervolgens het zeer belangrijke begrip significantiebereik in. De interpretatie van
typen als significantiebereiken wordt uitvoerig besproken. Uit de discussie in afdeling
drie over het significantiebegrip wordt echter duidelijk dat dit begrip te vaag is om
als grondslag te dienen voor een typentheorie. Niettemin heeft men het begrip signifi-
cantiebereik nodig: geen functie geeft voor alle individueën een waarde. Wat wij een
typenpredikatie zullen noemen is een oordeel wiens predikaat een categorie of type is.
Wij bespreken in afdeling vier meerdere hardnekkige filosofische problemen die met
typenpredikaties verbonden zijn. Ook betogen wij dat deze problemen in de construc-
tieve typentheorie een oplossing vinden. In de twee laatste afdelingen worden enkele
begrippen die met het typenbegrip nauw verwant zijn ter sprake gebracht. Het eerste
is het begrip soort (sortal in het Engels), dat in hedendaagse discussies over identiteit
een belangrijke rol speelt. In dit verband worden ook de begrippen algemeenheid en
kwantificatie besproken. Uitgangspunt voor de laatste afdeling is Husserls onderschei-
ding tussen formele en materiele categorieën. Dit onderscheid wordt vergeleken met
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